Leisure, Household Production, Consumption and Economic Well-being by Gørtz, Mette
u n i ve r s i t y  o f  co pe n h ag e n  
Københavns Universitet
Leisure, Household Production, Consumption and Economic Well-being
Gørtz, Mette
Publication date:
2006
Document version
Peer reviewed version
Citation for published version (APA):
Gørtz, M. (2006). Leisure, Household Production, Consumption and Economic Well-being. Cph.: Department of
Economics, University of Copenhagen. Rød Serie, No. 118
Download date: 02. Feb. 2020
PhD Thesis No. 149 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Leisure, Household Production, Consumption  
and Economic Well-being 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
Mette Gørtz 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
May 2006 
Department of Economics  
University of Copenhagen 
Studiestraede 6, DK-1455 Copenhagen 
www.econ.ku.dk 
  
 
Leisure, Household Production, 
Consumption and Economic Well-being 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mette Gørtz 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ph.D. thesis 
Department of Economics 
University of Copenhagen 
 
 
 
January 2006 
 
Preface 
This collection of essays constitute my Ph.D. thesis on “Leisure, Household 
Production, Consumption and Economic Well-being”. The research for the thesis was 
carried out while I was a Ph.D. student at University of Copenhagen. 
I would like to take this opportunity to thank colleagues, friends and family for 
support and encouragement throughout the project. I am indebted to my supervisors, 
Martin Browning and Allan Würtz, for their inspiration and readiness to discuss 
numerous aspects of my papers. I also want to thank my colleagues at Centre of Applied 
Microeconometrics (CAM) for contributing to an inspiring and stimulating research 
environment. 
During my time as a Ph.D. student I visited the Department of Economics at 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. I am grateful to Robert Willis for inviting me and 
for inspiring discussions of my research. I also want to thank colleagues at Department 
of Economics and Institute of Social Research (ISR) for valuable help, comments and 
feed-back. I thank the Euroclear Foundation, Knud Højgaards Fond, Oticon Fonden and 
Konsul Axel Nielsens Mindelegat for sponsoring my stay in Michigan. 
Finally, I would like to thank my family for their encouragement, help and support. I 
am truly indebted to my husband, Torsten, and my children, Ida, Anders and Asta, for 
moving to Michigan with me for six months. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mette Gørtz 
 
Copenhagen, January 2006  
 
 
Contents 
 
Introduction 
 
 
1 
Chapter 1:  
Household Production in the Family - Work or Pleasure?  
 
 
8 
Chapter 2:  
Spending Time and Money within the Household 
 
 
45 
Chapter 3:  
Ageing and Well-being: Consumption and Time Use of Elderly 
Americans 
 
 
 
82 
Chapter 4:  
Heterogeneity in Preferences and Productivity –  
Implications for Retirement 
 
 
 
111 
 
     
 
 
Introduction 
Why use time on time use? 
"Time is money" is a widely used expression. Still, the majority of economic theory 
and statistics on economic agents’ allocation of time is devoted to the time spent in 
relation to the labour market. Other uses of time are usually calculated residually as 
leisure time. However, it is becoming increasingly acknowledged that time spent both in 
and outside the labour market is important from an economic perspective. Time spent on 
home production, transportation etc. is important from a production side perspective, and 
the calculation of "real leisure", i.e. people's spare time after correcting for housework, 
do-it-yourself, transportation etc. is important for welfare analyses. Time use data are 
essential for analysing household living standards and intra-household allocation of 
resources and distribution of real income. Furthermore, time use data are crucially 
important when analysing the effects of policy changes on household decisions with 
respect to labour supply decisions in the market, domestic production, consumption and 
saving. For a recent discussion, cf. Apps (2003). 
The first systematic collection of time use data dates back to USSR 1924, but 
systematic attempts to collect methodologically comparable data for a large number of 
countries were not conducted until the 1960s, cf. Juster and Stafford (1991). There is an 
extensive literature on which methodologies are superior when conducting time use 
surveys. Basically, surveys are either conducted as "time diaries" or as "stylized" time 
use surveys. In time diaries, people are asked about their actual activities (by e.g. every 
10 or 15 minutes) for the last 24 hours. In stylized time use surveys, people are asked 
more generally about their habbits, i.e. "how much time do you normally spend on 
cooking/cleaning/transportation/do-it-yourself-work..." etc. Generally, time diaries give 
better (more reliable) information on average time spent on different activities, but with 
larger standard errors, especially for non-frequent activities as home-repairs and do-it-
yourself work. Whereas stylized time use surveys show smaller variance at the 
individual level, but with a tendency of less reliable averages. In particular, stylized time 
use questions may lead to a higher time use on sub-activities than diary-based surveys. 
In certain cases, stylized methods may yield a week with considerably more than 168 
hours of activity reported. For an extensive discussion of methodological issues, see 
Juster and Stafford (1991). In the 1990'es, much effort was put into developing unified 
methods at the European level. These methods have been implemented in more recent 
time use surveys. Bonke (2005) provides a discussion on drawbacks and advantages of 
diary and questionnaire techniques applied in a recent Danish time survey from 2001. 
Time allocation data have served two main research purposes. At the macro level, 
time data have been used in social accounting systems. A large part of production takes 
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place outside the market, and the output of this production is therefore not priced in the 
market. Often there are no accounts of this production. Or the production is measured by 
its input, i.e. time spent in activities outside the market. The size of the non-market 
sector, i.e. home production, "black" labour market activities etc. varies across countries. 
As there are large cross-country differences on activities belonging to the market versus 
home production or the informal economy, studies attempting to measure and compare 
economic output and welfare across countries have tried to incorporate measures of 
production in all sectors. This aspect is particularly important when comparing 
industrialized versus developing countries. Thus, attempts to perform "satellite accounts" 
related to the formal national account systems have been performed in a number of 
countries. 
At the micro level, time use data are increasingly used to describe and model 
household behaviour. Many of the earlier studies are of a descriptive nature. Juster and 
Stafford (1991) provide a survey of studies before 1990. In the last decade, a number of 
micro based studies on household time allocation have emerged. A recent survey is 
provided by Apps (2003). Hamermesh and Pfann (2005) underline the importance of 
more economic analysis of time use and emphasize that economists can contribute in 
describing individual allocation of time. 
Becker (1965) made an important contribution to consumption theory by underlining 
the role of time in consumption of goods and services. For example, consuming a meal is 
not valued only as food expenditure, one has to add the value of the time spent 
consuming the meal. Likewise, the utility of going to the theatre is not merely the price 
of the theatre tickets, but also the time spent enjoying the play.  
Gronau (1977, 1980, 1986) emphasized the need to deal more explicitly with time as 
an input in the production of goods and services consumed in the household than it had 
been done previously. Gronau developed the classical household production model 
which is a cornerstone in household production theory. Gronau’s model provides an 
essential contribution by explicitly accounting for housework in a household production 
model. Much of the work in this thesis builds on Gronau’s household production model. 
 
Chapter 1: Household Production in the Family – 
Work or Pleasure? 
The classical household production model assumes that the household acts as one 
decision-making unit when it comes to decisions on consumption, allocation of time etc., 
i.e. a so-called “unitary” model. The unitary model is important as it sets the scene for 
analysing the important trade-offs between time spent in different activities. More recent 
extensions to the classical household production model have focused on possible 
recreational pleasures of performing household production, see Graham and Greene 
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(1984) and Kooreman and Kerkhofs (2003). Chapter 1 builds on the classical household 
production model and discusses the possible extensions related to benefits of household 
production beyond the “market” value of the household product. The extra utility may be 
in the form of leisure which is (primarily) enjoyed by the person undertaking the 
activity. We name these “activity benefits”. Examples of this include childcare, 
gardening and do-it-yourself projects. Chapter 1 applies a household production model 
which explicitly incorporates “activity benefits” in the joint allocation of time for 
husband and wife. The model is tested empirically on data from a Danish time use 
survey from 2001 which has information on time spent in household production for both 
partners in some 600 Danish households. The model is analyzed in two different 
estimation frameworks: the General Method of Moments for a system of equations 
(GMM 3SLS) and Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML), and we conclude that 
GMM is the most appropriate estimation tool. Thus, the paper suggests a more flexible 
estimation framework than used previously. There is no significant evidence of “activity 
benefits” for men in household production, but there are some weak signs of the 
presence of such extra benefits for women. The paper contributes to the existing 
literature on household production by providing an extensive discussion of the 
identification issues involved. One important problem is that the benefits we identify are 
not necessarily related to the household production activity, i.e. “activity benefits”, but 
could just as well be due to the fact that households may attach extra value to goods 
produced by themselves rather than by someone else. We call these “consumption 
benefits”. We illustrate that the outcome of “activity benefits” and “consumption 
benefits” may be observationally equivalent. 
 
Chapter 2: Spending Time and Money within the 
Household 
In the last 15 years, there has been growing focus on the fact that households do not 
necessarily maximize one common utility function. More plausibly, the household 
members each have separate utility functions. This idea has led to a number of different 
approaches to intra-household decision making; see Browning, Chiappori and Lechene 
(2005) for references. One particularly popular approach is to assume that, however 
decisions are made, the outcome is always Pareto-efficient, see Chiappori (1988), Apps 
and Rees (1988) and Browning and Chiappori (1998). This assumption is central in the 
"collective" model where the distribution of “power” within the household is an 
important factor in determining intra-household allocation. 
Chapter 2, which is a joint paper with Martin Browning, sets out to compare the 
predictions on household allocation in a unitary versus a collective setting. We argue in 
the paper that a full picture of the intra-household distribution of material well-being 
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requires information on the allocation of both time and expenditure. The research 
question we address in the paper is illustrated by the following example. Consider a 
household comprising of a married couple in which the wife works more (in the home 
and in the market) as compared to other women with similar characteristics, wage of 
husband and wife and household financial situation. If we observe that she receives more 
goods than we would predict, then we could attribute the observation to her having a 
high taste for goods relative to leisure. This explanation is fully consistent with the 
unitary model. If, on the other hand, she also receives fewer goods, then it looks as 
though she lacks “power” in the household, which is an indication of the collective 
framework being a better description of household decision making. We develop a 
theoretical framework for this problem and present an empirical analysis based on the 
Danish time use survey from 2001. The Danish time use survey is unique in having both 
time use data and information on the intra-household allocation of goods for the same 
households. Our results provide evidence in favour of the collective model being the 
most appropriate framework for describing the intra-household allocation of time and 
goods. 
 
Chapter 3: Ageing and Well-being: Consumption and 
Time Use of Elderly Americans 
Chapter 3 and 4 further explore the importance of observing both time use and 
expenditure when measuring household well-being. This is particularly important when 
comparing welfare across individuals in different life stages. Chapter 3 and chapter 4 use 
data from the Consumption and Mail Activities Survey (CAMS, which is part of the US 
Health and Retirement Study, HRS) to study trends in consumption and time use around 
retirement in the US.  
The main objective of chapter 3 is to study how the value of time spent in household 
production and leisure affects economic well-being. Based on the 2003 Consumption 
and Mail Activities Survey (CAMS), we observe that the level of expenditure is lower 
for non-retired people, while levels of housework and leisure are higher. Expenditure 
and housework are decreasing with age, while leisure is increasing with age for both 
groups. Inequality in expenditure is higher for the group of retired households as 
compared to the group of non-retired households. However, while the elderly and retired 
seem to be less well off in terms of consumption goods bought in the market, they are 
generally “richer” in terms of time for household production or leisure. Thus, broadening 
our concept of economic well-being to include first the value of household production 
and secondly the value of leisure reduces economic inequality among the elderly.  
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Chapter 4: Heterogeneity in Preferences and 
Productivity – Implications for Retirement 
Several studies identify a fall in expenditure around retirement which seems difficult 
to explain in the context of the standard lifecycle model. Chapter 4 discusses the 
determinants of the retirement decision and the implications of retirement on economic 
well-being. The main contribution of the paper is to formulate the role of individual 
heterogeneity explicitly. There may be individual heterogeneity in 1) Productivity of 
market work versus housework, 2) Preferences for leisure versus consumption, 3) 
Marginal utility of wealth. We argue that unobserved heterogeneity in preferences, 
productivity and the marginal utility of wealth is correlated with the retirement decision.  
Data from CAMS for 2001 and 2003 are applied to study the differences in 
individual choices of expenditure, household production and leisure over age and across 
the groups of retired versus non-retired. The unobserved individual heterogeneity factor 
is isolated by comparing cross-sectional evidence and panel data estimates of the effects 
of retirement on consumption and time allocation. Based on cross-section data, we can 
identify a lower consumption for the retired, but when we exploit the panel nature of the 
data, the negative effect of retirement on consumption is smaller and insignificant. 
Moreover, the analysis points to a large positive effect of retirement on household 
production. Our results contribute to the discussion of the so-called retirement-
consumption puzzle which has most often been analyzed with cross-section or pseudo-
panel data. 
Many analyses of the retirement-consumption drop assume that the retirement 
decision is exogenous. However, many people probably partly base their decision on 
when to retire on the expected changes in consumption and time allocation. This 
suggests that the retirement decision is endogenous. To test this, we apply an 
instrumental variables methods in the treatment effects tradition. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Household Production in the Family – 
Work or Pleasure? 
Household Production in the Family – 
Work or Pleasure? 
 
Mette Gørtz 
CAM, Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen 
 
Abstract 
According to the classical household production model, an individual decides how 
much time to spend in household production based on the shadow price of his/her 
time spent in the labour market. This prediction has sometimes been criticized based 
on the reflection that some housework activities provide extra benefits beyond the 
consumption value of household production. The extra utility may be in the form of 
leisure which is (primarily) enjoyed by the person undertaking the activity, so-called 
“activity benefits”. Examples of this include childcare, gardening and do-it-yourself 
projects. This paper investigates the question of what is work and what is pleasure in 
household production. We apply a household production model which explicitly 
incorporates “activity benefits” to model the joint allocation of time for husband and 
wife. The model is tested on data from a Danish time use survey from 2001 which has 
information on time spent in household production for both partners in some 600 
Danish households. On the empirical side, the paper suggests using a GMM 3SLS 
estimator instead of the more restrictive Full Information Maximum Likelihood 
(FIML) estimator which has been used in previous empirical studies. We do not find 
significant evidence of “activity benefits” for men in household production, but we do 
find some weak signs of the presence of such extra benefits for women. The paper 
provides an extensive discussion of the identification issues involved. One important 
problem is that the benefits identified are not necessarily related to the household 
production activity, but might just as well be due to the fact that households may 
attach extra value to goods produced by themselves rather than by someone else, i.e. 
“consumption benefits”. We show that the outcome of “activity benefits” and 
“consumption benefits” may be observationally equivalent.  
 
Keywords: Household production, GMM, FIML 
JEL classification: C3, D1, J1, J2 
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1 Introduction 
According to the classical household production model, an individual decides on 
how much time to spend in household production based on the shadow price of his/her 
time spent in the labour market. Thus, household members derive utility from 
consuming the output of household production. Implicitly, this implies that home 
produced goods are perfect substitutes for market goods. The output of household 
production is usually thought of as a public good. 
An important consideration when debating what determines individual allocation of 
time between the market and household production is the idea that some housework 
activities may provide extra benefits beyond their consumption value.1 One obvious 
example is childcare. The time spent caring for one’s children contributes to household 
production, but (usually) parents also derive utility from spending time with their 
children. Other examples include do-it-yourself spells, gardening etc. which some 
people may partially consider as leisure activities. The discussion underlines that it is 
difficult to draw a line between what is housework and what is leisure. 
In general, it is widely recognized that people like to work. Beside the pure 
income/production side, work is perceived as giving pleasure, self esteem and a feeling 
of identity - in short, utility - to people. For example, in the Swedish HUS study of 1984 
and 1993, respondents were asked to state how enjoyable they found various activities 
on a scale from 0-10, cf. Hallberg and Klevmarken (2003). The answers to these 
questions indicate that playing with one’s own children and being in charge of one’s 
children produced the highest enjoyment for both men and women measured on the 
popularity scale (around 8), closely followed by market work (around 7). Making dinner 
or repair and maintenance tasks were given a 6 on the scale, whereas cleaning the house 
got the lowest scores (around 3-4) among all activities.2 This concept has been named 
"process benefits" (Juster, 1985) or “joint production” (Graham and Green, 1984, 
Kerkhofs and Kooreman, 2003). In this paper, we will choose an alternative name, 
“activity benefits”, for the phenomenon. Activity benefits are close substitutes to leisure 
and are therefore predominantly a private good enjoyed by the person undertaking the 
activity. 
                                                 
1 In this paper, we use the term “housework” for all types of activities that lead to a higher household 
product, including do-it-yourself work, gardening, child care etc. 
2 An indication of the fact that different types of work differ in popularity for individuals is people’s 
purchases of household services which they are unwilling to do themselves - e.g. cleaning - at an hourly 
pay which is sometimes higher than their own after-tax hourly wage. Part of the explanation for this 
phenomenon is differences in productivity between individuals doing housework in their own homes and 
professionals. However, in low-productivity jobs like cleaning, differences in productivity between 
professional cleaning assistents and individuals cleaning their own house will hardly explain why people 
tend to buy cleaning in the market. 
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A supplementary - or alternative – explanation for why households may choose a 
higher level of household production than what is suggested by the classical household 
production model is that households may attach a higher value to goods produced by one 
of the household members rather than to similar goods bought in the market. In this 
sense, the value of home produced goods is not comparable across households. Some 
households may have a higher preference for home-made goods than others, and these 
preferences may also diverge within the household. For example, the household may 
attach a higher value to spending leisure time with children whom they have raised 
themselves. The higher value of home made goods may also be due to the household 
members possessing skills that are specific to housework in their own house. While the 
effect of a higher value of home-made goods may be difficult to distinguish empirically 
from the “activity benefits” above, they are inherently different since this extra utility 
from home production may be enjoyed by either of the spouses independently on who 
did the housework. We shall refer to these benefits as “consumption benefits” in the 
following. We illustrate in the paper that household production outcomes with “activity 
benefits” and with “consumption benefits” respectively may be observationally 
equivalent. This raises an important identification issue.  
This paper investigates the question of what is work and what is pleasure in 
household production. The theoretical setup builds on a model by Kerkhofs and 
Kooreman (2003) which explicitly includes “activity benefits”. The model is an 
extension of Gronau’s classical model (Gronau, 1977, 1980, 1986). The model is tested 
empirically on a time use dataset of Danish households in 2001. We estimate our two-
equation model using a GMM 3SLS estimator, and we compare the results with the 
results found using a FIML estimator which was used in Kerkhofs and Kooreman 
(2003). Given our data, we find that the residuals are not normally distributed and 
consequently FIML is an inconsistent estimator under the assumption of normality. 
Provided correct moment conditions and without any assumptions about the functional 
form for the error terms, GMM 3SLS is consistent and efficient. Thus, the paper 
contributes by suggesting a less restrictive estimation method than previous analyses in 
this field. 
For the model without “activity benefits” in household production, we find 
complementarity between housework of husband and wife. We find no significant 
evidence of activity benefits for men, but we do see a weak sign of the presence of 
activity benefits for women (p-value=0.12). We also illustrate that the model may be 
able to establish the presence of activity benefits, but the model is not convincing in 
identifying the actual size of these benefits. We discuss the interpretation and the 
identification issues related to the results, in particular under what circumstances we are 
able to distinguish “activity benefits” from “consumption benefits” in the results.  
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2 Theoretical model 
In classical economic theory, households maximize utility over a bundle of goods 
purchased in the market subject to a budget constraint. Becker (1965, 1994) developed 
this framework by assuming that households combine time and market goods to 
consume some basic commodities that directly enter their utility functions. For example, 
consuming a meal is not valued only as the costs of buying food; one has to add the 
value of the time spent consuming the meal. Likewise, the utility of going to the theatre 
is not merely the price of the theatre tickets, but also the time spent enjoying the play. 
Gronau (1977) developed the classical household production model which is a 
cornerstone in household production theory. The model provides an essential 
development of Becker's framework by explicitly accounting for household production. 
According to Gronau, “An intuitive distinction between work at home (i.e., home 
production time) and leisure (i.e., home consumption time) is that work at home (like 
work in the market) is something one would rather have somebody else do for one (if the 
cost was low enough), while it would be almost impossible to enjoy leisure through a 
surrogate. Thus, one regards work at home as time use that generates services which 
have a close substitute in the market, while leisure has only poor market substitutes.” 
Essential assumptions in Gronau’s model are that home produced goods are perfect 
substitutes for market goods and that home production is subject to diminishing marginal 
productivity. Often, diminishing marginal productivity is thought to be due to fatigue or 
changes in input proportions. In Gronau’s model, diminishing marginal productivity is 
also due to the fact that as an individual increases housework, the composition of 
housework changes as he/she undertakes more activities with cheap market substitutes. 
Gronau’s central assumption of perfect substitutability between home-produced 
commodities and market goods has been the subject of some discussion. One point of 
criticism is that people do not always spend their time exclusively on one activity at a 
time, see e.g. Pollak and Wachter (1975). On the contrary, it will often be the case that 
part of the time people spend on housework can partly be considered as leisure. This 
observation is the background for Graham and Green’s (1984) extension of Gronau's 
model where they introduce so-called “joint production” which they define as 
housework also partly being leisure. Implicitly, this extension modifies the strong 
assumption of perfect substitutability between market goods and home products. 
Graham and Green (1984) use the American Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 
and find substantial “jointness” between home production time and leisure. 
Kerkhofs and Kooreman (2003) continue the development of a household production 
model which explicitly deals with the problem of household activities which are partly 
work, partly leisure activities. Kerkhofs and Kooreman (K&K) build on Graham and 
Green’s idea of “joint production”, but employ a different specification of the household 
production function. Their empirical application is based on Swedish time-allocation 
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data from the 1984 wave of the HUS survey. K&K look at both single and two-person 
households.  
This paper uses the K&K model as a starting point. The analysis concentrates on 
households with two adult members. We assume that the household members share one 
common utility function, i.e. a unitary utility function. In the classical Gronau household 
production model, households derive utility from the consumption of market goods, XM, 
commodities produced at home, Z, and leisure for the man and the woman, lm and lf. As 
in the classical Gronau model, it is assumed that market goods and goods produced in 
the household are perfect substitutes. 
 ( , , )M m fU U X Z l l= +  (1) 
Household production, Z, is a function of time spent in housework, hm and hf, for 
male and female respectively, and auxiliary inputs, XZ. For example, Z could be a meal 
produced with time inputs of the man and/or the woman, hm and hf, and intermediate 
inputs as food products, XZ: 
 ( , , )m f ZZ Z h h X=  (2) 
The household budget consists of non-labour income, y, and labour income, where 
wm and wf are hourly wages, and mm and mf are market labour supply in hours, for male 
and female respectively. This gives the following budget constraint: 
 M Z m m f fX X y w m w m+ = + +  (3) 
It is assumed that both partners participate in the labour force. This assumption 
ensures that we have observations on individual wages. Evidently, this assumption also 
entails the risk of selecting households with both spouses having a relatively high 
productivity in the market and/or low productivity in household production. Thus, 
individuals with high productivity at home could be underrepresented in the sample. On 
the other hand, productivity at home and in the market might be positively correlated 
through various (observed as well as unobserved) characteristics that affect both 
productivities in the same direction, suggesting that individuals with high productivity 
are overrepresented in the sample. It is difficult to determine the net direction of the 
selection bias in advance. We return to the discussion of selection problems in section 5, 
but note that our results apply for the large group of households where both spouses are 
in full-time employment. 
Each member of the household has a personal time constraint. T is total time 
endowment (e.g. 24 hours on a daily basis). 
  (4) ,    ,i i ih l m T i m f+ + = =
The household maximizes utility (1) subject to (2), (3) and (4), giving the following 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions: 
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where ξm and ξf denote shadow prices of the inequality constraints on labour time. If 
both partners participate in the labour force (mm>0, mf>0 and ξm=ξf =0), then we will 
find an interior solution, and (5) simplifies into: 
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∂ ∂
∂ ∂
 (6) 
The optimum can be viewed as the result of a two-stage decision process. In the first 
stage, the household decides on its requested level of household production. In the 
second stage, the household decides how to allocate non-production time and the 
purchase of consumption goods. Therefore, the household production model can be 
analysed only with the help of the production function, whereas the utility function does 
not appear until in the second stage of the decision process. It is a both necessary and 
sufficient condition that the production function Z is strictly concave to ensure a local 
maximum. The conditions in (6) are referred to as the so-called dichotomy in Kerkhofs 
and Kooreman (2003). For the dichotomy property to hold, it is important that the net 
marginal wage rate is exogenous. Moreover, the model does not take labour supply 
decisions into account. Thus, the model takes the non-random sub-sample of two-earner 
households as given. We would need to specify a utility function if we were to develop a 
full structural model including an endogenous labour supply choice. 
The interpretation of (6) is that an individual will choose a level of housework where 
her marginal product of time equals her wage rate in the market. If the marginal product 
of housework is lower than her wage rate, she will choose to work more in the market 
(and perhaps buy household production in the market). The model predictions in (6) 
correspond to the classical household production model where the “activity benefits”, 
i.e. the utility in the form of leisure value to the person performing the activity, are zero.  
In the following, we include the possibility of “activity benefits” in the model. Thus, 
we allow for the possibility that undertaking housework can both enhance household 
production and function as a sort of recreation activity for the person doing the work. 
For example, garden work provides utility through two channels: First, it enhances the 
household product, Z, which can be enjoyed by both partners in the household. 
Secondly, it may be seen as a sort of leisure activity for the person who works in the 
garden. This feature is included in the model in the following way: If a person spends hi 
hours on home production, he or she considers a certain part of this time, gi(hi), as a 
perfect substitute for leisure. The activity benefit function gi is increasing, twice 
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differentiable and concave in hi, gi'≤1 and gi'→0 as hi→T, meaning that the marginal 
utility of housework is decreasing in h (see figure 1).  
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Activity benefit function for individual i 
 
Introducing activity benefits, we get the following extended utility function for the 
household: 
  (7) ( , ( ), (M m m m f f fU U X Z l g h l g h= + + + ))
In this setting, the dichotomy property still holds. The partial optimization problem 
for household production changes into: 
 
0 , ; 0
max ( , , ) ( ) ( )
m f Z
m f Z m m m f f f m m f f Zh h T X
Z h h X w g h w g h w h w h X
≤ ≤ ≥
+ + − − −
))
))
 (8) 
And the first-order conditions are then: 
 
/ 1
/ (1- '(
/ (1- '(
Z
m m m m
f f f f
Z X
Z h w g h
Z h w g h
∂ ∂ =
∂ ∂ =
∂ ∂ =
 (9) 
Compared to the predictions in (6), we see that with the inclusion of activity benefits, 
the individual members of the household will choose a housework level where the 
marginal product of their housework equals their wage rate corrected for the part of 
individual housework activity which is perceived as leisure. By taking account of 
activity benefits, we achieve an explanation of why the chosen level of individual 
housework is sometimes higher than what the traditional labour supply model would 
predict. This is illustrated in figure 2 below. Individual i’s hourly wage rate is wi. 
Household production Z is an increasing function of i’s work in household production, 
hi, and the marginal product of hi is decreasing with hi. According to the classical 
household production model, person i will choose to increase her work in household 
production until the point, hi*, where her marginal product in household production is 
45o line 
gi
hiT
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equal to her wage rate, / i iZ h w∂ ∂ = . However, for given wage wi and given marginal 
production in household production, / iZ h∂ ∂ , we may observe that she works more in 
the household than the classical household production model would predict. If we 
observe that she works hi** hours in the household, where hi**>hi*, we may interpret the 
difference between hi** and hi* as a consequence of her deriving utility in the form of 
leisure from performing the housework. We may therefore identify the extent of this 
extra utility – activity benefits – from observations on her wage and her household 
production.  
If Z is strictly concave, we still have a unique solution (a local maximum). However, 
strict concavity of Z in hm and hf is a sufficient condition, but it is no longer a necessary 
condition, as both the left-hand and the right-hand side of the first-order conditions 
change when hm or hf changes. Thus, (7) allows for increasing returns to scale in 
household production provided the curvature of the gi-function is sufficiently high. To 
formulate this more intuitively, we can find a solution to the optimization problem with 
increasing returns to scale if the dis-utility of performing housework rises fast enough 
when hi increases to ensure that the combined utility of consuming and performing 
household production for each individual has a local optimum. 
 
Z Z’=wi(1-gi’(hi)) 
 
Figure 2:  Household production as a function of input of time, hi
 
Identification 
Usually, we observe neither the output of home production, Z, nor the input of 
auxiliary goods, XZ. The amount of household production therefore has to be based on 
information about the input of time in household production, and identification of the 
model is based on the first-order conditions. This poses a number of identification 
questions. 
hihi**
Z’=wi
hi* T 
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An important identification problem which has not been given much attention in the 
literature on household production models relates to the character of the “extra” benefits 
in household production. As discussed in the introduction to this paper, a higher 
household production than what the classical household production model predicts does 
not necessarily have to be ascribed to “activity benefits”. An alternative explanation may 
be that households attach a higher value to goods produced by one of the household 
members rather than similar goods bought in the market, and that the value the 
household puts on home-made goods is higher than the price they would get for them in 
the market. This higher value of household production may be due to several factors. 
Household members may have a higher preference for home-made goods. Or household 
members may possess household-specific skills which are important in the production of 
goods that they consume themselves; see Chiswick (1982) for a discussion of the value 
of a housewife’s time. In this sense, the value of home produced goods is not 
comparable across households. For example, both spouses in the household may attach a 
higher value to spending leisure time with children for whom one or both of them have 
cared themselves. These benefits are inherently different from the “activity benefits” 
described above since they may be enjoyed by either of the spouses irrespective of who 
did the housework. We name them “consumption benefits”. Thus, while the “activity 
benefits” through their leisure character are mainly private goods, “consumption 
benefits” are public goods. Some households may have a higher preference for home-
made goods than others, and these preferences may also diverge within the household. 
Figure 3 illustrates that household production with “activity benefits” and with 
“consumption benefits” respectively may be observationally equivalent. Assume we can 
observe the true value the household puts on their own household production, Zobs. 
According to Gronau’s classical household production model, we expect person i to 
work hi* hours in the household. But we observe that she works hi**. As we argued 
above, the higher input of housework may be due to “activity benefits”, i.e. the pleasure 
of undertaking household production activities. Since household production  generates 
this extra, leisure-like benefit, she is willing to increase her housework to a point where 
her marginal product of household production is lower than her wage rate. 
Usually, we can not observe the value of household production, but the household 
can. Suppose we think that the value of household production is Zobs and again, we 
expect hi* where obs i
i
Z w
h
∂ =∂ . However, the household attaches an additional value to 
consuming home-made products, i.e. “consumption benefits”, so Z=Zhh. Suppose 
individual i does not particularly enjoy working in the house, so there are no activity 
benefits. She therefore chooses her optimal housework where hh i
i
Z w
h
∂ =∂ . In our 
example, this corresponds to an optimal housework of hi**. We therefore see that the 
two cases with “activity benefits” and “consumption benefits”, respectively, may be 
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observationally equivalent. This raises an important identification issue which we shall 
return to in the empirical part of the paper.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
hi** hi* 
Zhh
Zobs
Zobs’(hi)=wi(1-gi’(hi)) 
Zobs’(hi)=wi
hi
Zhh’(hi)=wi
Z 
Figure 3: Identification in household production model 
 
A number of additional identification issues may arise. These have already been 
thoroughly discussed in Kerkhofs and Kooreman (2003), and we shall only refer the 
main points from this discussion. First, we only observe allocations which are optimal 
for input vectors (wm,wf,y). Non-labour income, y, influences labour supply, but since 
we only observe households where both spouses have a paid job, we assume that we can 
identify unique optimal allocations (hm*,hf*,XZ*) based on observations of (wm,wf). 
Secondly, since XZ is not observed, we have to formulate our first-order conditions in 
terms of the net product value function, i( , )m fZ h h , where: 
 i
0
( , ) max ( , , )
Z
m f m f Z ZX
Z h h Z h h X X
≥
≡ −  (10) 
Values of XZ that could be in agreement with a maximization of the net product 
i( , )m fZ h h  would also have to satisfy the first of the first-order conditions in (9). It is 
assumed that (10) has a unique finite, non-zero solution for all pairs of (hm,hf). It is 
therefore also assumed that / ZZ X∂ ∂  is continuously differentiable. A sufficient 
condition is that the marginal product of auxiliary goods is a strictly decreasing function 
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of XZ, is greater than one for XZ=0, and eventually falls below one when XZ is increased 
for all (hm,hf). 
Another question is whether we can find different functional forms of the housework 
activity benefit specification with observationally equivalent outcomes in terms of 
housework, wages etc. Kerkhofs and Kooreman (2003) provide evidence that in general, 
the presence of activity benefits is identified. Moreover, if the activity benefit functions 
are restricted to some parametric function as e.g. the functional form chosen in section 4, 
it is generally also possible to establish the magnitude of the activity benefits for 
couples. K&K point out that in general, the model has limited power for identification of 
activity benefits in single earner households. In the following, we restrict the analysis to 
couples. 
 
3 Data 
The data are from the Danish Time Use Survey for 2001 (DTUS). The DTUS 
complies with methodologies developed at the EU level for conducting time use surveys; 
see Bonke (2005) for a detailed description. For married and cohabiting respondents, the 
partner in the household was also asked to participate in the survey. We have detailed 
information about time use of both spouses for a good 1700 couples. There are two 
sources of information on time use. First, each respondent filled in a diary stating their 
activities at a detailed level every 10 minutes in two 24-hour days, one a week-day and 
the other a weekend day. Second, the questionnaire asked the respondents about their 
“usual” time use. The questionnaire also contained questions about personal and 
household characteristics. This background information is combined with information 
from register (administrative) information from Denmarks Statistics on the respondent 
and partner, giving access to further personal and household information. The wage 
measure used in this paper is from the register data and is therefore not directly linked to 
the information given in the time use survey. 
As mentioned, as well as keeping a time diary, respondents were asked about the 
time they normally spend on housework and in the labour market in a typical week. 
Housework time includes normal housework such as cleaning, laundry, shopping, 
cooking etc. and gardening, repairs, other do-it-yourself work and child care. As always 
the classification of child care as housework is difficult, as discussed above. Since 
respondents were only asked one question on usual housework, we cannot break out 
child care separately.  
In general, it is observed that surveys asking about normal time use have a smaller 
variance, but perhaps a more imprecise mean of time use, while diary information gives 
more precise means, but with a larger variance, see Juster and Stafford (1991). We have 
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chosen to use normal time use rather than the diary information to avoid the very serious 
infrequency problems in the latter.  
Table 1 shows the time spent in household production for couples, broken down by 
the work status of the two partners. We define full-time market work to be at least 30 
hours per week, including commuting time. Thus a respondent may be unemployed in 
the survey week and still report more than 30 hours per week of market work. Part-time 
work is not very prevalent in Denmark so that “not full-time” generally means “out of 
the labour force” (particularly for men). The “neither full-time” group is mostly made up 
of older, presumably retired, couples. Table 1 shows familiar patterns with men doing 
less housework than women who have the same work status. One should also note that 
there is a wide within category dispersion in household production, as shown by the 
standard deviations. 
 
Male household production, 
minutes/day 
Female household production, 
minutes/day 
 
Mean Std. Median Mean Std. Median 
Both 
(#=804) 
93.2 65.1 85.7 134.0 74.8 128.6 
Female  
(#=112) 
118.5 80.9 85.7 111.9 65.8 90.0 
Male  
(#=342) 
80.6 58.6 68.6 155.7 100.8 128.6 
Neither  
(#=343) 
109.8 92.6 85.7 161.7 100.6 128.6 
 
Table 1:  Household production and labour market status (full-time or not) 
 
In the following, we focus on the sample of households in which both husband and 
wife work full-time in the labour market. The load of housework (including child care) 
for full-time couples naturally depends on the number and ages of children within the 
household. Table 2 presents time use broken down by child status for the full-time 
households. We see that the load of housework increases with the number of children, 
also when we condition on both partners being in full-time work.  
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Male household production,  
minutes/day 
Female household production, 
minutes/day  
Mean Std. Median Mean Std. Median 
No children  
(#=349) 
80.5 54.9 68.6 116.6 65.1 102.9 
1 child  
(#=180) 
90.8 63.6 85.7 128.0 63.4 120.0 
2 children  
(#=207) 
104.8 64.5 85.7 150.7 68.6 128.6 
3+   
(#=68) 
129.7 94.3 111.4 187.6 120.1 171.4 
 
Table 2:  Household production and number of children 
 
The determination of household production based on the wage rate is central in the 
theoretical model. When a person decides how much time to allocate to housework, the 
shadow price of time is obviously the wage rate net of taxes on labour. In the data, we 
only have information on the gross wage rate. To arrive at a very crude estimate of net 
wages, we performed a simple imputation of individual marginal tax rates.3 In our 
estimation of the model, we present results with both the imputed net wage and the gross 
wage rate. 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of housework and wages for men and women. Out of 
the sample of full-time employed people, we have information on wage rates for both 
husband and wife for 629 couples. This is the dataset used in the econometric 
estimations below. For both men and women, the correlation between housework (in 
hours per day) and wages (in kroner per hour) is small and negative. For men, the OLS-
estimate from regressing housework on net wage is -0.0014 (t-value is -0.73) which is 
not significant. For women, the OLS-estimate is -0.012 (t-value is -3.35), which implies 
that for two randomly selected women with a difference in hourly wage of 10 kroner, the 
woman with the highest wage rate will work approximately 7 minutes less in the house 
per day. This is without controlling for any individual or household characteristics. 
 
                                                 
3 The imputation of the marginal tax rate was based on the gross wage for a person who works full-time 
for the whole year. Details are given in the Appendix. We also tried to calculate individual specific 
marginal tax rates based on register information about total gross income, but unfortunately our net wage 
rate estimates based on these imputed marginal tax rates seem to be very noisy and the relationship 
between gross and net wages seems somewhat difficult to explain. 
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Figure 4:  Housework and wages for men and women 
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Figure 5:  Housework and wages for men and women 
 
Both household production and wage rates show a strong positive correlation for the 
two spouses in figure 6. This is probably partly due to positive assortative mating, i.e. 
the well-established observation that people seem to find a partner that looks very much 
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like themselves in terms of observable characteristics as background, age, education, 
wage rates etc. See Becker (1991) or Weiss (1997) for a discussion. The positive 
correlation in household production is also very likely to be due to the presence of 
children in the household (which is obviously strongly correlated between the partners). 
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Figure 6:  Intra-household correlation in household production and wages 
 
Despite the strong correlation of housework within the family, we still find that 
women do the majority of the household production, see figure 7. On average, women 
do 59 percent of the housework, and the median wife does 58 percent of the housework. 
In 7 percent of the households, the woman does less than half of the housework. The 
wife takes on more than 75 percent of the housework in more than 11 percent of the 
households. 
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Figure 7:  Female share of household production within the family 
 
4 Econometric specification 
In the following, we empirically investigate the theoretical first-order conditions (6) 
and (8). In the theoretical model, we assumed that household production is a function of 
housework time, hm and hf, and intermediate inputs into household production, XZ. As 
discussed previously, time use surveys usually do not contain any measure of the output 
of household production, and due to the imperfect substitution possibilities of household 
production for comparable market goods it is difficult to find comparable market prices 
for the output from household production. Furthermore, as we have no information on 
auxiliary goods used in the production of household production, XZ, we analyse the net 
product value function, iZ , below instead of the (gross) production function found 
above: 
 i 2 2½ ½m m f f mm m ff f mf m fZ b h b h c h c h c h h= + + + +  (11) 
bm and bf are strictly positive. The C-matrix, , has to be negative 
definite to ensure a well-behaved production function. Housework of the two spouses, 
h
mm mf
mf ff
c c
C
c c
⎛ ⎞= ⎜⎝ ⎠⎟
m and hf, can be substitutes or complements; substitutes if cmf<0 and complements if 
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cmf>0. As mentioned above, we concentrate on households where both spouses are 
employed. First-order conditions (for employed people) when activity benefits are not 
accounted for are: 
 
i
i
/
/
m m mm m mf f m
f f ff f mf m f
Z h b c h c h w
Z h b c h c h w
∂ ∂ = + + =
∂ ∂ = + + =  (12) 
And first-order conditions when we do take activity benefits into account are: 
 
i
i
/ (1
/ (1
m m mm m mf f m m
f f ff f mf m f f f
'( ))
'( ))
mZ h b c h c h g h w
Z h b c h c h g h w
∂ ∂ = + + = −
∂ ∂ = + + = −  (13) 
Furthermore, we assume that individuals are heterogeneous in their marginal 
productivity of housework. Thus, we let bm and bf depend on household and individual 
specific characteristics captured in xm and xf, respectively: 
 ln( ) 'ln( ) '
m m m m
f f f
b x u
b x u
ββ f
= +
= +  (14) 
Therefore, the marginal productivity of housework time for a married man, hm, 
depends on the parameters bm, cmm and cmf as well as the level of both his own and his 
wife’s housework. Parallel for a married woman. The household chooses a level of 
household production time for wife and husband depending both on these factors as well 
as wages and utility of housework as reflected in the g-function.  
For the model without activity benefits, the system of equations expressed in errors 
is: 
 ' ln( ) '' ln( ) '
m m m m m mm m mf f m m
f f f f f mf m ff f f f
u b x w c h c h x
u b x w c h c h x
β β
β β
= − = − − −
= − = − − −  (15) 
wm, wf, xm, and xf are assumed to be exogenous. To estimate the model with activity 
benefits, we specify a specific functional form for the activity benefit function that 
captures the characteristics for g set out above. As in Kerkhofs and Kooreman (2003) 
and Graham and Greene (1984), we assume the following functional form for g: 
 1( ) 1 ,      ,
1
i
i
i i i
i
hg h h i m f
T
δ
δ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= − =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 (16) 
Where , 0m fδ δ ≥ . If 0m fδ δ= = , we are in the classical household production  
framework. As ,m fδ δ →∞ , all household production time is perceived as leisure. After 
differentiating gi with respect to hi, we arrive at a system of equations with activity 
benefits: 
 
ln( ) ' ln(( / ) ) '
ln( ) ' ln(( / ) ) '
m
f
m m m m m m mm m mf f m m
f f f f f f mf m ff f f f
u b x h T w c h c h x
u b x h T w c h c h x
δ
δ
β β
β β
= − = − − −
= − = − − −  (17) 
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5 Estimation and results 
5.1 Classical household production model - no 
activity benefits 
In this section, we concentrate on the classical household production model in (15). 
That is, we assume 0m fδ δ= = . Kerkhofs and Kooreman (2003) estimated this system 
by maximum likelihood, which is the efficient estimator if the error terms are joint 
normally distributed:  
 | , (0,m m f uu
f
u x x Nu
⎛ ⎞ )Σ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ∼  (18) 
We follow the specification of the non-linear likelihood function for a linear system 
of equations in a Full Information Maximum Likelihood model as can be found in 
Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, chapter 18). See appendix A2. 
Normality of the error terms is often a strong assumption.  Alternatively, we can 
apply the General Method of Moments (GMM) for systems, i.e. the GMM 3SLS 
estimator. The advantage of GMM 3SLS is that we obtain consistent estimates under 
much weaker assumptions, since we do not have to assume anything about the functional 
form of the distribution of the error terms. We use the efficient GMM estimator for a 
system of equations formulated in Wooldridge (2001, chapter 14). See appendix A3. 
In estimating the system in (15), we use our imputed measures of net wages for the 
wage rates as net wages are the most correct measure for the shadow price of time. 
Results with the gross wages are shown in appendix 4. The individual and household 
characteristics captured in the X-matrices consist of individual age, individual education 
in years, dummies for homeownership, the presence of younger and older children and 
non-labour income. We can think of (15) as hf being endogenous in the first equation 
and hm being endogenous in the second equation. As instruments for female household 
production, hf, we use her gross wage, her gross wage squared, her age, her age squared, 
and her education (measured through five education dummies). Thus, we assume that the 
error term in equation 1 is uncorrelated with these instruments. As instruments for male 
household production, hm, in the second equation we use his gross wage, his gross wage 
squared, his age, his age squared and his education (measured through five education 
dummies). Our moment conditions are therefore constructed under the assumption that 
the error terms in equation 2 are uncorrelated with the instruments. The reason for using 
gross wages as instruments (rather than net wages as above) is that they have higher 
explanatory power of hm and hf and thus serve as stronger instruments. Both sets of 
instruments are jointly significant in explaining the variation in household production, 
although their explanatory power as measured by R2 is low (see appendix A3). On the 
other hand, these instruments make us accept the null hypothesis of the overidentifying 
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restrictions test that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error terms. More details 
about choice of instruments are given in appendix A3. The estimations results for GMM 
3SLS and FIML are shown in table 3 below. 
 
  GMM 3SLS t-value FIML t-value 
cmm -272.116 -2.15 -643.542 -1.52 
cff -88.629 -3.53 -1597.810 -1.75 
cmf 14.143 0.76 -422.431 -0.95 
 Male equation      
Constant 5.322 8.78 7.159 7.99 
Age 0.002 0.93 0.002 1.16 
Education, years 0.158 1.25 0.025 0.49 
Homeownership 0.120 1.91 0.166 3.26 
Dummy young children 0.218 3.92 0.200 4.54 
Dummy children 7-17 0.079 1.70 0.127 3.13 
Non labour income 0.004 0.32 0.020 1.72 
 Female equation      
Constant 5.670 17.10 8.340 15.66 
Age 0.004 2.19 0.002 1.36 
Education, years -0.209 -2.41 -0.153 -1.68 
Homeownership 0.115 2.87 0.180 3.60 
Dummy young children 0.161 4.29 0.203 4.60 
Dummy children 7-17 0.109 3.72 0.145 3.67 
Non labour income 0.022 2.75 0.028 2.55 
 
Table 3:  Estimation results for GMM 3SLS and FIML 
 
Apart from the elements in the C-matrix, the two sets of estimates show similar 
characteristics. The signs and sizes of the coefficients estimated are of the same order of 
magnitude. Based on the residuals from the FIML estimation, we reject individual 
normality of the error terms (and therefore also joint normality).4 Therefore FIML is 
inconsistent.5 GMM 3SLS is consistent if the moment conditions apply. Moreover, in 
our case without normally distributed error terms, GMM 3SLS is efficient among 
                                                 
4 Details on normality tests and histograms for the residuals from the FIML estimation can be found in 
appendix A.2. 
5 For normally distributed disturbances, GMM 3SLS has the same asymptotic distribution as the FIML 
estimator, which is in this case asymptotically efficient among all estimators, cf. Greene (2003, chapter 
15). Moreover, Hausman (1975, 1983) shows that the FIML estimator is also an IV estimator. 
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estimators which rely only on moment conditions. In the rest of this paper, we apply 
GMM 3SLS when estimating the household production model. 
The estimates of cmm and cff are negative, as assumed, and significant. We find a 
positive (though insignificant) estimate of cmf which is an indication of complementarity 
between housework of husband and wife. In this respect, our results deviate from 
Kerkhofs and Kooreman (2003) who found that male and female home-production are q-
substitutes. The C-matrix is negative definite (the eigenvalues of the C-matrix are 
negative) which is in agreement with a well-behaved production function in the classical 
household production model. 
 
5.2 Activity benefits – allowing for the pleasure of 
housework  
In the previous section, it was assumed that there are no “activity benefits” in 
household production, i.e. that the activity benefit parameters, 0m fδ δ= = . In this 
section, we look at the consequences of allowing for activity benefits. We performed a 
grid search within a range of “reasonable” activity benefit parameters ( mδ  and 
fδ between 0 and 1.5). The GMM problem was difficult to solve for high values of fδ  
where bf became negative for low observations of hf or hm. In order to obtain estimates 
in the grid search, we took out observations where hf or hm were less than 20 minutes per 
day. We therefore performed the activity benefit estimations with a subset of 596 
observations as compared to the original dataset used above of 629 observations. The 
objective function for the GMM problem was consistently minimized in the region 
where m fδ δ< , and we found an optimum for  and . We tested the joint 
significance of the estimates by using the GMM distance statistic, cf. Wooldridge (2001, 
chapter 8), which is 
ˆ 0.7mδ = ˆ 1.3fδ =
2χ  distributed with 2 degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis 
0m fδ δ= = . We found that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that both parameters are 
equal to 0 at a p-value of 0.10. However, for mδ  restricted to 0, we found an optimal 
value of with a p-value of 0.12. We use this result to conclude that there is 
some evidence of the presence of activity benefits for women, although the size of 
activity benefits is poorly estimated since values for 
ˆ 0.8fδ =
fδ  within the range of  0.4 and 
upwards produce almost the same value of the objective function. See details of the tests 
in Appendix 5.  
Inserting the parameter estimate of  into the gˆ 0.8fδ = i-function formulated in (14) 
and using the observation that the time spent in housework is around 10 percent of the 
total time for women, we find that on average the fraction of housework that is also 
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perceived as leisure is close to 90 percent. If we instead enter , we find that on 
average around ¾ of women’s housework time is a substitute for leisure. This seems like 
an unlikely high leisure value of household production. 
ˆ 0.4fδ =
The result of the estimation with the value of  found by grid search is shown 
in the appendix table A3. The estimate of c
ˆ 0.8fδ =
ff is negative but, as we discussed above, 
increasing returns to scale (positive cff) is not necessarily a problem in the extended 
household production model that allows for activity benefits. What matters for the 
optimization is that the contribution of the second order derivative of the g-function 
(which is negative) is large enough to counteract the contribution of the positive second-
order derivative of the Z-function, see appendix 6. 
To conclude on the above, there is some evidence of activity benefits for women in 
our sample of full-time employed couples, but the estimates are imprecise and 
insignificant even at a 10 percent level. A natural question to ask is whether it is more 
likely to find activity benefits in households where a larger part of household production 
could be perceived as partly leisure. This could be the case for families with children 
where a relative high proportion of time use is child care. Out of the 629 full-time 
couples used in this analysis, 370 families had children below 17 years. Since this is a 
rather small sample, we will not present the results for the families with children dataset.  
 
5.3 Interpretation of results 
In order to interpret the parameter estimates in table 3, we reformulate the model in 
reduced form: 
 
1 1 exp( ' )
1 1 exp( ' )
mf
m m f m m
mm mm mm
mf
f f m f f f
ff ff ff
c
h w h x
c c c
c
h w h x u
c c c
β
β
= − − +
= − − +
mu
 (19) 
An increase in female housework by one hour will increase male housework by 
ˆ 14.143 0.05
ˆ ( 272.116)
mf
mm
c
c
− = − =−  hours. And an increase in male housework by one hour 
will increase female housework by 
ˆ 14.143 0.16
ˆ ( 88.629)
mf
ff
c
c
− = − =−  hours. A male wage 
increase of 10 DKr per hour decreases his daily time in household production with 
1 1*10 *10 0.037
ˆ 272.116mmc
= − =  hours or around 2 minutes per day, while a similar 
wage increase for the wife decreases her daily time doing housework with 
 28
1 1*10 *10 0.11
ˆ 88.629ffc
= − =  hours or 7 minutes per day. Thus, women’s time in 
housework is more sensitive to wage changes which is reasonable since women’s 
average housework is higher than men’s and therefore corresponds to a flatter segment 
on the household production curve. Having children affects both male and female 
household production positively. Homeownership also has a positive effect, and age is 
positively correlated with housework. Education has opposite effects on male and female 
housework. While education increases his housework (althought the effect is not 
significant), more educated women tend to do less housework. This apparent paradox 
probably also is a sign of positive assortative mating in education. Thus, women with a 
higher education marry men with a higher education. This also suggests that his and her 
housework are substitutes on the margin.  
 
5.4 Discussion 
The analysis above investigates “activity benefits” in household production. It is 
argued that one can not compare one hour worked at home with one hour worked in the 
market without taking into account the activity benefits of performing household 
production. It is hereby implicitly assumed that there are no activity benefits connected 
to performing market work. However, this is not necessarily the case. As argued in the 
introduction, Hallberg and Klevmarken (2003) analyzed the Swedish HUS study of 1984 
and 1993 and found that market work was considered nearly as enjoyable as being with 
one’s own children and more enjoyable than most household chores. Juster and Stafford 
(1985, 1991) found similar trends in American data. As a pragmatic solution to this 
conceptional problem, we may interpret the estimates as a measure of the relative 
activity benefits from carrying out household production compared to working in the 
market. 
In figure 3, we illustrated how a household production model with “activity benefits” 
or with “consumption benefits” may be observationally equivalent. We will therefore try 
to interpret our results in a “consumption benefit” framework. Suppose the value of 
household production is Zhh for the household, j, producing it. If Zhh is higher for 
household j than another household would attach to the production by household j, then 
XM and Zhh cannot be perfect substitutes. We assume that we can observe the value other 
households put on household production by household j, Zobs.  We may formulate the 
relationship between Zobs and the “true” value of household production for household j, 
Zhh, as a form of multiplicative “premium” for home-made products. Since we cannot 
observe XZ, we concentrate on net household production, iZ : 
 i i i i* ,    where  ( ,hh obs obs m f )Z k Z Z Z h h= =  (20) 
 29
In optimum, we find that: 
 
i i
i
*
1 *
hh obs
i
i i
obs
i
i
Z Zk w
h h
Z w
h k
∂ ∂= = ⇒∂ ∂
∂ =∂
 (21) 
Comparing this with (9) where 
i
(1 '( ))*obs i i
i
Z g h w
h
∂ = −∂ i , we find that: 
 1 (1 '( ))i ig hk
= −  (22) 
With our empirical specification of the model, (22) is equivalent to: 
 1
ii
i
i
h Tk
k T h
δδ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= ⇔ = ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 (23) 
In this simple parameterization where both spouses attach the same premium, k, to 
household production, (23) implies that if 0mδ =  then 0fδ = . This is not the case in our 
empirical estimations.  From (23) we also note that ln( / )
ln( / )
f m
m f
T h
T h
δ
δ =  in the case where the 
extra benefits are in the form of “consumption benefits”. 
To illustrate, suppose we have  which is not too far from the empirical 
results above, and we use the observation that around 10 percent of women’s time is 
devoted to housework. Then , implying that the value for the 
household of household production is 2.5 times larger than what we would expect based 
on observed household production, if we assume that there are no “activity benefits”. 
Above, we noted that 
ˆ 0.4fδ =
0.4ˆ (1/ 0.1) 2.5k ≈ ≈
iδ  is estimated with a high standard error. If we instead assumed 
, we would find . ˆ 0.1iδ = 0.1ˆ (1/ 0.1) 1.25k ≈ ≈
The above discussion does not allow us to determine whether there are “activity 
benefits” or “consumption benefits” in play but is primarily intended to illustrate the 
identification problems. A more comprehensive modelling would include the possibility 
of the two partners having different preferences for household production. This would 
probably accommodate our empirical finding that ˆ ˆm fδ δ≠ .  
A further step to obtain a fuller picture of the process of allocating time to household 
production within the household would be to develop a model that incorporates the 
distribution of “power” within the household, i.e. a “collective” model as proposed by 
Chiappori (1988, 1992, 1997), or the intra-household allocation model proposed by 
Apps and Rees (1988, 1996, 1997). We postpone this challenge for future analysis.  
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Our selection consists of couples where both spouses work more than 30 hours a 
week including commuting time. Thus, the sampling is based on labour market status 
which is endogenous in the model. This gives rise to selection bias. On the one hand, we 
might experience an under-representation of more home-productive individuals in the 
sample, since these individuals are relatively more likely not to have a paid job. On the 
other hand, it might be that the personal characteristics which determine productivity in 
the market and thus enhance the chances of being employed also lead to a relatively high 
productivity at home. Thus, we might see an over-representation of people who are 
productive at home in the sample. Gronau and Hamermesh (2001) show that there is a 
positive correlation between the level of education and demand for variety in time-use 
activities. They interpret this result as evidence that people with higher levels of 
education have a higher productivity, not only in market work, but also in housework. 
The net direction of the selection bias is difficult to predict.  
Although the possible selection bias is potentially important, we postpone the 
treatment of this matter for future analysis. Selection is only a problem if we generalize 
our results beyond the group of full-time employed. The results found above still apply 
for the full-time employed. We note that the labour force participation rate is very high 
for both women and men in Denmark, and the incidence of part-time employment is 
low. 
 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we build on the classical household production model developed by 
Gronau (1977, 1980, 1986) with an extension allowing for “activity benefits” (“process 
benefits” due to Juster, 1985, or “joint production” due to Kerkhofs and Kooreman, 
2003). We estimate the parameters of the model empirically on Danish time use data 
with interpretable results. 
First, we estimate the model without “activity benefits”, i.e. without allowing for the 
possibility that some of the activities which we characterize as household production 
also provide benefits per se for the person performing the activity. For this formulation 
of the model, we find that housework by husband and wife show the expected 
diminishing returns to scale and that his and her time in housework are complements. In 
this respect, our results differ from a previous study by Kerkhofs and Kooreman (2003) 
who found that housework by husband and wife are q-substitutes. 
Secondly, we estimate the household production model with activity benefits. We 
find some evidence of the presence of activity benefits in household production for 
women, but the effect is not significant on a 10 percent level (p-value is 0.12). 
Furthermore, we find that the size of the extra benefit is measured with a large 
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imprecision. The results are in line with previous analyses by Graham and Green (1984) 
and Kerkhofs and Kooreman (2003).  
In the paper, we discuss alternative interpretations and identification issues related to 
our results. We note that the model only deals with activity benefits in household 
production, while possible intra-household differences in the taste for market work are 
ignored. Moreover, we argue that extra benefits related to household production may be 
related to households having a higher preference for home-made products rather than 
household products bought in the market.  We call these “consumption benefits” to be 
able to distinguish them from “activity benefits”. We illustrate that these two types of 
benefits can be observationally equivalent. However, the benefits are inherently different 
in the sense that “activity benefits” (in the form of leisure) are private goods, while 
“consumption benefits” is a public good which directly enhances the utility of the two 
spouses, irrespective of who carried out the housework. 
In general, the model’s explanatory power is low. Housework of husband and wife 
are strongly correlated, and the exogenous explanatory variables can only explain a 
modest part of the variations in housework across households. Thus, there is probably 
considerable unobserved heterogeneity in housework. We leave this question for future 
research. 
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Appendices 
 
A.1    Data 
Table A1 contains summary statistics for the selection of 629 households where both 
spouses work in the labour market and where the wage rate is observed in the data. 
 
Variable Mean Std. Min Max 
Male characteristics         
Housework, hours per day 1.56 0.93 0.29 5.00 
Wage, DKr per hour 210.81 78.06 84.00 649.00 
Age 42.57 9.76 22.00 66.00 
Education in years 13.10 2.52 10.00 18.00 
Female characteristics      
Housework, hours per day 2.16 1.01 0.29 5.00 
Wage, DKr per hour 164.24 47.79 71.00 461.00 
Age 40.58 9.58 20.00 61.00 
Education in years 13.34 2.56 10.00 18.00 
Household characteristics         
Homeownership 0.85 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Dummy young children (0-6) 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Dummy children 7-17 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Non labour income, 1000 DKr 23.41 63.87 0.00 1003.14 
Number of observations 629    
 
Table A1:  Summary statistics 
 
Construction of net wages 
Net wages are constructed on the basis of gross wage rates for a full-time person who 
works 1500 hours per year. Based on rules on marginal tax rates and labour market 
contributions for 2001, we assume that a person with an imputed total gross wage 
income below 178,000 DKr (US$ 28,000) pays around 50 percent in marginal tax, for 
total gross wage incomes between 178,000 DKr and 277,000 (US$ 45,000), the marginal 
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tax rate is 55 percent, and for gross wage incomes beyond 277,000 DKr, the marginal 
tax rate is 68 percent.  
 
A.2    Full Information Maximum likelihood (FIML) 
 
Likelihood functions in FIML 
The likelihood function for the non-linear FIML estimator is, according to Davidson 
and MacKinnon (1993) (formula 18.85): 
 
1
1
1 1
i
i
( , ) ( , )
1log(2 ) log det log ( , , ) ( , , ) '
2 2 2
( , , ) ,        U NID(0, )
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i
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−
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− + − Σ − Σ
= Σ
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∑
∑ ∑
∼
 (24) 
Thus, central assumptions behind FIML are that the error terms follow a normal 
distribution, and are homoskedastic (and serially independent). Yi is 1xg, Γ  is gxg, Xi is 
1xk (where k is the number of explanatory variables), Ui is 1xg, and Σ  is gxg. In our 
case with a two-equation model, g=2. 
 
Normality tests 
Figure A1 shows histograms for the residuals from the FIML estimation. Normality 
tests (skewness-kurtosis test and Shapiro-Wilkinson test) for the residuals reject the null 
that the error terms are normally distributed. Especially, the test for skewness contributes 
to the rejection which is also suggested by figure A1.  
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Figure A1:  Distribution of residuals from FIML estimation 
 
A.3    GMM-3SLS 
In formulating our moment conditions for the GMM-3SLS estimator, we follow 
Wooldridge (2001, ch. 14). The efficient GMM-3SLS estimator solves: 
 1 1
1 1 1
ˆ ˆˆ ˆmin ( ) ( ' ' ) ( )
Tn n n
i i i i i i i i
i i i
Z q n Z u u Z Z qθ θ θ− −∈Θ = = =
⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∑ ∑ ∑
⎤⎥  (25) 
Where Z is a matrix of instruments for the endogenous variables. In the first 
equation, we instrument female household production by her wage, her wage squared, 
her age, her age squared and education dummies. In the second equation, we use the 
same procedure and instrument male household production by his wage, his wage 
squared, his age, his age squared and education dummies. Table A2 shows that the 
explanatory variables in both equations are jointly significant with a very low p-value 
for the 2χ  test. The R2’s are low in both equations. With these instrument, we can 
accept the null in the overidentifying restrictions test that the instruments are 
uncorrelated with the error terms. 
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    Coefficient t-value 
Female equation    
  Female wage -0.007 -2.09 
  Female wage squared 0.010 1.4 
  Female age 0.117 3.6 
  Female age squared -0.001 -3.51 
  Female education 2 0.096 0.52 
  Female education 3 -0.142 -1.47 
  Female education 4 -0.293 -1.87 
  Female education 5 -0.122 -1.13 
  Female education 6 -0.351 -2.31 
  Constant 0.719 1.05 
  R2 0.050   
  Chi2 38.550   
  p-value 0.000   
Male equation    
  Male wage -0.004 -2.78 
  Male wage squared 0.005 2.04 
  Male age 0.084 2.86 
  Male age squared -0.001 -2.85 
  Male education 2 0.023 0.14 
  Male education 3 0.118 1.34 
  Male education 4 0.044 0.31 
  Male education 5 0.166 1.49 
  Male education 0.151 1.16 
  Constant 0.406 0.66 
  R2 0.029   
  Chi2 21.080   
  p-value 0.012   
 
Table A2:  SUR estimation of instruments for hm and hf 
 
Overidentifying restrictions tests 
In order to test whether the instruments are uncorrelated with the error terms, we 
perform the overidentifying restrictions test. Under the null hypothesis that the residuals 
are uncorrelated with the error terms, the value of the objective function of the GMM 
problem is 2χ -distributed with 8 degrees of freedom (equal to number of instruments 
minus number of explanatory variables). The value of the objective function in the 
optimum is 7.05. Thus we accept the null hypothesis that the instruments are 
uncorrelated with the error terms. 
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 A.4   Results with gross wages 
In the paper, we used imputed net wages (see appendix A1) as the net wage is in 
principle the most correct measure of the shadow price of time. In order to arrive at the 
imputed net wages,  we had to use a rather crude method to impute the marginal tax 
rates. This imputation might add to measure error of the wage rate which people use 
when deciding how to allocate their time. For comparison, we present the regression 
results with gross wages in table A3. 
 
  GMM-3SLS t-value 
cmm -786.285 -3.11 
cff -469.875 -3.01 
cmf -22.996 -0.26 
 Male equation   
Constant 6.476 12.21 
Age 0.003 1.13 
Education, years 0.158 1.39 
Homeownership 0.130 2.24 
Dummy young children 0.220 4.44 
Dummy children 7-17 0.093 2.17 
Non labour income 0.008 0.64 
 Female equation   
Constant 7.260 17.65 
Age 0.004 2.16 
Education, years -0.219 -2.30 
Homeownership 0.145 3.10 
Dummy young children 0.198 4.82 
Dummy children 7-17 0.129 3.84 
Non labour income 0.025 2.68 
 
Table A3:  Regression results with gross wages 
 
A.5    Jointness 
We test the joint significance (2 restrictions) of the activity benefit parameters by a 
2χ  test with 2 degrees of freedom. The value of the objective function is 11.45 under the 
null hypothesis (restricted version) and 8.84 for the unrestricted estimation. Thus, the 
value of the J-test which is the reduction in the objective function from going from the 
restricted to the unrestricted version of the model is around 2.6. The critical value of the 
 distribution is 4.61 for a significance level of 0.10. The null hypothesis is 
therefore accepted, and we reject joint significance of the activity benefit parameters. 
2 (2)χ
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We also tested the significance of the activity benefit parameters individually. If we 
restricted 0fδ ≡ and performed a grid search for mδ , we found the optimum for ˆ 0.mδ =   
On the other hand, if we restricted 0mδ ≡ , we found an optimum for where the 
value of the objective function is 9.06. The value of the J-test is then around 2.4 with a 
p-value=0.12. The critical value of the  distribution is 2.71 for a significance level 
of 0.10. Thus, we are close to concluding that our estimate of 
ˆ 0.8fδ =
2 (1)χ
fδ  is significant. Figures 
A2 and A3 below illustrate that the the objective function is almost flat for a broad range 
of values of mδ  and fδ  respectively, so the activity benefit parameters are estimated 
with great imprecision. Table A4 below shows the estimation results under the null 
(restricted version) and for .  ˆ 0.8fδ =
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Figure A2:  Values of objective function for fixed levels of fδ  
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Figure A3:  Values of objective function for fixed levels of mδ  
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  No activity benefits Activity benefits for women
cmm -270.804 (-2.15) -278.280 (-1.99)
cff -99.981 (-3.11) -11.402 (-2.04)
cmf 18.602 (0.92) 4.219 (1.66)
Male equation  
Constant 5.446 (9.09) 5.593 (10.26)
Male age 0.003 (1.09) 0.003 (1.38)
Male education 0.143 (1.19) 0.115 (1.10)
Dummy home owner 0.088 (1.47) 0.086 (1.50)
Dummy for children 0.174 (3.41) 0.176 (3.61)
Dummy for teenagers 0.056 (1.24) 0.065 (1.63)
Non labour income 0.011 (0.99) 0.012 (1.11)
Female equation  
Constant 5.746 (15.35) 3.595 (6.65)
Female age 0.003 (1.89) 0.004 (1.56)
Female education -0.196 (-2.21) -0.273 (-2.37)
Dummy home owner 0.094 (2.23) 0.140 (2.34)
Dummy for children 0.136 (3.62) 0.177 (3.50)
Dummy for teenagers 0.115 (3.68) 0.161 (3.66)
Non labour income 0.019 (2.36) 0.028 (2.40)
Note: t-values in parentheses. 
 
Table A4:  Results for model without and with activity benefits 
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 A.6    Finding an optimum with increasing returns to scale 
In the household production model without activity benefits, we have to assume 
decreasing returns to scale, i.e. i i''( ), ''( ) 0m fZ h Z h <  or - for the specific functional form 
of net household production - cmm,cff <0 as a necessary condition for finding an 
optimum. However, increasing returns to scale is not in conflict with finding an 
optimum in the model with activity benefits. Thus, cmm,cff <0 is a sufficient but not a 
necessary condition. What matters for the possibility of finding an optimum is the 
curvature of the activity benefit function, gi(hi). In order to find an optimum for one of 
the spouses in the house, the following condition must be fulfilled for the model in its 
general form: 
 
i
i i
i
i
2
'( ) / 0
(1 '( ))
''( )*(1 '( )) '( )* ''( ) 0
(1 '( ))
''( ) ''( )
(1 '( )) '( )
i
i
i i
i i i i i i
i i
i i i
i i i
Z h h
g h
Z h g h Z h g h
g h
g h Z h
g h Z h
∂ ∂ < ⇒−
− + < ⇒−
< −−
 (26) 
Using our specific functional form for iZ  and applying the above condition to both 
male and female, this implies that: 
 max , fmmf
f m
bbc
h h
⎛ ⎞> − −⎜⎜⎝ ⎠
⎟⎟  (27) 
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Abstract
We consider theoretically and empirically the allocation of time
and money within the household. The novelty of our empirical work
is that we have a survey which provides information on both time use
and the allocation of some goods within the household, for the same
households. Thus we can consider whether a partner who enjoys more
leisure also receives more consumption, which looks like the outcome
of ’power’ within the household, or receives less consumption, which
looks like diﬀering tastes across households.
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1 Introduction
The most consistent finding regarding time use across countries and over time
is that, on average, married men do more market work and less housework
than married women. It has also been found that, on average, married men
and women enjoy much the same leisure.1 These averages, however, mask
1The major exception to this is Italy.
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very marked heterogeneity in time use within individual households. Thus we
find some households in which one partner does a good deal more work (in the
market and in the home) than the other partner and enjoys less leisure. There
are a number of possible rationale for this. First, there may be heterogeneity
in the tastes for work (relative to the output from the work) within the
household. Second, wages and/or productivity in home production may vary,
which would induce diﬀerences in the leisure taken. Finally, ‘power’ may be
distributed unevenly within the household and the ‘low power’ individual
may be required to work more. Data on time use alone do not suﬃce to
identify the relative importance of these three factors. To identify this, we
need to observe other outcomes within the household. The distribution of
material welfare within the household depends on two elements: individual
time use and the allocation of expenditures. Time use surveys give a good
picture of the distribution of time to market work, housework, leisure and
personal care between partners but do not have comparable information on
expenditures. This means that we cannot convincingly make the mapping
from time use to welfare.
As an example that we shall often return to below, consider a household
comprising of a married couple in which the wife works more (in the home
and in the market) as compared to other women with similar characteristics,
wage of husband and wife and household financial situation. To make the
link to her material welfare relative to other women, we need to know what
is happening to the distribution of goods within the household. If we would
observe that she receives more goods than we would predict, then we could
attribute the observation to her having a high taste for goods relative to
leisure.2 If, on the other hand, we observed that she also receives less goods
then it looks as though she lacks ‘power’ within the household and that the
distribution of material well-being within the household is skewed towards the
husband. Clearly, we need to observe both sets of outcomes (the allocation
of time and money) to calculate the intra-household distribution of material
well-being and its determinants.
The traditional focus of welfare analysis has been on the distribution of
material well-being across households - the inter-household distribution. The
household has been viewed as one unit, and it has implicitly been assumed
that household members do not have conflicting interests. This description
is usually referred to as the ‘unitary’ model. In the past two decades there
2We shall formalize this in the theory section below.
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has been a number of analyses of the situation in which household members
have conflicting objectives and a growing interest regarding the distribution
of material well-being within the household; that is, the intra-household dis-
tribution of material well-being. A number of diﬀerent approaches have been
suggested; see Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2005) for references. One
particularly popular approach is to assume that, however decisions are made,
the outcome is always Pareto-eﬃcient, see Chiappori (1988), Apps and Rees
(1988) and Browning and Chiappori (1998). This assumption is central in
the ‘collective model’ where the distribution of ‘power’ in the household con-
tributes to determining intra-household distribution. This paper explores
and compares the implications of adopting a ‘unitary’ versus a ‘collective’
framework to describe the allocation of well-being.
The intra-household allocation of expenditures has been the principal fo-
cus in a number of theoretical and empirical studies during the last two
decades, (see, for example, Browning et al (1994), Lundberg et al (1996)
and Phipps and Burton (1998)). Other studies have dealt with the intra-
household allocation of time, see Chiappori (1992) and (1997) and Apps and
Rees (1996) and (1997). Apps and Rees address the question of whether
household members exchange time for consumption and stress the need for
data on the simultaneous allocation of time and consumption within house-
holds.
Below we present an empirical analysis based on a survey of Danish house-
holds that was specifically designed for the research reported in this paper.
The survey is unique in the sense that it collects both time use data and
information on the intra-household allocation of goods for the same house-
holds. As far as we are aware, this is the first time that data on time use
and the allocation of goods within the household have been available in the
same survey. This gives us the opportunity to present a much fuller picture
of the distribution of material well-being within the household than has been
possible in the past. In the next section we give a description of our data col-
lection and some descriptive results for time use and individual expenditures.
In section 3 we present a simple theoretical model designed to isolate the ef-
fects discussed above. We choose a simple parameterisation for two reasons.
First, it allows us to discuss clearly what we think are the main theoretical
issues without excessive concern for perverse eﬀects due to strong substi-
tutability or complementarity between the consumption of diﬀerent goods
and time use. Second, our parameterisation leads to a structural model that
yields linear reduced forms that can be taken to the data. Also in section
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3, we discuss how to account for observed and unobserved heterogeneity and
present our identification scheme. An important aspect of our identification
scheme is that we can allow that wages are endogenous through their correla-
tion with unobservable tastes for work. In section 4 we present an empirical
structural analysis of the data on time use and the allocation of goods within
the household.
2 The Danish Time Use Survey
2.1 Background
Our data are from the Danish Time Use Survey for 2001 (DTUS). This survey
provides detailed information on time use for more than 2700 Danish individ-
uals in 2001 of whom about 1700 lived with a partner. The DTUS complies
with methodologies developed at the EU level for conducting time use sur-
veys; see Bonke (2005) for a detailed description. For married and cohabiting
respondents, the partner in the household was also asked to participate in
the survey. We have two sources of information on time use. First, each
respondent filled in a diary stating their activities at a detailed level every
15 minutes in two 24-hour periods, one a week-day and the other a weekend
day. The second source is from the questionnaire in which respondents were
asked about their ‘usual’ time use.
A unique feature of the data collection is that respondents were also asked
about their and their partner’s expenditures on three categories of goods,
bought for their own consumption. The details of the expenditure module
are given below. The module was designed by Jens Bonke and Martin Brown-
ing in collaboration with Denmarks Statistics who ran the survey. Browning,
Crossley and Weber (2003) present a discussion of the pros and cons of us-
ing information on ‘usual’ expenditures from general purpose surveys. The
broad conclusion from their analysis is that although survey measures are
noisy as compared to diary measures, they do contain a useful signal. The
questionnaire also asked about personal and household characteristics as well
as about the usage of domestic appliances and individual perception of their
economic situation.
Finally, these survey data were linked to register (administrative) infor-
mation from Denmarks Statistics on the respondent and partner, giving ac-
cess to further personal and household information and information on hous-
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ing. Particularly important in this respect is that the register data contains
a wage measure for employed individuals that is constructed independently
of the time use collected in the survey so that we do not have the familiar
division bias when considering time use and wages. The DTUS is unique in
having information on time use, individual expenditures and wages for the
same household.
2.2 Time use
As well as keeping a time diary, respondents were asked about the time they
normally spend on housework and in the labour market in a typical week.
Housework time is specified to include normal housework such as cleaning,
laundry, shopping, cooking etc. and also gardening, repairs, other do-it-
yourself work and child care.3 Market work time includes commuting. In
general, it is observed that surveys asking about normal time use have a
smaller variance, but perhaps a more imprecise mean of time use, see Juster
and Staﬀord (1991). Diary information gives more precise means, but the
variance is larger, especially when including time for home repairs etc. We
have chosen to use normal time use rather than the diary information to
avoid the very serious infrequency problems in the latter. In the Appendix
we provide a comparison of the diary records and the normal times reported.
Table 1 shows the time usage of couples, broken down by the work status
of the two partners. We define full-time market work to be at least 30 ‘nor-
mal’ hours per week, including commuting time. Thus a respondent may be
unemployed in the survey week and still report more than 30 hours per week
of market work. Part-time work is not very prevalent in Denmark so that
‘not full-time’ generally means ‘out of the labour force’ (particularly for men).
The ‘neither full-time’ group is mostly made up of older, presumably retired,
couples. Table 1 shows familiar patterns with men doing less housework than
women who have the same work status, but with leisures being roughly equal
(in mean) for those with the same status. Being full-time employed has a
dramatic eﬀect on mean leisure with about 30 hours per week less for women
and 35 hours less for men. For our purposes, a particularly important feature
of the time uses shown is their wide within category dispersion, as shown by
the standard deviations.
3As always the classification of child care as housework is contentious. No one seriously
argues that it cannot also be an important leisure activity. Since respondents were only
asked one question on housework, we cannot break out child care separately.
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Figure 1 shows the details of leisure for the ‘both full-time’ group. The left
hand panels show the levels for wives and husbands.4. As can be seen there
is considerable dispersion. The top right hand panel shows the wife’s relative
leisure, defined as the wife’s leisure relative to the husband’s leisure. The
median and mean are 0.98 and 0.99 respectively but about 10% of couples
have a leisure relative below 0.8 and 7% have above 1.25. The scatter plot
in the bottom right panel indicates a positive correlation between the two
leisures with a slope less than unity (the OLS value is 0.51 with a t-value of
14.9). There are many candidate explanations for this positive correlation,
including assortative mating on wages (so that two partners with high wages
will both take less leisure), assortative mating on preferences for leisure or
complementaries in leisure.
Females Males
Full-time m h l m h l
Both 40.5 15.7 55.8 44.7 10.9 56.4
(# = 813) (6.0) (8.7) (10.3) (9.1) (7.6) (11.1)
Wife 40.2 13.1 58.6 2.0 13.1 96.3
(# = 114) (4.9) (8.1) (10.1) (6.8) (8.1) (12.2)
Husband 5.7 18.1 88.2 45.1 9.3 57.5
(# = 311) (10.6) (11.9) (16.6) (10.5) (6.7) (12.2)
Neither 1.1 18.9 91.9 0.7 13.0 98.2
(# = 284) (5.2) (11.7) (12.9) (3.9) (10.9) (11.2)
m,h and l are market hours, housework hours
and leisure hours per week. Sd’s in brackets.
Note: m+ h+ l + 42 = 168
Table 1: Time use of wives and husbands
In the following, we analyse only the sample of households in which both
husband and wife work full-time in the labour market. This is to allow us to
focus on the role of relative wages on the intrahousehold allocation of time
and money. The analysis of the disparity in leisures between partners who do
not have the same full-time status is left for future work. The load of house-
work for full-time couples (which we define to include child care) naturally
depends on the number and ages of children within the household. Table 2
4With values below 40 set to 40 for the sake of presentation.
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Figure 1: Leisure for husband and wife.
presents time use broken down by child status. This table indicates that al-
though children have some eﬀect (in the expected directions) the diﬀerences
are not large, once we condition on both partners being in full-time work. In
particular, parents do not have drastically lower leisures which suggests that
they may even have more leisure is we re-categorise some time spent with
children as leisure.
2.3 Personal expenditures
As mentioned above, the primary objective of the DTUS was to collect infor-
mation on time use and we could only collect limited information on personal
expenditures. The following questions were asked of the respondent:
‘When you think of your own personal expenditures, how large do you
estimate it normally is on the following items during one month’:
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Females Males
# children m h l m h l
0 41.0 13.5 57.5 44.5 9.4 58.0
(# = 357) (6.3) (7.5) (9.9) (10.1) (6.5) (11.4)
1 40.7 15.1 56.2 43.7 10.7 57.6
(# = 175) (6.3) (7.5) (9.3) (7.0) (7.5) (8.8)
2+ 39.9 18.8 53.3 45.5 13.0 53.5
(# = 281) (5.4) (9.8) (10.9) (8.8) (8.5) (11.5)
Notes: see Table 1
Table 2: Time use by child category
• ‘Clothing and shoes’
• ‘Leisure activities, hobbies etc.’
• ‘Other personal consumption’
The respondent was then asked the same questions for their spouse/cohabitant.
It is very rare to have survey information on expenditures for individuals
within the household and questions can be raised about the validity of the
information obtained in this way. Fortunately, in Denmark we have a reliable
survey of within household allocations from the Danish Household Expendi-
ture Survey (DHES) which can be used to check the validity of our responses.
The DHES is a conventional diary based survey of expenditures with the un-
conventional feature that respondents keeping an expenditure diary record
who the item was bought for (‘her’, ‘him’, ‘the household’, ‘children’ and
’other’).5 Since the DHES has very detailed categories for goods we can
construct aggregates that correspond to our three aggregates. Comparing
the information in our survey (the DTUS) and the DHES we find that for
‘clothing’ and ‘recreation’, the expenditure shares are very close to the cor-
responding groups from DHES. For ‘other personal consumption’, there is
some divergence, but this may very well be attributed to diﬀerences in the
definition of this group. In future work we shall combine the information
from both surveys but this raises statistical issues (mainly dealing with the
infrequency in the DHES data) that would take us too far from the analysis
presented here.
5This is also due to a data initiative of Bonke and Browning.
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Figure 2: Wife’s expenditure relative to husband’s.
Many households did not give consumption information and some had
missing wage information in the administrative data. In the end we have
615 households in which both partners are in full-time work and for which
we have all of the necessary time use, expenditure, wage and demographic
information. Appendix A.5 gives details of the sample selection. Figure 2
shows the distribution of the wife’s relative expenditure (with values above
3 set to that value) for that sample. As can be seen the mode is close to
unity and, indeed, many households report exactly the same expenditures on
the three goods for husband and wife. This clearly indicates some reporting
error but informal analysis (which assumes that the ‘same value’ reports are
due to rounding) suggests that this does not lead to significant bias. In the
data 20% of households have an expenditure relative above 1.5 and 18% have
a value below 1/1.5.
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Figure 3: Expenditure and leisure
Figure 3 shows the scatter plot of relative leisures against relative expen-
ditures for our sample. This is at the heart of our research question. If within
household heterogeneity dominates then, conditional on relative wages, the
two relative measures should be negatively correlated. If, on the other hand,
power dominates then the correlation should be positive. The scatter dia-
gram shows a mild positive association (the OLS value is 0.029 with a t-value
of 2.35) but this does not take account of diﬀerences in relative wages. To
do that we need a structural model.
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3 Theory
3.1 Allocation within the household
In this section we develop a simple model of the allocation of time and money
within the household. We consider a two person household with A being ‘she’
and B being ‘he’. The two members of the household sell labour on a labour
market at fixed wages and they buy private goods which are distributed
between the two partners. The members of the household also engage in
housework which produces a public good that is consumed jointly. Table 3
presents our notation and the following equations give the constraints the
household faces.
xH + xA + xB = wAmA + wBmB + y (1)
lA + hA +mA = T (2)
lB + hB +mB = T (3)
Q = F (hA, hB, xH) (4)
In these constraints we assume that the household public good, Q, is pro-
duced with inputs of time and physical inputs for household production
(equation (4)). We assume that F (.) is smooth with FA, FB and Fx (the
partials with respect to the respective levels of housework and money inputs)
all positive.
xA A’s total expenditure on private goods
xH Expenditure on household production
Q Household public good
lA A’s leisure time
hA A’s housework time
mA A’s market work
wA A’s wage
y Household ‘other income’
We adopt the convention of denoting relative values
by the notation without subscripts. For example:
x A’s relative expenditure = xA/xB
w A’s relative wage = wA/wB
Table 3: Notation
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Given the constraints the household faces, we have to model how the two
people make decisions over the ten choice variables:
(xH , xA, xB, Q, lA, lB, hA, hB,mA,mB)
We assume that each person has private preferences over their own goods,
represented by the felicity function:
uA = uA (xA, Q, lA)
uB = uB (xB, Q, lB) (5)
This formulation explicitly assumes that there are no externalities so that, for
example, A’s valuation of her leisure is independent of her husband’s leisure.
The ‘no externalities’ assumption is undoubtedly unrealistic but is widely
used since it allows us to infer individual welfares from potential observables.
We will return to the discussion on complementarity in leisures below. We
are also assuming that the two partners are indiﬀerent between time spent
in housework and time spent in market work. If we wished to allow for
diﬀerential preferences over the two time uses then we would need to include
hA in A’s utility function, and similarly for B.
We extend preferences by allowing that each person cares for the other
(or ‘defers to’ the other, to use a term suggested by Pollak) and that the
respective social welfare functions for the household are given by:
ΨA = uA + λAuB (6)
ΨB = u
B + λBu
A (7)
where we shall assume that the weights λA and λB are non-negative. Given
these preferences there are a number of ways of modelling the interactions
between the two partners that lead to household outcomes. Here we adopt a
collective framework in which the two partners agree that they will maximise
the weighted sum of their individual social welfare functions to generate a
household social welfare function, Ψ, according to:
Ψ (xA, xB, Q, lA, lB) = µ˜ΨA + (1− µ˜)ΨB, µ˜ ∈ [0, 1]
= µuA (xA, Q, lA) + u
B (xB, Q, lB) (8)
where the second expression follows from a convenient re-normalisation, using
(6) and (7). The Pareto weight µ is a composite of the distribution of power
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within the household (the parameter µ˜) and the degree of caring (given by
λA and λB). This brings out explicitly that one person caring for the other
has a similar eﬀect for observables as a lack of power. If we assume that
the Pareto weight for A, µ, is a fixed constant then we have a ‘unitary’
model. As opposed to this, an important idea in the ‘collective’ framework
is that the Pareto weight (which is here defined as the weight put on the
woman’s individual utility in the household utility function) is positively
related to the ‘power’ of the wife. Generally, the intra-household distribution
of ‘power’ may depend on so-called distribution factors. These are potential
observables such as relative wages and extra-household factors such as the
sex ratio in the population and unobservables such as the degree of caring
and the personalities of the two partners.
Given the constraints (equations (1) to (4)) and (8) we have the following
four equations (the derivations are given in the Appendix):
uBx
uAx
= µ (9)
uBl
uAl
= µ
wB
wA
=
µ
w
(10)
uBl
uBx
= wB (11)
uAl
uAx
= wA (12)
From (11) and (12) we see that each partner acts as an individual for their
choice of private consumption and leisure, conditional on a given level of
Q. This is the familiar result that if there are no externalities then we can
decentralise any allocation by a redistribution of initial endowments. In this
case it is as though, given Q, A solves:
max
xA,lA
uA (xA, Q, lA) subject to xA + wAlA = yA
where yA is A’s allocation of income for private expenditure and leisure. The
term yA is known as the sharing rule in the intra-household literature. Note
that we have:
yA + yB = (y − xH) + (T − hA)wA + (T − hB)wB
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so that the individual notional incomes sum to full income for the household,
net of the costs of inputs to the public good. In the analysis here where
we explicitly consider time use, the sharing rule is for the sharing of full
income; that is, both time and money (net of expenditures on the public
good). Once we have empirical estimates of the utility and Pareto weight
functions we shall present results for the sharing rule for full expenditures.
3.2 A convenient parameterisation
In the following treatment of the model for the household equilibrium set out
in equations (9) through (12), we focus on the first two of these conditions.
These can be used to derive expressions for relative expenditure and relative
leisure that we discussed in the introduction to this paper. This expression
will generally contain the unobservable level of home produced good, Q, so
that we have to assume some separability in the utility function in our em-
pirical work. We choose to work with a particularly simple parameterisation
that incorporates this assumption. As discussed in the introduction, this
simple parameterisation allows us to derive key theoretical results and also
to derive a tractable structural model to take to the data. The model also
implies some over-identifying assumptions which we shall test. The value of
having an explicit structural model for the empirical analysis is that it allows
us to state our identifying assumptions clearly and it allows us to interpret
the estimated parameters.
We assume that the utility functions are additive over the three argu-
ments:
uA = θA ln (xA) + τA
µ
ρ
ρ− 1
¶
(lA)(
ρ−1
ρ ) + f (Q)
uB = θB ln (xB) + τB
µ
ρ
ρ− 1
¶
(lB)(
ρ−1
ρ ) + f (Q) (13)
where, without loss of generality, we have normalised the preferences on the
public good to be the same for both partners. This parameterisation has two
major restrictions: the additivity and the use of power forms for consumption
and leisure. The additivity is restrictive, but not as much as might first be
thought. For example, it is reasonably well established that consumption
and market work are complementary (see Browning, Hansen and Heckman
(1999) for a survey of empirical results). This is usually assumed to be
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because there are costs of going to work and because agents can substitute
housework for market goods in household production. The additive forms
given in (13) imply the observed non-separabilities of total expenditure and
market work; details are given in the Appendix A.2. Thus the additive form
is more flexible than it first appears.
The second restrictive feature of our parameterisation is the use of the
power form. This is frankly for convenience since it allows us to derive closed
form expressions for relative leisure and relative expenditure. If we took other
forms then we would have four equations (for each partners level of leisure
and expenditure) rather than two. The power form taken for the sub-utility
function for leisure is to allow that labour supply in a unitary model may not
be very responsive to changes in wages. Concavity requires ρ > 0 and some
leisure is always required if ρ < 1. The parameter ρ is the negative of the
Frisch (or λ-constant) elasticity of leisure with respect to the wage; details
are given in Appendix A.3. Reliable estimates of this parameter are in short
supply (see Browning et al (1999)) but a low value (of about 0.1) is thought
appropriate.6
Within household heterogeneity is captured by the parameters θA, θB, τA
and τB; we postpone discussion of between household heterogeneity until the
next subsection. From (9) we have:
µ =
uBx
uAx
=
θB
θA
xA
xB
=
¡
θ−1
¢ xA
xB
(14)
where θ = θA/θB symbolizes A’s preferences for private consumption relative
to B’s preferences for consumption. Denoting A’s relative consumption by x
we have:
x =
xA
xB
= θµ (15)
The distribution of leisure in the household is given by (10). It is straight-
forward to show that A’s relative leisure, l, is given by:
l =
lA
lB
=
µ
µτ
wB
wA
¶ρ
= (µτ)ρw−ρ (16)
where τ = τA/τB is A’s relative weighting for leisure.7
6We could replace the log for private consumption by a similar formulation, but this
turns out not to be necessary in the empirical analysis.
7Note that if we allowed the curvature parameter σ to vary across the partners then
we would not have a simple form for the relative leisures.
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We consider first comparative statics results for a unitary model. For
variations in (µ, θ, τ) these are:
∂x
∂µ
> 0,
∂l
∂µ
> 0 (17)
∂x
∂θ
> 0,
∂l
∂θ
= 0 (18)
∂x
∂τ
= 0,
∂l
∂τ
> 0 (19)
The first result states that A’s consumption and leisure both increase if her
Pareto weight increases. The other two pairs of equations show that we can
sensibly interpret θ and τ as being pure consumption and leisure heterogene-
ity terms. More interesting is the eﬀect of changes in distribution factors
for a non-unitary model. We denote the distribution factors by (z1, ...zD, w)
where we distinguish between unspecified distribution factors (the zd’s) and
the relative wage. We have (denoting the partial of µ with respect to zd by
µd):
∂x
∂zd
= θµd (20)
∂l
∂zd
= ρµρ−1τρw−ρµd (21)
and
∂x
∂w
= θµw (22)
∂l
∂w
= −ρ (µτ)ρw−ρ−1 + ρµρ−1τρw−ρµw (23)
Equations (20) to (23) have two interesting corollaries. The first considers the
reactions to two diﬀerent non-wage distribution factors, zi and zj. Dividing
one by the other we have the following proportionality result:
∂x
∂zi
/
∂l
∂zi
=
∂x
∂zj
/
∂l
∂zj
(24)
This extends the proportionality results of Browning et al (1994) and Bour-
guignon et al (2005) which derive similar restrictions for demands. Those
papers show that these restrictions are necessary and suﬃcient for a collective
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model. The restriction (24) is testable if we have at least two distribution
factors.
The second interesting implication of the responses to changes in distri-
bution factors is the result for the variation of the relative leisure, l, with
respect to the relative wage, equation (23). The first term on the right hand
side is the familiar labour supply response which is the only eﬀect in the
unitary model. Here we shall call this eﬀect the unitary eﬀect. It is negative
which implies that an increase in A’s relative wage leads to a fall in her
relative leisure. In a unitary setting the Pareto weight is unaﬀected by the
change in relative wages (µw = 0), so that she will be relatively worse oﬀ (as
compared to her husband) even though her relative wage has increased. Of
course, she may be absolutely better oﬀ since the total expenditure increases.
If we assume that a higher relative wage increases the Pareto weight (µw > 0)
then the second expression on the right hand side of (23) is positive. This
represents the collective eﬀect, over and above the unitary eﬀect. Formally
the collective eﬀect will dominate if the elasticity of the Pareto weight with
respect to the relative wage is greater than unity:
∂l
∂w
> 0⇔ ∂ lnµ
∂ lnw
> 1 (25)
Once again, this is a testable condition. The relative expenditure response
to a change in the relative wage (22) is positive if the Pareto weight is
positively related to the relative wage (µw > 0). In a unitary framework,
relative expenditure is unaﬀected by a change in the relative wage (µw > 0).
This is also a testable condition.
3.3 Heterogeneity
In our empirical work we shall use a cross-section of Danish households. In
this subsection we discuss informally how heterogeneity in the population re-
lates to observables such as the distribution of private expenditures within the
household. In our data we observe: {xA, xB, wA, wB, lA,lB,mA,mB, hA, hB}.8
We also observe demographics such as the age, education and work sta-
tus of the partners, household composition (mainly the number and ages
of children) and household income. In our empirical work below we shall
8Actually, we only observe three sub-components of expenditures for each partner on
private goods; we postpone how we deal with the missing information until the empirical
section.
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concentrate on the female relative leisure, l, and household expenditure, x.
In particular, we will investigate how these variables relate to observable
characteristics and to each other through unobservables.
We begin our discussion assuming that we have a sample of households
from a population who all have the same observable characteristics, including
wages wA and wB. In the model of the last subsection, equations (15) and
(16), we had three parameters for each household: {µ, θ, τ}. These parame-
ters are distributed across our population. Given particular assumptions on
the joint distribution of household parameters, we ask what are the implica-
tions for the joint distribution of {x, l} for the population? The important
implications are the following.
Proposition 1 If there is variation in power across the population so that
µ has a non-degenerate distribution and θ is independent of τ then x and l
will be positively correlated.
This corresponds to the case in our introduction in which variations in ex-
penditure and leisure shares derive from variations in the ‘power’ parameter
µ. The converse case is given by:
Proposition 2 If there is no variation in µ but θ and τ are negatively cor-
related then x and l will be negatively correlated.
That is, if the relative taste (between husband and wife) for leisure and the
relative taste for private expenditure are negatively correlated then shares
will also be negatively correlated. This corresponds to the ’taste diﬀerence’
case discussed in the introduction. In general, of course, we must allow that
all three factors are heterogeneous and interdependent.
Having considered unobserved heterogeneity we can now consider observ-
able heterogeneity. In our sample, households diﬀer widely in their observable
characteristics and we have to allow that the household parameters depend
on these. To accommodate this, we assume that the parameters depend on
observables. In the case of the Pareto weight µ, the dependence is on what
are termed distribution factors as well as on unobservable factors. Candi-
dates for the observable distribution factors are household income and the
relative wages, relative ages and relative educational levels of the two part-
ners. The unobservables could include, for example, the outside options the
two partners have (contained in µ˜ in equation (8)) and how much they care
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for each other (λA and λB in (6) and (7)). The other two parameters, θ and
τ , are taste parameters that may depend on unobservables such as the idio-
syncratic taste for work and an observable vector of preference factors such
as the age and education of the two partners and the presence of children.
One weakness of our model is that we have assumed away complemen-
taries between female and male time use. Previous contributions, using uni-
tary models, by Hamermesh (2000), Hallberg (2003) and Ruuskanen (2004)
address the issue of couples synchronising their time in both market work,
housework and leisure and analyze the eﬀects of economic and demographic
variables on jointness in time-use. A central feature in these contributions is
the distinction between a general time synchronization in society, due to the
organisation of the labour market, shop opening hours etc., and the intended
synchronization of couples’ time based on their wish to spend some time to-
gether. This distinction is usually analyzed based on the diﬀerence between
synchronization of time in ‘pseudo couples’ who have been matched based
on a number of observable characteristics and in real couples, see Hallberg
(2003). Based on Finnish time-use data with a highly detailed level of activi-
ties, Ruuskanen (2004) finds that couples tend to spend around 20%−25% of
their leisure together during weekdays, while around one third of the leisure
is spent together during weekends. The overall conclusion in the contribu-
tions by Hamermesh (2000), Hallberg (2003) and Ruuskanen (2004) is that
jointness in the timing of leisure and housework is important. However,
the evidence regarding the sign and size of the eﬀects of economic and de-
mographic variables is somewhat mixed. Allowing for complementarity by
extending the collective model we use leads to a much more complicated
model and we leave it for future work. However, some simulations of our
model suggest that introducing complementarity would not change the sign
of the eﬀects discussed above, but would only tend to diminish the numerical
size of the eﬀects since the two partners will tend to make their individual
leisure choice approach the leisure approach of their partner.
3.4 Empirical specification
As mentioned above, in our empirical work, we concentrate on the female
relative expenditure and leisure share, see equations (15) and (16). We have
information on wages, wA and wB, but we do not, of course, have any mea-
sures for µ, θ and τ . In the household allocation literature, it is usually
suggested that the Pareto weight µ depends on a set of distribution factors
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including the diﬀerences in age, education and wage between the two spouses
as well as environmental factors as the population (or regional) sex ratio. All
these factors impact each of the spouses opportunities outside the marriage
and are therefore argued to aﬀect each of the partners ‘power’ within the
marriage. For the empirical specification of the model, we model µ in the
following way (re-calling that w represents the relative wage):
µ = exp(α0 + α0zd + δw ln (w) + εµ) (26)
where zd is a D-vector of non-wage distribution factors.9 The unitary eﬀect
outweighs the collective eﬀect in equation (23) if δw < 1. The zero-mean
variable εµ is an error term which captures other factors aﬀecting µ which
we have not been able to account for explicitly with our data.
Turning to the preference parameters, we model A’s relative taste for con-
sumption and leisure, θ and τ respectively, as a function of a set of household
attributes such as age and the presence of children, za, and unobservable
components:
θ = exp(γθ0 + γ
0
θza + εθ) (27)
τ = exp(γτ0 + γ
0
τza + ετ) (28)
We assume that the distribution factors (zd, ln (w)) are disjoint from the
preference factors za.
Before substituting these parameterisations into the equations derived
above we have to take account of the fact that we only observe a subset of
expenditures by each partner. If we let x∗ denote the ‘true’ relative expen-
diture and x be the relative expenditure calculated from the subset of goods
we observe then we define implicitly a factor η by:
x ≡ eηx∗ (29)
The factor η varies across households. Our model above relates to x∗ but
our empirical modelling uses x.
Entering (26), (27) and (28) into (15) and (16) (allowing for equation
(29)) and taking logs, we have the following pair of structural equations for
the shares of observables:
9In our empirical work below we test for whether the two log wage measures enter
separately (so that the Pareto weight depends on the level of wages as well as the relative
value). We reject this so we discuss the simpler form here.
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ln
xA
xB
= lnx = (α0 + γθ0) + α
0zd + γ0θza + δw ln (w) + (εθ + εµ + η) (30)
and
ln
lA
lB
= ln l = ρ (α0 + γτ0) + ρα
0zd + ργ0τza
+ρ (δw − 1) ln (w) + ρ (ετ + εµ) (31)
Our primary parameters of interest are the Pareto weight parameters (α0, α, δw).
This structural system has a system of linear reduced forms:
lnx = πx0 + π0xzd + π
0
θza + πxw ln (w) + εx (32)
ln l = πl0 + π
0
lzd + π
0
τza + πlw ln (w) + εl (33)
Although parameter ρ is identified if we have estimates of the reduced form
parameters, we do not feel confident in the estimate since it is a parameter
that governs intertemporal allocation and we have only cross-section data.
Consequently we shall present results with a priori plausible values for ρ.
If we fix ρ then all of the parameters of primary interest are identified
from either equation, except for the intercept α0. The result that we cannot
identify the ‘location’ of the Pareto weight is generic; as Bourguignon et al
(2005) we can only identify the Pareto weight if we observe the allocation of
all goods to each partner. If we take a particular value for ρ then this gives
the following D + 1 cross-equation restrictions:
πil = ρπ
i
x for i = 1, 2...D (34)
πlw = ρ (πxw − 1) (35)
where πil is the ith element of πl. These restrictions are a test of our main-
tained assumptions. Finally we note that if we assume that εθ, ετ and η are
distributed independently of each other then we expect a positive correla-
tion between the errors in the two reduced form equations, through their
dependence on εµ.
To close this section we consider the identification of our parameters
of interest. Since we do not have panel data we necessarily have to make
strong assumptions concerning the unobserved heterogeneity. The strongest
assumption is that both the composite errors εx and εl are uncorrelated
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with the right hand side variables in the two equations. For some of the
components this is unobjectionable. For example, the assumption that the
mismatch between true expenditure shares and observed expenditure shares
(η) is uncorrelated with a preference factor such as age is probably innocuous.
The strongest element of our identifying assumption is that wages are uncor-
related with ετ which captures relative preferences for work. We might well
expect that a high taste for work leads to higher wages, all other observables
(such as education) being considered. In the intrahousehold literature we are
forced to make this exogeneity assumption for want of a decent instrument
for wages. Since we have two equations and cross-equation restrictions, we
can test for this in our framework. Suppose that:
εl = κ ln (w) + ε˜l (36)
where ε˜l is uncorrelated with ln (w), zd and za. Then the log relative wage in
equation (33) is exogenous if and only if κ = 0. Substituting (36) into (31)
gives:
ln l = ...+ ρ (δw − 1 + κ) ln (w) + ρ (ε˜τ + εµ) (37)
In this case, the test for the restriction in (35) can be viewed as an exogeneity
test. If we reject exogeneity then we only impose estimate (34) to derive our
estimates of the structural parameters. Note, however, that the test depends
on the value of ρ we assume and we can always choose a value for the latter
that makes the estimate of κ exactly zero.
4 Results
4.1 Parameter estimates and tests
We first present the estimates for a completely unrestricted model, see Table
4. A number of features of these estimates deserve attention. First, the
children variables are insignificant in both equations. It is important to
emphasise that the latter finding for the leisure equation does not imply
that mothers and fathers do the same amount of child care (here classified
as housework); for example the estimates are consistent with mothers doing
more child care and fathers doing more market work (a common finding in
the literature for young children) or more other types of housework. Second,
the parameter estimates for log wages in the expenditure equation are of
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Relative Relative
Variable expenditures leisures
Constant −.735 [1.20] −.243 [1.34]
log gross hhold inc. .183 [1.04] .096 [1.83]
log wife’s wage .195 [1.95] −.098 [3.28]
log husband’s wage −.192 [1.62] −.012 [0.35]
wife’s age −.019 [3.24] .000 [0.01]
husband’s age .015 [2.59] −.000 [0.17]
wife’s education −.012 [1.07] .006 [1.90]
husband’s education −.004 [0.34] .007 [2.15]
# young children −.059 [1.09] −.003 [0.19]
# older children −.015 [0.30] −.011 [0.76]
R2 .027 .039
Correlation (χ2 (1)) 0.11 (6.92)
Values in [.] are absolute t-values.
Table 4: Estimates of unrestricted model
very similar absolute magnitude but opposite sign (see the footnote following
equation (26)). Third, the age variables in the two equations sum to close to
zero and are significant in the expenditure equation. Fourth, the education
variables enter with the same sign within each equation.
Before moving on to the structural estimation it is worth testing for some
restrictions on the reduced form; specifically, whether we can replace the
levels of his and her variables by their diﬀerence. More specifically, we test
whether the coeﬃcient to the wife’s wage is equal to the negative of the coef-
ficient to the husband’s wage etc., as our first look at the estimates suggests.
We test these restrictions on both equations jointly. The χ2 (2) statistics
for these within-equation restrictions on the log wages, age and education
are 4.69, 2, 33 and 19.94 respectively (with probabilities of 9.6%, 31% and 0
respectively).10
Consequently we impose the first two restrictions on the reduced form;
parameter estimates are given in Table 5. As can been seen, the coeﬃcients
on other variables do not change significantly and the diﬀerenced variables
are more ‘significant’. Thus the reduced form estimates point toward relative
wage having a positive eﬀect on the relative expenditures and a negative eﬀect
10In all cases the diﬀerence is her value minus his.
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Relative Relative
Variable expenditures leisures
Constant −.706 [1.16] −.227 [1.24]
Log gross hhold inc. .146 [1.40] .003 [0.09]
Log relative wage .191 [2.83] −.051 [2.52]
Relative age −.016 [2.93] .001 [0.36]
Female education −.011 [0.96] .006 [1.82]
Male education −.003 [0.26] .007 [2.12]
Young children −.021 [0.44] −.002 [0.16]
Older children −.023 [0.46] −.010 [0.73]
R2 .027 .039
Correlation (χ2 (1)) 0.11 (6.97)
Values in [.] are standard errors.
Table 5: Estimates of reduced form
on relative leisures. The diﬀerence between her age and his age has a negative
eﬀect on relative expenditure implying that the oldest of the spouses has a
relatively smaller expenditure share. Finally, note that the R2 is low for both
equations and that there is significant positive correlation between the errors
in the two equations. We turn now to the interpretation given the structural
model derived above.
4.2 Structural estimates and implications
When we consider the theoretical restrictions on the reduced form equation
estimates we have to decide which right hand side variables are distribution
factors and which are preference factors. For the former, relative wages and
household gross income are natural candidates since they are not usually
taken to be preference factors and hence should only enter the expenditure
equation through the Pareto weight. Conversely, the children dummies can
reasonably be taken as preference factors since they impact directly on the
value of leisure. Following the results in Browning et al (1994)) we also
choose to take the diﬀerence in age as a distribution factor; this does not
rule out that preferences depend on age but simply that the dependence is
the same for husband and wife. We leave the classification of the education
variables to the data. If we do not impose exogeneity of the relative wage in
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the leisure equation (see equation (37)) then we have two restrictions (for the
diﬀerence in age and log household income). To test we take a value for the
curvature parameter of ρ = 0.1, which is in line with ρ-values found in other
empirical studies.11 The value of the χ2 (2) test statistic for the restriction
given in equation (34) is 1.81 (probability = 40%). We impose these two
restrictions and then test for (35). Given that we assume that relative wage
is a distribution factor, this is a test for the exogeneity of log relative wages
in the relative leisure equation. The χ2 (1) statistic for exogeneity is 2.69
(probability= 10%). Given that this is marginally significant we shall present
results with and without exogeneity. The first and second set of columns in
Table 6 present the estimates for the structural model without and with (35)
imposed respectively.12
Our main parameter of interest is the coeﬃcient for the log relative wage.
As we would expect the eﬀect is stronger when we impose exogeneity (com-
pare the estimates of 0.189 and 0.213 in the expenditure equation) but for
both cases it is positive in the consumption equation and negative in the
relative leisure share equation. As we recall from (22), the relative wage only
aﬀects relative expenditure through its positive eﬀect on the Pareto weight,
see equations (25) and (31). This is evidence in favour of the collective model.
The fact that the relative wage is negative in the relative leisure equation
is not contradictory to the collective framework, but on the other hand a
positive eﬀect would have given extra evidence in its support. However, a
negative eﬀect means that the unitary eﬀect outweights the collective eﬀect
for leisures, see (23).The diﬀerence in age has a negative eﬀect on the Pareto
weight so that wives who are older than their husbands have less power.
Finally, the level of gross household income has a positive eﬀect suggesting
that wives do better in high income households but note that this eﬀect is
statistically weak. We interpret our results as being consistent with a non-
unitary, collective framework as a suitable description of household decision
making for expenditures and time use.
Figure 4 shows the implications of our estimates in graphical form, with
exogeneity of relative wages imposed. Since the intercept for the Pareto
11In our estimation the optimal value of σ was 0.06. Using this value rather than the
value of 0.1 gives very similar results.
12The parameter estimates for the education variables suggest that we cannot treat
them (or their diﬀerence) as distribution factors; a formal test of (34) confirms this. We
also note that excluding the ‘insignificant’ preference factors makes only a small diﬀerence
for the coeﬃcients on the distribution factors.
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Relative wage Relative wage
endogenous exogenous
Relative expenditure equation
Constant −.657 [1.10] −.652 [1.09]
Log hhold gross inc. .138 [1.35] .138 [1.35]
Log relative wage .189 [2.81] .213 [3.24]
Diﬀerence in age −.015 [2.71] −.015 [2.71]
Female education −.010 [0.94] −.011 [1.01]
Male education −.003 [0.23] −.002 [0.16]
Young children −.021 [0.44] −.020 [0.41]
Older children −.022 [0.44] −.021 [0.42]
Relative leisure equation
Constant −.289 [4.01] −.295 [4.09]
Log hhold gross inc. .014 [1.35] .014 [1.35]
Log relative wage −.048 [2.47] −.079 [11.96]
Diﬀerence in age −.001 [2.71] −.001 [2.71]
Female education .006 [1.74] .007 [2.08]
Male education .007 [2.05] .006 [1.77]
Young children −.002 [0.15] −.004 [0.29]
Older children −.012 [0.81] −.013 [0.90]
Correlation of errors 0.11 0.11
Values in [.] are absolute t-values.
Table 6: Structural form estimates
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weight is not identified (see the discussion preceding (34)) we take the relative
expenditures to be unity when the wages and the ages are the same and
household income is at the mean of the data. The variation in relative wages
on the x-axis is from her wage being half of his (lnw = −0.65) to her wage
being 60% higher than his (lnw = 0.5). The variation in relative expenditures
over this range for medium income households is from around 0.86 to 1.11
so that changes in relative wages lead to substantial changes in expenditure
shares: an elasticity of 0.22. The upper and lower lines show the responses for
changes in household income of one half of the mean to twice the mean; these
are also substantial (about 0.89 to 1.09) but recall that these are imprecisely
estimated. The results for the eﬀect of relative wages on relative leisures are
a compound of a unitary eﬀect (here fixed to be 0.1) and a collective eﬀect.
For the latter the coeﬃcients are the same as for relative expenditures except
that the coeﬃcient is multiplied by ρ = 0.1 (see (30) and (31)). The unitary
eﬀect elasticity is −0.1 (by assumption) and the collective eﬀect elasticity is
+0.02 so that the net elasticity is 0.08.
As we have seen the fits of our reduced form equations are rather poor
( 2.7% and 3.9% for expenditures and leisures respectively) and most of the
variation in relative expenditures and leisures is unexplained. If we are willing
to make strong assumptions concerning the error terms in (30) and (31) then
we can decompose this latent variation into that part which is due to the
unobserved variation in Pareto weights and the part due to measurement
error and unobserved preference factors. To do this we assume:
E ((εθ + η) εµ) = E (ετεµ) = E ((εθ + η) ετ ) = 0 (38)
Under these assumptions the variances of (εθ + η), ετ and εµ are identified
from the error variances σ2x, and σ
2
l and the covariance, cov (εx, εl). The
estimated values of the latter are 0.329, 0.0296 and 0.01 respectively. Under
our assumptions we have:
cov (εx, εl) = ρσ2µ (39)
so that the variance of εµ, σ2µ, is 0.1. The proportions of the latent variation
that are explained by the Pareto weight are given by:
σ2µ
σ2x
=
0.1
0.329
= 0.304 (40)
ρ2σ2µ
σ2l
=
0.01 ∗ 0.1
0.0296
= 0.003 (41)
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Figure 4: The variation in relative expenditures
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for expenditures and leisures respectively. Thus about 30% of the unex-
plained variation in relative expenditures can be attributed to variations in
power but only a fraction (0.3%) can be attributed thus for the leisure rela-
tives.
5 Conclusions
This paper treats the interactions between the allocation of time and the
allocation of expenditure within the household. We develop a simple col-
lective model with household production which allows us to bring out the
main theoretical issues and also to discuss explicitly issues of accounting for
heterogeneity, measurement error and exogeneity in our empirical work. We
show that if there is no wage variation across households and there is hetero-
geneity in power and uncorrelated heterogeneity in preferences over work and
private goods then relative expenditures and relative leisure will be positively
correlated. Conversely, if there is no variation in power and preferences for
work and private consumption are negatively correlated then the relative ex-
penditures and leisures will be negatively correlated. We show how variations
in wages across couples modify these predictions. For our parametrisation,
the eﬀects of changes in relative wages can be decomposed additively into a
unitary eﬀect and a collective eﬀect. In the relative expenditure equation,
the unitary eﬀect is zero, so only the collective eﬀect is in play. In the rela-
tive leisure equations, both eﬀects are operating, see (23). These two eﬀects
have opposite signs so that the net eﬀect is ambiguous. Finally, we provide a
general proportionality test for a collective model in which all outcomes are
eﬃcient.
Although we present theoretical results, the main contribution of our pa-
per is to provide an empirical analysis of the intra-household allocation of
time and money, making use of a unique data set with information on both
time use, assignable private expenditures and individual wages for more than
600 households. Even though we have a relatively small sample and noisy
data some strong signals come through loud and clear in the empirical analy-
sis. In the raw data, leisure and assignable expenditures are relatively equal
for husbands and wives in the mean, but there is a great deal of heterogeneity
across couples. We find that wives who have more leisure also have higher
expenditures, without controlling for any observable covariates. In a reduced
form analysis we find that relative wages have a significant and positive ef-
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fect on relative expenditures and a significant and negative eﬀect on relative
leisures.
Turning to our structural model, we find that tests for a collective model
do not reject. We also find that age diﬀerences and gross household income
can be treated as distribution factors. The evidence on the exogeneity of
relative wages in the relative leisure equation is marginal but the conclusions
are much the same whether or not we treat relative wages as exogenous in that
equation. In terms of observables, distribution factors have a large impact on
relative expenditures but only a small (albeit, statistically significant) impact
on relative leisures. Thus moving from the wife having a wage that is half her
husband’s to having a wage that is double increases her share of assignable
expenditures by about 25%. The same variation decreases her relative share
of leisure by about 8%, most of which can be attributed to the unitary eﬀect.
Most of the variation in observed relative expenditures and observed relative
leisures is unexplained. Under strong assumptions we conclude that about
30% of the unexplained variation in relative expenditures is due to variations
in unobserved power but almost none of the unexplained variation in leisures
can be accounted for by variations in power.
A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of theoretical results
Given the household utility function:
Ψ = µuA(xA, Q, lA) + uB(xB, Q, lB) =
= µuA(xA, F
µ
T − lA −mA, T − lB −
(xH + xA + xB − y − wAmA)
wB
, xH
¶
, lA)+
+uB(xB, F
µ
T − lA −mA, T − lB −
(xH + xA + xB − y − wAmA)
wB
, xH
¶
, lB)
(42)
which is maximised with respect to the six control variables (xA, xB, lA, lB,mA, xH).
Assuming interior solutions13 we have the following first order conditions:
µuAx = (µu
A
Q + u
B
Q)
FB
wB
13In our sample below, all partners are in market work and all report positive levels of
leisure.
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uBx = (µu
A
Q + u
B
Q)
FB
wB
FA =
µuAl
µuAQ + u
B
Q
FB =
uBl
µuAQ + u
B
Q
FA = FB
wA
wB
Fx = FB
1
wB
In our data, we do not observe anything about the output of the public
good produced, so we cannot hope to use the conditions on the marginal
productivities FA, FB and Fx. Rearranging the first-order conditions, we end
up with the four equations (9)-(12) in the text.
A.2 Derived preferences over total expenditure and
market work
We here show that if preferences over consumption, leisure and the home
produced good are additive then derived preferences over total expenditure
and market work have ‘consumption’ non-separable from market work. Sup-
pose we have a single person with the utility function u (x,Q, l) and access
to home production Q = F (h, y) where h is housework and y is expenditure
on home production. Time use satisfies the constraint: m + l + h = T . We
define a derived utility function over total expenditure, c = x+y, and market
work, m, by:
V (c,m) = max
y,h
{u (c− y, F (h, y) , T − h−m)} (43)
That is, the total expenditure, c, is divided optimally between direct con-
sumption (c−y) and home production (y) and housework is chosen optimally,
given the market work level, m. By the envelope theorem we have:
Vc (c,m) = ux
³
c− yˆ, F
³
hˆ, yˆ
´
, T − hˆ−m
´
(44)
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where subscripts denote partial derivatives. Taking derivatives with respect
to m we have:
Vcm (c,m) = −uxx
∂yˆ
∂m
+ uxQ
"
Fh
∂hˆ
∂m
+ Fy
∂yˆ
∂m
#
− uxl
∂hˆ
∂m
(45)
If we impose additivity on u (.) this gives:
Vcm (c,m) = −uxx
∂yˆ
∂m
(46)
which is positive if housework and market inputs to home production are
substitutes ( ∂yˆ∂m < 0). Thus consumption (c) and market work (m) are com-
plements in the derived utility function.
A.3 The interpretation of the leisure curvature para-
meter
Once again we consider a single agent and we ignore home production. Our
parameterisation (13) has:
u (c, l) = ln c+
µ
ρ
ρ− 1
¶
(l)(
ρ−1
ρ ) (47)
Denoting wage by w the first order condition is:
ul = wuc = λw (48)
where λ is the marginal utility of consumption. Using the parameterisation
and normalising the total time available to unity (l + h = 1), we have the
following closed form for the Frisch (or λ-constant) labour supply function:
hˆ = 1− (λw)−ρ (49)
The Frisch elasticity is then given by:
∂hˆ
∂w
w
hˆ
= ρ
µ
1− h
h
¶
' 2ρ (50)
if we assume that full-time work is about h = 1/3. Generally the left hand
side elasticity is thought to be small with values of 0.1 − 0.2 thought to be
plausible, so that values of around 0.05− 0.1 are probably reasonable for ρ.
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A.4 Data selection
The initial data set consists of 1767 couples. Of these couples, we have
information on hours spent in the labour market, in household production
and in leisure for 1522 couples. In our analysis we confine ourselves to looking
at couples where both work full time, that is 813 couples. For a little more
than 100 of these, we have no information on wage rates for both spouses in
the household. We also have to have information on assignable consumption
on clothing, recreation and other personal consumption for both partners in
the household. For a good 50 of the couples, this information has not been
given in the questionnaire. Finally, we drop a small number of outliers and
end up with the data set used for this analysis of 615 couples.
A.5 Summary statistics
In the table below are shown the summary statistics for the 615 couples used
in the estimations.
Mean Std. Min. Max.
Female relative consumption 1.20 0.72 0.09 4.70
Female relative leisure 0.99 0.18 0.48 1.98
Female relative age 0.96 0.10 0.64 1.53
Relative wage 0.93 0.25 0.06 1.93
Household gross income 0.61 0.20 0.15 2.72
Female age 40.47 9.53 19 61
Female education, # of years 13.37 2.55 10 18
Dummy for young children (up to 6 years) 0.39 0.49 0 1
Dummy for older children (7-17 years) 0.31 0.46 0 1
A.6 Diary and survey time use
Figure 5 below compares the distributions of women’s housework share (her
housework relative to total housework) from the question on usual time use
for housework and the information from the time diaries. As we would expect,
the diary information is much more dispersed. This reflects infrequency in
the diary information and rounding in the survey response data. This can
be seen most clearly in the spikes at zero and unity. The means and medians
of the two sources are (0.61, 0.60) for the diary and (0.59, 0.57) for the usual
time response.
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Figure 5:
78
References
[1] Apps, P. (2003): Gender, Time Use and Models of the Household, IZA
DP No. 796. IZA, Bonn.
[2] Apps. P., and R. Rees (1997): Collective Labour Supply and Household
Production. Journal of Political Economy, Volume 105, Issue 1 (Feb.,
1997), pp. 178-190.
[3] Apps. P., and R. Rees (1996): Labour Supply, household production
and intra-family welfare distribution. Journal of Public Economics, 60,
pp. 199-219.
[4] Apps, P., and R. Rees (1988): Taxation and the household, Journal of
Public Economics, Vol. 35, No. 3, April 1988, pp. 355-369.
[5] Aronsson, T., S.-O. Daunfeldt and M. Wikström (2001): Estimating in-
trahousehold allocation in a collective model with household production,
Journal of Population Economics, 14, pp. 569-584.
[6] Becker, G. S. (1994): A Treatise on the Family. Cambridge, Mass. Har-
vard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts. London, England.
[7] Becker, G. S. (1965): A Theory of the Allocation of Time. Economic
Journal, Vol. 75, No. 299 (Sep., 1965), pp. 493-517.
[8] Bonke, J. (2005): Paid and unpaid work - diary information versus
questionnaire information. Social Indicator Research, Vol. 70, pp. 349-
368.
[9] Bourguignon, F., M. Browning and P.-A. Chiappori (2005): "Eﬃcient
intra-household allocations and distribution factors: implications and
identification", mimeo, University of Copenhagen.
[10] Browning, M., P.-A. Chiappori and V. Lechene (2005), "Distributional
eﬀects in household models: separate spheres and income pooling",
CAM Working Paper 2005-09, University of Copenhagen.
[11] Browning, M., L.P. Hansen and J. Heckman (1999), Micro Data and
General Equilibrium Models, Handbook of Macroeconomics, Volume 1A,
edited by J. Taylor and M. Woodford, North Holland, Amsterdam.
79
[12] Browning, M., F. Bourguignon; P.-A. Chiappori and V. Lechene (1994),
”Income and outcomes: a structural model of intrahousehold alloca-
tion”, Journal of Political Economy, 102(6), pp. 1067-96.
[13] Browning, M., and P.-A. Chiappori, (1998), “Eﬃcient Intra-household
Allocation: A General Characterisation and Empirical Tests”, Econo-
metrica, Vol. 66, No. 6, pp. 1241-78.
[14] Browning, M., T.F. Crossley and G. Weber (2003): Asking Consump-
tion Questions in General Purpose Surveys. Economic Journal, Vol. 113,
Issue 491, pp. 540-567.
[15] Chiappori, P.-A. (1997): Introducing Household Production in Collec-
tive Models of Labor Supply. Journal of Political Economy, Volume 105,
Issue 1 (Feb., 1997), pp. 191-209.
[16] Chiappori, P.-A. (1992): Collective Labour Supply and Welfare. Journal
of Political Economy, Volume 100, Issue 3 (Jun., 1992), pp. 493-467.
[17] Chiappori, P.-A. (1988): Rational Household Labor Supply. Economet-
rica, Vol. 56, No. 1, January 1988, pp. 63-90.
[18] Hamermesh, D. (2000): Togetherness: Spouses’ Synchronous Leisure
and the Impact of Children. NBER Working Paper, No. 7455. Cam-
bridge, USA.
[19] Hallberg, D. and A. Klevmarken (2003): Time for children: A study of
parent’s time allocation. Journal of Population Economics, Vol. 16, pp.
205-226.
[20] Juster, F.T. and F.P. Staﬀord (1991): The Allocation of Time: Em-
pirical Findings, Behavourial Models, and Problems of Measurement.
Journal of Economic Literature, Volume 29, Issue 2 ( June, 1991), pp.
471-522.
[21] Kerkhofs, M. and P. Kooreman (2003): Identification and Estimation
of Household Production Models. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 18,
pp. 337-369.
[22] Lundberg, S.J., R.A. Pollak and T.J. Wales (1996): Do Husbands and
Wives Pool Their Resources? Evidence from the United Kingdom Child
Benefit. Journal of Human Resources. XXXII-3.
80
[23] Phipps, S., and P. Burton (1998), ”What’s mine is yours? The influ-
ence of male and female incomes on patterns of household expenditure”,
Economica, Vol. 65, No. 260, pp. 599-613.
[24] Ruuskanen, O.-P. (2004): An Economic Analysis of Time Use in Finnish
Households. Ph.D.-thesis. Helsinki School of Economics. HeSE.
81
  
 
Chapter 3 
 
Ageing and Well-being: Consumption 
and Time Use of Elderly Americans 
 
 
Ageing and Well-being: Consumption 
and Time Use of Elderly Americans 
 
 
Mette Gørtz 
CAM, Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper studies patterns of consumption, household production and 
leisure for the elderly American population. The main objective of the paper is 
to study how incorporating the value of time spent in household production 
and leisure affects economic well-being. Based on the 2003 Consumption and 
Mail Activities Survey (CAMS) from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), 
we find that the level of expenditure is lower for non-retired people, while 
levels of housework and leisure are higher. We also see that expenditure are 
decreasing with age, while leisure is increasing with age for both groups. 
Inequality in expenditure is higher for the group of retired households as 
compared to the group of non-retired households. However, while the elderly 
and retired seem to be less well off in terms of consumption goods bought in 
the market, they are generally “richer” in terms of time for household 
production or leisure. Broadening our concept of economic well-being to 
include first the value of household production and secondly the value of 
leisure reduces our measure of economic inequality among the elderly.  
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1 Introduction 
The economic well-being of the elderly population has been followed closely over 
the last couple of decades as the population share of the elderly as well as the mean age 
have increased, cf. Hurd (1990), Lumsdaine and Mitchell (1999), Rendall and Speare 
(1993). Much of the interest has focused on comparing income or expenditure of the 
working and the retired population. However, the debate usually underlines that 
economic well-being should be analyzed in a broader context incorporating other 
sources of welfare as e.g. household production and leisure, cf. Hamermesh and Pfann 
(2004), Becker (1965), Gronau (1986), Bonke (1992), Dow and Juster (1985). 
This paper looks into consumption, household production and leisure for the elderly 
population. We use data from a survey from the US Health and Retirement Study (HRS), 
the Consumption and Activities Mail Survey (CAMS) from 2003, to study consumption, 
household production and leisure for elderly people. In general, for people at the same 
age, we find significant differences in levels of expenditure and time-use depending on 
whether people have retired or not. Based on cross-sectional evidence, we see that 
expenditure is decreasing with age, while leisure is increasing with age. Housework is 
slightly decreasing with age. These trends are characteristic of both the retired group and 
people still at work. 
The main purpose of this paper is to analyze distributional issues related to ageing 
and retirement.1 More specifically, we explore the consumption distribution among the 
elderly and the differences between people who have retired and people still working in 
terms of different concepts of consumption. The average level of expenditure is around 
10-20 percent higher for the non-retired population as compared to the retired population 
and inequality is higher for the group of retired households as compared to the group of 
non-retired households. Our analysis confirms that while the elderly seem to be less well 
off in terms of consumption goods bought in the market, they are generally “richer” in 
terms of time which can be allocated to either household production or leisure. We 
broaden our concept of economic well-being to include first the value of household 
production, and secondly the value of leisure. This has consequences for our assessment 
of inequality among the elderly. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data applied in the 
analyses. Section 3 presents trends in consumption of the elderly. Section 4 shows the 
                                                 
1 In studies of inequality, current income may not reflect the long run consumption possibilities of the 
household. Due to possibilities of borrowing and saving through the capital markets, intergenerational 
transfers etc., current income is usually more fluctuating (volatile) than consumption. This makes 
measured inequality based on income data, particularly income data from one year, higher than if the 
analysis was based on consumption, cf. Blundell and Preston (1998), and Attanasio et al. (2004). Problems 
of large differences between income and consumption might even be more serious for the group of elderly 
people since this group will often have a lower income from market activities supplemented with 
consumption out of savings etc.  
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distribution of expenditure among the elderly and discusses the distributional aspects 
within and across the subgroups retired and non-retired people. Section 5 presents trends 
in time use for the elderly. In section 6, we discuss the value of time spent in household 
production and leisure, and we look at the consequences of including the value of time 
for the level of distribution of economic well-being in a broader sense. Section 7 
concludes. 
 
2 Data 
Data used for this paper is from the US Health and Retirement Study (HRS). In 
particular, we use the Consumption and Activities Mail Survey (CAMS) which has 
information about time use and consumption for the elderly population in 2001 and 
2003. We use data from the 2003 survey to study inequality in consumption and time 
use.2 CAMS is described in Hurd and Rohwedder (2003, 2005). Further documentation 
on the CAMS and HRS data can be found at the Health and Retirement Study webpage 
(http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu ). 
The consumption part of the survey asks about recalled consumption of a long list of 
consumption items. The respondent could choose to report consumption per week, per 
month of per year and indicate the chosen reporting period for each consumption item. 
Total consumption and consumption in the main consumption groups in CAMS is 
comparable to consumption of the same age group in the CEX, cf. Hurd and Rohwedder 
(2005). 
CAMS’ time use information is based on respondents’ recalled time use over the last 
week or month, depending on the character of the activity. Previous analyses of time use 
data observe that information based on respondents’ recalled time use has a lower 
variance than time use information based on a diary. On the other hand, time use diaries 
generally give better estimates of average time use, cf. Juster and Stafford (1991). The 
questions in the time use survey allow for double activities. The respondents were asked 
to assess their time spent on different activities, irrespective of whether these activities 
were carried out as the single activity at the time or the respondent performed several 
activities at the same time. For example, if the respondent spent one hour ironing while 
at the same time watching the television, the time use at both activities would be counted 
as one hour. Therefore, it is not given that the sum of all activities adds up to 24 hours a 
day. We have made the simplifying assumption that one hour spent on M activities is 
equal to 1/M effective hours devoted to each activity. We argue that this is justified 
based on the observation that the productivity in work done when “multi-tasking” is 
lower than in the case where the person is only doing one thing at the time. Moreover, if 
                                                 
2 We performed the analysis with 2001 data, too. The results from using 2001 and 2003 data, 
respectively, give similar results. We concentrate on 2003 data in this paper. 
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the person enjoys leisure (e.g. watches television) while at the same time ironing, the 
individual value of this leisure is lower than if the person had simply concentrated on 
watching television. In praxis, this means that we have rescaled all detailed activities to 
ensure that the sum of time use per person equates 24 hours a day. 
Due to missing information and outliers in many consumption and time-use 
variables, it has been necessary to perform a thorough data cleaning. The result of the 
data cleaning process is a dataset of a little more than 1000 individuals. Retirement 
status is generally based on people’s own reporting. The average retirement age for the 
whole sample in our dataset is around 62 years.  
 
3 Expenditure and ageing 
In the following, we use information on consumption from the CAMS data on 8 main 
consumption groups: housing (mortgage plus rent), utilities (energy, water and 
telephone), car use (petrol plus repairs/services), health related expenditure (excluding 
health insurance), expenditure on equipment for home and garden (not 
repairs/maintenance etc.), food at home, dining out, clothing and equipment for leisure 
activities (including travel expenditure) and other expenditure (gifts, contributions etc.). 
We define our measure of total consumption as the sum of these 8 main consumption 
groups. We define basic consumption as food at home, food out, clothing and 
expenditure for leisure activities. 
Data on expenditure is generally collected at the household level. The level of 
consumption is likely to vary depending on whether the household consists of a single 
person, is a married household or a household with children still living at home. As it is 
custom in these types of analyses, we adjust total expenditure for the number of 
household members. As there are obviously economies of scale related to sharing the 
same house and other types of consumption, it is customary to take this into account 
using so-called “equivalence scales”, meaning that the correction factor takes economies 
of scale into account. We use the most simple equivalence scale, the square-root of the 
number of household members, to adjust for different household sizes. However, this 
definition of equivalence scale is problematic, cf. Atkinson and Bourguignon (2000). 
One of the problems with this simple adjustment is that it does not treat additional 
household members differently depending on whether they are adults or children.  
Figure 1 shows cross-sectional evidence for total consumption and for aggregated 
basic consumption. For both consumption aggregates, we find that consumption is lower 
for the older respondents in the survey than for the younger respondents. Moreover, for 
almost all age categories, respondents not having retired have a higher level of 
consumption than retired people.   
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Figure 1: Expenditure through age 
 
The development in consumption for the detailed categories over age shows the same 
pattern as for total expenditure, see figures 2-6. Except for health expenditure, 
consumption is decreasing monotonically with age, and the level of consumption is 
higher for non-retired than for retired persons. The difference in consumption across the 
two groups of retired and non-retired is significantly different from 0 according to a 
simple t-test. For non-retired respondents approaching the usual retirement age, 
consumption is getting closer to the consumption level for retired people. It should also 
be underlined that the group of non-retired gets very thin in the high-age groups. 
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Figure 2: Expenditure on housing and utilities over age 
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Figure 3: Expenditure on home&garden supplies and car use 
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Figure 4: Expenditure on health and other expenditures 
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Figure 5: Expenditure on food at home and food out 
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Figure 6: Expenditure on clothing and recreation 
 
When looking at consumption for the retired and the non-retired groups separately, it 
appears that there is a negative correlation between consumption and age for both 
groups. Thus, consumption is declining with age for both retired and non-retired people, 
but at different levels. Moreover, the consumption level for the non-retired converges to 
the consumption level for the retired population at the same age as people approach the 
normal retirement age. 
However, it should be emphasized that this is cross-sectional evidence. Thus, when 
comparing consumption across age, we are in fact comparing consumption for different 
cohorts in the population. The CAMS-cohort around the age of 70, who was born in the 
beginning of the 1930’s, has faced other possibilities and living conditions than the 
CAMS-cohort now around the age of 50 who were born in the 1950’s. Furthermore, 
different cohorts have faced different options for inter-temporal substitution due to long-
term shifts in capital markets, interest rates etc. which might have induced them to 
choose different paths of consumption. 
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4 Distribution of expenditure 
We now turn to look at the distribution of consumption in the elderly population. In 
general, insight into the distribution of consumption is preferable to information on the 
distribution of income if we want to compare welfare distribution in the population, 
especially for the group of elderly where savings, capital income etc. serve as a 
significant source of consumption. 
The literature on inequality contains a vast discussion on appropriate measures of 
distribution and inequality, cf. Atkinson and Bourguignon (2000). Graphical 
presentations include simple histograms and the Lorenz curve. A number of indices 
summarize characteristics of the whole income distribution in one “inequality measure”. 
The Gini coefficient is one of the most well known and popular indices. Graphically, it 
is related to the Lorenz curve as the area between the Lorenz curve and the diagonal and 
as such straightforward in its interpretation. However, the Gini coefficient is not 
decomposable, neither by population subgroups, e.g. through a decomposition in retired 
and non-retired people, nor by consumption/welfare subgroups. Another group of 
measures which fulfils the decomposition property is the “generalized entropy” 
measures including Theil’s index (1967). Simple variance measures are also 
decomposable into within-group and between-group effects.3
In the following, we use a number of different measures of inequality to ensure that 
our assessment of distributional issues is not a consequence of the chosen inequality 
measures. For graphical presentations, we draw the Lorenz curve. For numeric 
presentation, we calculate the coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by 
mean), the standard deviation of log consumption (which is often preferred as it puts 
relatively less weight on observations in the tails of the distribution), and the Gini and 
Theil indices. The Theil and Gini indices in their general form are (Cowell, 2000): 
 
( ) log ( )
( ) ( )
1( ) | ' | ( ) ( ')
2 ( )
Theil
Gini
x xI F dF x
F F
I F x x dF x dF x
F
µ µ
µ
⎛ ⎞≡ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
≡ −
∫
∫∫
 (1) 
Thus, the Gini index measures the mean difference between any observation x and 
another observation x’ in the distribution. 
Since our data is probably most noisy in the tails of the expenditure distribution due 
to missing information or misunderstandings in questionnaire, measurement error etc., 
                                                 
3 One could be concerned that the choice of inequality measure to compare distributions might lead to 
contradictory conclusions. For distributions with the same mean and total population, it can be shown that 
the use of different indices lead to the same conclusion if the Lorenz curve for one distribution is above 
the Lorenz curve for another distribution at all points in the distribution. This condition is known as 
“Lorenz dominance”. 
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we also report the easily interpretable decile ratio (D9/D1), which is expenditure for the 
household at the 90th percentile over expenditure for the household at the 10th percentile. 
 
 Total Retired Non-retired 
Decile ratio (D9/D1) 4.15 4.38  3.38  
Coefficient of variation 0.59 0.63  0.54  
Standard deviation of log(xtot1) 0.55 0.57  0.50  
Theil index 0.15 0.17  0.13  
Gini index 0.31 0.32  0.28  
Mean expenditure per year, US$ 21,900 20,700  23,800  
# of individuals in group 1030 633  397  
 
Table 1: Distribution of total expenditure 
 
Based on the inequality measures above, we first note that inequality is higher in the 
group of retired than in the group of non-retired. The variance of consumption (here 
defined without correcting for degrees of freedom) is easily decomposed into “within” 
and “between” groups effects: 
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where R is the group of retired people, L is the group of people who are still in the 
labor market, and N is the whole group of elderly, implying R+L=N. x is expenditure 
per equivalence scaled household. x is mean within relevant group. 
Thus, the variance in expenditure x for the whole group of elderly is equal to a 
weighted sum of the variances of each sub-group – the “within effects” - plus the square 
of the difference in mean expenditure weighted by RL/N2 – the “between effect”. 
Using the variance decomposition approach outlined above, we find that within-
group effects of the two groups, retired and non-retired, contribute to the major part of 
the total inequality in the group of elderly. Less than 1 percent of total inequality can be 
attributed to between-group effects. This is consistent with the finding that mean 
expenditure does not vary much between the two groups. 
One of the important advantages of the Theil index is that it is decomposable for 
subgroups of the population and that the decomposition is simple to interpret. The Theil 
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index can be decomposed into a weighted sum of Theil indices for the population 
subgroups plus a Theil index for the inequality between the means of the subgroups: 
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For example, in the case where we want to decompose the total population of elderly 
people into the two groups of retired and non-retired people, we find that the Theil index 
for the total population is the sum of the Theil indeces for each subgroup, each weighted 
by the consumption share of this subgroup (the “within” effects), plus the Theil index 
found when comparing the consumption means across subgroup (the “between” groups 
effect). Based on the calculations above, the Theil index value of 0.15 for the total 
population of elderly constitutes of a contribution of 0.10 from the group of retired and 
0.05 for the group of non-retired. Therefore, the “within” effects contribute to the main 
part of inequality among the elderly, while the “between” effect is negligible. This is 
consistent with the conclusion for the variance decomposition. 
 
5 Time use and ageing 
The respondents in the CAMS survey were asked to state their time use on 31 
activities, cf. table A3 in the appendix. These activities are aggregated into 6 major 
activity groups: leisure, housework, marketwork, personal care, transport & 
communications (including computer time) and other activities (including volunteer 
work, helping out friends and family etc.).  
Comparing time use for retired people and non-retired people, it appears that the time 
spent on the 6 main activities is very different between these two groups. Not 
surprisingly, the level of market work is significantly higher for people still in the labor 
market (some retired people still have a low number of working hours), whereas people 
who have retired spend a significant number of extra hours in leisure or with housework. 
We also find that the time spent on personal care is somewhat higher for people who 
have retired, and the same is true for time spent in other activities (which is a small 
number of hours). On the other hand, people who have not retired spend more time 
traveling/commuting or communicating (using computer).  
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 All Retired Non-retired 
Leisure 8.3 9.4 6.4 
Personal care incl. sleep 8.0 8.3 7.4 
Housework 3.0 3.3 2.4 
Travel and communication 1.8 1.5 2.4 
Marketwork 2.1 0.6 4.6 
Other activities 0.8 0.9 0.7 
No. of households 1030 633 397 
 
Table 2: Time use in hours per day 
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Figure 7: Time in housework and marketwork over age 
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Figure 8: Time spent in leisure and personal care & sleep 
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Figure 9: Time spent in transport & communications and other activities 
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The variation in time use over different age groups shows the same pattern for the 
retired and the non-retired group. The level of market work slowly declines over the age 
groups. Housework, which is at a relatively high level for the retired people, slowly 
increases with age. The level of housework is decreasing across age groups for the group 
of non-retired. Time spent on leisure activities decreases with age for non-retired people 
and is fairly constant for retired people. 
Time spent on personal care including sleeping increases with age, whereas time 
spent on transport & communications and other activities decreases with age for both 
retired and non-retired. Again, it should be noted that we are looking at cross-section 
data where cohort effects are present. Thus, time spent on computer use is probably 
affected by the fact that people in their 50’s are much more likely to have learned to use 
a computer than people in the 70’s. 
Our results on trends in time use over ages confirm prior analyses, cf. Hill (1985) and 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (2004). 
 
6 Economic well-being 
6.1 The value of time 
The above analysis illustrates that consumption is decreasing with age, while 
household production and leisure is increasing with age. This tendency might be 
interpreted as evidence of the observation that households substitute expenditure with 
time – in household production and leisure – when they age. Thus, households substitute 
from goods bought in the market to goods produced at home and to leisure. To fully 
measure the welfare effect of these substitution effects, we have to measure the value of 
time spent in household production and leisure. 
Generally, there are two main methods for assessing the value of housework. By the 
first method, housework is valued through its opportunity-cost where the shadow price 
of household production equals the individual wage rate. An alternative approach is to 
price household production by a market alternative. For example, the value of time spent 
on cleaning equals the price of cleaning bought in the market. For a discussion of the 
value of a housewife’s time, see Chiswick (1982). 
Both valuation methods are problematic. Valuation by market alternative is far from 
ideal. Differences in productivity between household production performed by one-self 
and house services could lead to a biased estimate of household production. On the one 
hand, this estimate might be upward biased because productivity in household 
production by the husband or wife is lower than the productivity of a hired professional 
carrying out work in the household. This productivity difference is probably most 
prevalent when comparing the work of a trained craftsman with do-it-yourself work. On 
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the other hand, it might be argued that the estimate of the value of do-it-yourself work 
might be downward biased since people might put more energy, effort and concentration 
into work done for themselves than a professional would have done. Furthermore, 
valuation by this method requires detailed knowledge of the type and quality of the 
activity performed at home in order to find a relevant market substitute. 
The valuation by opportunity cost is based on the perception that individuals allocate 
their time between market work and housework in such a way that the marginal products 
of their time in both uses are equal to their wage rate. One obvious objection to this 
approach is that it does not provide a valuation of alternative time uses for corner 
solutions, i.e. in cases where people do not spend any time at housework, but only in 
market work. Or, vice versa, when people spend no time in market work, but only work 
in the house, for example because they have retired.  
A pragmatic approach to the last problem could be to use individual wage rates 
observed shortly before retirement. However, we would then implicitly assume that 
productivity in various activities is constant over the years after retirement. Thus, we 
would not account for declining productivity in housework as people get older; e.g. as a 
consequence of health problems, reduced physical mobility, cognitive ability etc. In 
general, evaluating the value of time by its alternative cost seems less relevant for people 
who are retired. Retirement is a more or less “irrevocable” decision as it can be difficult 
to return to the labor market after some years in retirement. On the other hand, returning 
to the labour market from retirement is not uncommon. In the CAMS data, a few 
individuals who reported that they were retired in 2001, had returned to the labour 
market in 2003. Maestas (2004) analyzed “unretirement” transitions based on HRS data. 
She found that nearly one-half of retirees follow a non-traditional retirement path that 
involves partial retirement and/or retirement. Moreover, the unretirement rate observed 
at least five years after their first retirement is around ¼. Dygalo and Abowd (2005) 
study trends in productivity over the labor market career and find that in general, 
productivity increases with age. It is difficult to find studies that analyze what happens 
to productivity close to and after retirement. Gronau and Hamermesh (2001) show that 
there is a positive correlation between the level of education and demand for variety in 
time-use activities. They interpret this result as evidence that people with higher levels 
of education have a higher productivity, not only in market work, but also in housework. 
Another common objection to the use of the wage as an indicator for the value of 
household production is that certain types of housework provide individual satisfaction 
to the person performing the activity. Following this line of thought, these so-called 
“process benefits” should partly be considered as a form of leisure activity. Prominent 
examples are time devoted to child care, gardening, some do-it-yourself activities etc. 
This problem is discussed in Gronau (1986), Graham and Greene (1984), and Kerkhofs 
and Kooreman (2003) and will not be discussed further here. Previous studies of process 
benefits indicate that people rate time with children and friends highest, closely followed 
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by market work, while most housework activities are rated considerably lower, cf. 
Hallberg and Klevmarken (2003) and Juster (1985). 
The HRS Core Data provides information on hourly wages for a large part of our 
CAMS sample. The mean hourly wage in our sample is US$ 25 which is higher than the 
mean wage for the private sector reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) which 
is US$ 18. The wage information in HRS is noisy. As a pragmatic solution, we base our 
valuation of time on the mean wage from BLS (corrected for an average marginal tax 
rate of 30 percent). Obviously, this is problematic, as there are productivity differences 
across the population in both market work and housework. Furthermore, these 
productivity differences probably affect the allocation of time between market work and 
housework. We use half the after tax mean wage to value time spent in household 
production or leisure. This correction is arbitrarily chosen to take account of the possible 
decline in productivity after retirement. The correction is in accordance with Aguiar and 
Hurst (2004) who also arbitrarily choose to use one-half the previous wage rate to value 
household production. Thus, we operate with a value of one hour spent in household 
production or leisure of approximately $6 which probably represents a lower bound on 
the value of time in leisure and household production.  
 
6.2 Redistribution of well-being 
In the following, we try to take the value of time into account. We define extended 
consumption as total expenditure plus the value of household production. And we define 
total welfare as total expenditure, the value of household production and the value of 
leisure. 
It is not always obvious whether the result of housework, household production, is a 
private good or a public good. In the following we assume that household production is 
shared within in the household. For example, the result of the time spent cooking a meal 
by one spouse will usually be enjoyed by both spouses. Likewise, a newly cleaned house 
will benefit both spouses, although preferences for a clean house might differ within the 
household. We do not take scale effects in household production into account. 
Therefore, parallel to the consumption data above, we apply an equivalence scale 
correction to adjust for number of household members consuming household production. 
On the other hand, we do not have any knowledge of the housework by the spouse. Also, 
one could argue that household production is a public good where consumption is non-
rival. On the other hand, the level of household production is somewhat higher in 
couples than for singles. 
Figure 10 below depicts Lorenz curves for total expenditure (left panel, above), for 
extended consumption (right panel, above), and for total welfare (left panel, below).  
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Figure 10: Lorenz curves for total consumption, extended consumption (including 
housework) and welfare (including value of leisure) 
 
The inequality indices and measures for expenditure, extended consumption and 
welfare in table 3 confirm that inequality shrinks, the more broadly defined our 
consumption/welfare concept is. Thus, when allowing for the value of household 
production in our extended consumption concept, the Gini coefficient reduces from 0.31 
to 0.26. When we include the value of leisure in the extended welfare figure, inequality 
is even further reduced to 0.17. These trends hold when we treat the groups of retired 
and non-retired separately. 
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Expen-
diture 
Household 
production 
Extended 
consumption 
Leisure Welfare 
Total sample      
Decile ratio (D9/D1) 4,15 6,30 3,20 2,79 2,09 
Coeff. of variation 0,59 0,70 0,49 0,36 0,31 
Std. dev. log x 0,55 1,12 0,46 0,40 0,29 
Theil index 0,15 0,23 0,11 0,07 0,05 
Gini index 0,31 0,37 0,26 0,21 0,17 
Mean per year, US$ 21,900 5,100 26,900 19,000 45,900 
Retired      
Decile ratio (D9/D1) 4,38 6,34 3,33 2,16 2,00 
Coeff. of variation 0,63 0,66 0,51 0,29 0,29 
Std. dev. log x 0,57 1,19 0,48 0,33 0,28 
Theil index 0,17 0,21 0,12 0,04 0,04 
Gini index 0,32 0,35 0,27 0,16 0,16 
Mean per year, US$ 20,700 5,600 26,500 21,600 48,100 
Non-retired      
Decile ratio (D9/D1) 3,38 6,22 2,85 2,69 2,18 
Coeff. of variation 0,54 0,70 0,46 0,37 0,33 
Std. dev. log x 0,50 0,97 0,42 0,39 0,31 
Theil index 0,13 0,22 0,09 0,07 0,05 
Gini index 0,28 0,37 0,24 0,21 0,17 
Mean per year, US$ 23,800 3,900 27,700 14,800 42,500 
 
Table 3: Distribution of expenditure, extended consumption and welfare 
 
Household production is about as unevenly distributed as expenditure, as reported by 
table 3. Thus, the significant reduction in inequality when moving from expenditure to 
extended consumption is due to the fact that household production is negatively 
correlated with expenditure. In popular terms, people who are relatively poor in terms of 
money compensate by enjoying the results of a relatively higher household production. 
This is illustrated by the following decomposition of the variance of extended 
consumption (extx) into the sum of the variance in expenditure (x), the variance in 
household production (hhp) multiplied by hourly wage (w) squared and the covariance 
between extended consumption and hhp multiplied by 2*w: 
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var( ) var( * )
var( ) *var( ) 2 *cov( , )
extx x w hhp
x w hhp w x hhp
= + =
= + +  (4) 
The correlation between expenditure and household production is around -0.07. 
Using the results in table 3, we find that more than 90 percent of the variance in 
extended consumption can be attributed to the variance in expenditure. In the same 
manner, we decompose total variance in welfare into the contributions of the sources of 
total welfare, i.e. expenditure, value of household production and value of leisure and 
the effects of the correlations among the three sources of welfare: 
  (5) 
2 2
2
var( ) var( ) *var( ) *var( )
2 *cov( , ) 2 *cov( , ) 2 *cov( , )
welf x w hhp w lei
w x hhp w x lei w hhp lei
= + + +
+ + +
The correlation between expenditure and leisure is -0.11, and the correlation between 
household production and leisure is -0.01. More than ¾ of the variance in welfare 
consists of the contribution from expenditure, while household production and leisure 
contribute with, respectively, around 1/20 and 1/5. The negative correlation works in the 
opposite direction with a total contribution of around -12 percent. 
The simple decomposition of extended consumption and welfare in (5) underlines 
that “redistribution” through the inclusion of time in our welfare concept is sensitive to 
our valuation of time spent in household production and leisure.  
 
6.3 Mobility in well-being 
The inequality indices and measures above all share the common feature that 
inequality is summarized in one figure. However, these measures do not describe the 
effects at the individual level  when we broaden our concept of consumption. Thus, a 
reduction in one of the inequality measures above might reflect that the inclusion of the 
value of time benefits more in the bottom of the welfare distribution than in the top, still 
preserving more or less the same ranking of the individuals, but it might also be the case 
that the ranking has been completely reversed. One way to get a picture of this is to 
calculate the difference in each individual’s percentile position in the expenditure, the 
extended consumption and the welfare distributions, respectively. The distributions of 
these changes are shown in figure 11 below. The peaks of the distributions in all four 
panels are around zero, indicating that most individuals more or less keep their position 
in the ranking. However, a considerable amount of people jump several deciles when the 
consumption concept is broadened from expenditure to extended consumption including 
household production. And the change in ranking is even higher when the welfare 
concept is extended to incorporate the value of leisure.  
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Figure 11: Histograms of changes in percentile position of individuals when moving 
from expenditure to extended consumption (top) and welfare (bottom) 
 
7 Conclusion 
The analyses presented in this paper illustrate that inequality is higher among the 
retired than among the non-retired group. However, people with low levels of 
expenditure are often less constrained for time for housework and/or leisure. By 
broadening our concept of economic well-being by taking the value of time in 
housework and leisure into account, we find that inequality among the elderly in general 
shrinks. Moreover, we find that the pattern is reversed in the sense that inequality in 
well-being is lower among the retired than among the non-retired. The results should be 
interpreted with care as the value of time spent in leisure and household production is 
difficult to measure, especially for the group of retired where the alternative pricing 
method makes less sense than for people with a more tight bond to the labor market. 
Future research in this area is needed to tackle the problems of the valuation of time and 
the substitutability between expenditure, household production and leisure. Moreover, it 
would be useful to develop tools to better analyze the “mobility” of 
individuals/households in the welfare distribution when we move from measures of 
well-being solely based on expenditure to a measure of well-being which incorporates 
the value of time. 
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Figure A1: Time spent in housework and marketwork by gender over age 
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Figure A2: Time spent in leisure and personal care (including sleep) 
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Figure A3: Time spent in transport & communications and other activities 
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Figure A4: Histograms of expenditure, housework and leisure 
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Figure A5: Retirement age 
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Figure A6: Extended consumption (including household production) and welfare 
(extended consumption and leisure) through age 
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Var. name in 
panel 
Var. name in 
CAMS 2001 
Var. name in 
CAMS 2003 
Mortgage XB7 B7 B13 
Home/rent insurance XB8 B8 B7 
Property tax XB9 B9 B8 
Rent XB10 B10 B14 
Electricity XB11 B11 B15 
Water XB12 B12 B16 
Heat XB13 B13 B17 
Phone/cable XB14 B14 B18 
Auto finance charges XB15 B15 B19 
Auto insurance XB16 B16 B9 
Health insurance XB17 B17 B11 
House/yard supplies XB18 B18 B20, B22 
Home maintenance XB19 B19 B24, B25 
Food/drink groceries XB20 B20 B36 
Dining out XB21 B21 B37 
Clothing XB22 B22 B26 
Gasoline XB23 B23 B38 
Vehicle service XB24 B24 B10 
Drugs XB25 B25 B28 
Health services XB26 B26 B29 
Medical supplies XB27 B27 B30 
Vacations XB28 B28 B12 
Tickets to movies, sports events etc. XB29 B29 B31 
Hobbies/leisure equipment XB30 B30 B32, B33 
Contributions XB31 B31 B34 
Gifts XB32 B32 B35 
 
Table A2: List of consumption groups in CAMS consumption survey 
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Code Description Observed Activity type* 
A1 WATCH TV weekly L 
A2 READ PAPERS/MAGS weekly L 
A3 READ BOOKS weekly L 
A4 LISTEN MUSIC weekly L 
A5 SLEEP/NAP weekly P 
A6 WALK weekly T 
A7 SPORTS/EXERCISE weekly L 
A8 VISIT IN PERSON weekly L 
A9 PHONE/LETTERS/EMAIL weekly L 
A10 WORK FOR PAY weekly M 
A11 USE COMPUTER weekly T 
A12 PRAY/MEDITATE weekly L 
A13 HOUSE CLEANING weekly H 
A14 WASH/IRON/MEND weekly H 
A15 YARD WORK/GARDEN weekly H 
A16 SHOP/RUN ERRANDS weekly H 
A17 MEALS PREP/CLEAN-UP weekly H 
A18 PERSONAL GROOMING weekly P 
A19 PET CARE weekly L 
A20 SHOW AFFECTION weekly O 
A21 HELP OTHERS monthly O 
A22 VOLUNTEER WORK monthly O 
A23 RELIGIOUS ATTENDANCE monthly L 
A24 ATTEND MEETINGS monthly T 
A25 MONEY MANAGEMENT monthly H 
A26 SELF CARE monthly P 
A27 PLAY CARDS/GAMES/PUZZLES monthly L 
A28 CONCERTS/MOVIES/LECTURES monthly L 
A29 SING/PLAY MUSIC monthly L 
A30 ARTS AND CRAFTS monthly L 
A31 HOME IMPROVEMENTS monthly H 
*) H: Housework, L: Leisure, M: Marketwork, P: Personal care including sleep,  
T: Transport and communication (computer time), O: Other activities. 
 
Table A3: List of activities in CAMS time use survey 
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Abstract 
This paper discusses the determinants of the retirement decision and the 
implications of retirement on economic well-being. The main contribution of 
the paper is to formulate the role of individual heterogeneity explicitly. We 
argue that individual heterogeneity in 1) productivity of market work versus 
housework, 2) preferences for leisure compared to consumption, and 3) 
marginal utility of wealth, is correlated with the retirement decision. Based on 
US consumption and time use data for 2001 and 2003 from the Consumptions 
and Activities Mail Survey (CAMS), we study the patterns of individual 
choices of expenditure, household production and leisure for people in and 
around retirement. The unobserved individual heterogeneity factor is isolated 
by comparing cross-sectional evidence and panel data estimates of the effects 
of retirement on consumption and time allocation. Based on cross-section data, 
we can identify a difference in consumption due to retirement status, but when 
the panel nature of the data is exploited, the effect of retirement on 
consumption is small and insignificant. Moreover, the analyses point at a large 
positive effect of retirement on household production. Our results therefore 
contribute to the discussion of the so-called retirement-consumption puzzle. 
Many analyses of the retirement-consumption drop assume that the retirement 
decision is exogenous. However, the individual decision on when to retire may 
depend on expected changes in consumption and time allocation. This 
suggests that the retirement decision is endogenous. To test this, we apply an 
instrumental variables method in the treatment effects tradition. 
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1 Introduction   
Trends in consumption and well-being for the elderly have attracted a great deal of 
attention in recent years. A vast empirical literature has identified a fall in expenditure 
around retirement which may seem difficult to explain in the context of the standard 
lifecycle model which – in its simplest form – implies consumption smoothing. This 
phenomenon is often referred to as the so-called “retirement-consumption puzzle”. 
However, while simple life cycle models may predict that consumption should be 
smoothed across periods of predictably high and low income, it is in fact the marginal 
utility of consumption that is smoothed across time periods. 
Previous studies of the consumption drop offer various explanations. First, it is 
argued that retirement leads to a substitution from consumption bought in the market to 
consumption with a higher content of household production, thus retaining the same 
level of consumption in a broader sense. A second argument is that retirement is 
followed by a substitution of consumption for leisure, thereby retaining the same level of 
well-being. A third explanation attributes the reduction in expenditure to a reduction in 
consumption items related to working life, i.e. transport, eating out (e.g. lunch), work 
clothing etc. A fourth interpretation is that preferences change over the life cycle. And a 
fifth explanation focuses on the idea that if retirement is caused by an unexpected event 
such as job loss or disability, the observed consumption fall is not in conflict with the 
life-cycle model of consumption. In the following, we refer the main points of the 
existing literature which is centered around these five arguments. 
Hamermesh (1984) tries to identify what he refers to as the “missing link” in the life 
cycle model. He concludes that the drop in consumption can be rationalized by a 
combination of a bequest motive, uncertainty about length of lifetime, coupled with a 
rate of time preference which exceeds the real rate of interest. Hamermesh (1984) argues 
that individuals may simply have preferences for consumption earlier in life, partly due 
to expectations about health.  
This idea is also discussed in Banks, Blundell and Tanner (1998) who use a “pseudo-
panel” based on 25 successive years of data from the British Family Expenditure Survey. 
After controlling for changes in mortality risk and labor-market-related costs there is still 
an unexplained gap left between actual and predicted consumption growth around the 
age of retirement. This leads them to conclude that there may be unanticipated shocks 
occurring around the time of retirement. Banks, Blundell and Tanner argue that the 
systematic arrival of unexpected adverse information is the only way to fully reconcile 
the fall in consumption. 
Haider and Stevens (2004) use subjective retirement expectations (the expected year 
of retirement prior to actual retirement) as an instrument for retirement and thereby 
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isolate the element of “surprise” in retirement.1 By instrumenting retirement, the 
estimated consumption drop is reduced substantially. 
Ameriks, Caplan and Leahy (2002) find that many working households do expect a 
considerable fall in consumption when they retire. After retirement, some households 
experience that the fall in consumption is smaller than their ex ante expectations. 
Ameriks, Caplan and Leahy attribute part of this divergence to unexpected stock market 
appreciation that may create surprises in a positive or negative direction to retiring 
households. 
A number of contributions focus on the possibility of substituting household 
production for consumption at retirement, cf. Aguiar and Hurst (2004), Hurd and 
Rohwedder (2003), and Browning and Kolodziejczyk (2005). Aguiar and Hurst (2004) 
compare cross-sectional information from detailed food diaries with data on food 
expenditure for US households. They show that even though food expenditure declines 
at retirement, neither the quantity nor the quality of food consumption is lower for 
retired people. They underline that it is not clear whether this measure of food intake 
captures the utility of food consumption. 
Hurd and Rohwedder (2003) use the Consumption and Activities Mail Survey 
(CAMS) 2001, which is part of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to show that a 
substantial proportion of households expect their expenditures to decrease upon 
retirement. Based on the difference between people’s anticipated changes in 
consumption prior to retirement and their realized changes in consumption, they 
conclude that in general people expect a consumption drop after retirement which is 
larger than their realized consumption drop. In a follow-up study by Hurd and 
Rohwedder (2005), they use two waves of CAMS, 2001 and 2003, to examine the 
changes in consumption and time use over the period. They find no evidence of a 
consumption drop. 
Browning and Kolodziejczyk (2005) consider a model where consumption and 
leisure are non-separable and retirement is endogenous. They argue that non-
separabilities are due to 1) fixed costs of going to work, and 2) household production. 
They show that unobserved heterogeneity related to these non-separabilities lead to 
biases in the OLS estimates of the structural parameters. 
Miniaci, Monfardini and Weber (2003) use synthetic cohorts in Italy and find a 
decline in spending at retirement. They show that Italian households who retired in the 
sample period had reasonable information about their pension income and argue that 
forward looking consumers would only choose to reduce expenditure because of their 
increased leisure after retirement. They find evidence that taking leisure into account 
markedly reduces the drop in consumption at retirement.  
                                                 
1 Haider and Stevens (2004) quote Leon Trotsky (1879-1940) saying: “Old age is the most unexpected 
of all things that happen to a man”. 
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Bernheim, Skinner and Weinberg (2001) find a discontinuity in consumption at 
retirement which is negatively correlated with retirement savings and income 
replacement rates. However, they find no evidence for explanations suggesting that this 
discontinuity should be related to differences in relative tastes for leisure, home 
production or work-related expenses. Bernheim, Skinner and Weinberg (2001) conclude 
that their results are difficult to interpret in the context of the life-cycle model and that 
people tend to use simple rules of thumb instead of rationally planning their retirement 
saving as the life-cycle model implies. 
Smith (2004) uses the British Household Panel Study (BHPS) to investigate the drop 
in consumption of food at home and well-being.2 She distinguishes between different 
groups of retired people wrt. their retirement being voluntary or involuntary (due to 
health or employment shocks). The idea is that when retirement is voluntary, people are 
assumed not to experience a negative wealth shock at retirement, while people who 
retire involuntarily will be more likely to experience negative wealth shocks. 
Christensen (2005) uses Spanish panel data to study the effects of retirement. She 
finds no income fall for retiring households in the Spanish data and finds no significant 
effect of retirement on any commodity groups except medicines. 
The main contribution of this paper is to explicitly formulate the role of individual 
heterogeneity in 1) preferences for the output of home production versus market 
products, 2) productivity in household production versus in the market, and 3) the 
marginal utility of wealth. We argue that unobserved heterogeneity in preferences, 
productivity and marginal utility of wealth may be correlated with the retirement 
decision. Thus, individuals with a relatively high taste for goods produced at home or 
with a relatively high productivity in home production may be more inclined to retire 
earlier than individuals with relatively higher taste for and productivity in market 
production. And individuals with a relatively low marginal utility of wealth will be 
expected to retire early, ceteris paribus. If the unobserved individual heterogeneity is 
correlated with the retirement status, then OLS-estimates of the effect of retirement will 
be biased and inconsistent. 
Most previous studies of the consumption drop have been based on cross-section 
data or data from pseudo panels. Smith (2004) and Christensen (2005) both used panel 
data, but none of these studies explicitly discussed the role of unobserved heterogeneity. 
Pseudo panels are constructed on the basis of observables and can not take account of 
unobserved heterogeneity. We use the 2001 and 2003 panel from the Consumption and 
Activities Mail Survey (CAMS) which has information on consumption and time use. 
We isolate the individual heterogeneity factor by comparing cross-sectional evidence 
and panel data estimates of the effects of retirement on consumption and time allocation. 
                                                 
2 Well-being is measured by an index which weighs together different types of self-reported factors 
contributing to physical, psychological and emotional well-being. 
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Comparing OLS-estimates with panel data estimates, we see that the fixed effects panel 
data estimates are numerically smaller and significantly different than the OLS 
estimates, and we also find that the fixed effects estimates differ significantly from the 
random effects estimates. We interpret this as evidence that unobserved heterogeneity in 
preferences, productivity and the marginal utility of wealth is correlated with the 
retirement decision.  
In most studies of the retirement-consumption drop, the retirement index has been 
viewed as an exogenous variable. Thus, it is usually assumed that the retirement decision 
is unaffected by the level of or anticipated changes in consumption or housework, 
respectively. However, we can think of several examples where people’s retirement 
decision is linked to anticipated changes in consumption or housework. Previous studies 
have investigated the timing of the retirement decision, cf. Gustman and Steinmeier 
(1986), Rust and Pheelan (1997). In this paper, we allow for endogeneity in the 
retirement decision by applying a treatment effects methodology. When using predicted 
probabilities as an instrument in our panel data analysis of the consumption and 
housework model, we find somewhat larger but still insignificant effects of retirement 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review the theoretical background 
of the dynamic life-cycle model. In section 3, we present the data. Section 4 shows some 
empirical evidence on consumption and time use over ages. In section 5, we develop the 
empirical model. Section 6 presents the results from the panel data estimations. Section 
7 presents an analysis of the possible endogeneity problem in the retirement decision, 
and section 8 concludes. 
 
2 Theoretical background 
According to the life-cycle model of consumption and labor supply, an 
individual/household chooses a path of consumption and leisure where the marginal 
utilitiy of consumption and leisure is constant over the lifetime, cf. Browning et al. 
(1985). Most empirical analyses of the life-cycle model formulate utility as a function of 
consumption of market-produced goods and leisure. Leisure is usually defined as time 
spent not doing market work. This definition does not take other uses of time explicitly 
into account. The importance of including the value of household production in the 
utility function has been emphasized by Gronau (1977, 1980, 1986) in his important 
extension of Becker’s seminal work on the allocation of time, cf. Becker (1965). 
The standard life-cycle model can be extended to explicitly include home production,  
cf. Rupert et al. (2000). We allow for three uses of time each time period, t: market work 
(hmt), household production (hnt), and leisure (lt). The individual/household derives 
utility from consuming market goods (cmt), home-produced goods (cnt) and leisure (lt). 
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Home-produced goods are produced with the input of time spent in housework (hnt).3 
Wages are assumed exogenous over the life cycle. We use a marginal-utility-of-wealth-
constant labor supply function, also known as a Frisch function, cf. Blundell and 
MaCurdy (1999). A critical assumption in this framework is that preferences show 
intertemporal strong separability. The marginal utility of wealth, tλ , serves as the 
sufficient statistic to capture all information from other periods necessary to solve the 
maximization problem of each current period. For simplicity, we assume a non-
stochastic interest rate. The household optimization problem can be formulated into a 
dynamic programming problem. The individual/household chooses consumption of 
market goods, household goods and leisure according to the following value function: 
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At is the real value of assets at the beginning of period t, ρ the household’s 
subjective discount rate, r the real rate of return earned on assets between t and t+1, wt 
the after-tax wage rate, Bt is unearned non-asset income, and H the total available time 
per period (e.g. year/week etc.). As usual, we assume that U is convex and monotonous 
in its elements.  
It should be emphasized that we are here looking at individuals who have a positive 
supply of working hours in the labour market. This implies that we focus on finding an 
interior solution for the choice of market work, as well as for consumption and 
housework. We shall relax this assumption in section 5 to treat the situation where 
people are retired (which implies a corner solution). Solving the consumer’s problem by 
standard dynamic programming techniques leads to the following first-order conditions: 
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/t tV Aλ = ∂ ∂  is the marginal utility of wealth. 1tλ + is a random variable which is 
realized by the beginning of period t+1. We therefore end up with the familiar result that 
                                                 
3 Unlike the model derived in Rupert et al. (2000), we abstain from the - in this context unnecessary - 
complication of introducing home capital in the household production function. 
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the individual/household chooses a level of consumption of market goods where the 
discounted marginal utility (discounted by the subjective discount rate) equals the 
marginal utility of wealth (discounted by the interest rate). Furthermore, we find that the 
marginal utility of time devoted to market work and housework should be numerically 
equal across activities. And finally, we conclude that the discounted marginal utility of 
housework depends on the wage rate and the marginal utility of wealth, discounted by 
the interest rate. The first-order conditions imply that consumption demand and the 
supply of market work and housework can be formulated as functions of the individual’s 
current characteristics (including wages) and the marginal utility of wealth at t, which 
captures all relevant information and expectations about the other periods. The Euler 
equation implies a time path for tλ  of the form: 
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By repeated substitution, the marginal utility of wealth, tλ , can be expressed by an 
individual fixed effect, 0λ , plus the sum of the bj terms. The bj’s are a function of the 
consumer’s individual discount rate, ρ , and the market interest rate, r.  
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If we assume that ρ and rt are constant across consumers, the first term in tλ will 
vary depending on the age of the individual or household head. In cases where the rate 
of time preference, ρ , equals the rate of interest, then bj=0 in all time periods, and λ  is 
constant over time and equal to 0λ . In praxis, ρ will vary across individuals and across 
time and will often deviate from the rate of interest. 
 
3 Data 
Data used for this paper is from Consumption and Activities Mail Survey (CAMS) 
which is part of the US Health and Retirement Study (HRS). CAMS has information 
about time use and consumption for the elderly population in 2001 and 2003. The 
CAMS 2001 and 2003 data form a panel of about 3000 individuals, and information 
from the CAMS panel has been linked to background information from the HRS survey. 
The CAMS data is described in Hurd and Rohwedder (2003, 2005). Further 
documentation on the CAMS and HRS data can be found at the Health and Retirement 
Study webpage (http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu ). 
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The consumption part of the survey asks about recalled consumption of an extensive 
list of consumption items. The respondent could choose to report consumption per week, 
per month of per year and indicate the chosen reporting period for each consumption 
item. Total consumption and consumption in the main consumption groups in CAMS is 
comparable to consumption of the same age group in the US Consumer Expenditure 
Survey (CEX), cf. Hurd and Rohwedder (2005). One of the problems with expenditure 
information based on recall questions is that it seems to be very noisy; see Browning, 
Crossley and Weber (2003) for a discussion. 
CAMS’s time use information is based on respondents’ recalled time use over the 
last week or month, depending on the character of the activity. Previous analyses of time 
use observe that so-called “stylized” time use surveys where respondents are asked about 
their “normal” or recalled time use have a lower variance than time use information 
based on a diary. On the other hand, time use diaries generally give better estimates of 
the means of time use. See Juster and Stafford (1991) for a discussion. The questions in 
the time use survey have been asked to allow for double activities. Thus, the respondents 
were asked to assess their time spent on different activities, irrespective of whether these 
activities were carried out as the single activity at the time or if the respondent 
performed several activities. For example, if the respondent spent one hour ironing while 
at the same time watching the television, the time use at both activities would be counted 
as one hour. The consequence of this survey method is that it is not given that the sum of 
all activities adds up to 24 hours a day. This is a well known picture in “stylized” time-
use surveys. As the theoretical model outlined above builds on a time constraint saying 
that the sum of market work, housework and leisure should equate 24 hours a day, we 
have made the simplifying assumption that one hour spent on M activities is equal to 
1/M effective hours devoted to each activity. In praxis, this means that we have rescaled 
all detailed activities to ensure that the sum of time use per person equates 24 hours a 
day. 
Due to missing information and outliers in many consumption and time-use 
variables, it has been necessary to perform a thorough data cleaning. We started out with 
a balanced panel dataset of around 4300 observations (2179 per year) between 50 and 75 
years of age. Observations with missing information or extreme outliers in both the time 
use part and the consumption part, and observations where the change from 2001 to 
2003 seemed unrealistic (e.g. increases in consumption of more than 200 pct.), were 
dropped. Furthermore, we dropped observations with missing information on one of the 
explanatory variables. Moreover, as a panel data analysis demands information for each 
individual in both years, we had to drop panel observations for an individual/household 
if they were missing or “odd” in one of the years. The result of the data cleaning process 
is a somewhat smaller dataset than the original CAMS data. Consequently, we end up 
with a balanced panel of 1372 observations per year. A little more than half (753) of the 
individuals in this panel had already retired in 2001. A good 600 were not retired in 
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2001, and of these 158 individuals retired between 2001 and 2003, while 461 remained 
not retired in both years. There is a small group of people who “unretire”, i.e. who were 
retired in 2001 but not in 2003. This is not unrealistic. Retirement is often seen as an 
absorbing state since it can be difficult to return to the labour market after retiring, but 
returning to the labour market from retirement is not uncommon.4 But this observation 
could also be due to misreporting in either 2001 or 2003. In this paper, we choose to 
disregard individuals who “unretire”. 
Retirement status is generally based on people’s own reporting. In the CAMS survey 
as well as the HRS, people were asked if they were retired or otherwise.5 The average 
retirement age for the whole sample in our panel dataset is around 62 years, and the 
people who retired in the period 2001-2003 were around the same age on average. 
Figures in the appendix show the distribution of retirement ages for the whole sample 
and for the subset of people who retired in the period 2001-2003. The distributions 
appear to show similar characteristics. 
 
4 Expenditure, time use and ageing 
In the following, we document the general trends of consumption and time use in our 
panel dataset from 2001 and 2003. For comparison with other studies of the retirement-
consumption drop, we focus on food at home and an aggregate of basic consumption 
items which consists of food-at-home, food-out, clothing and leisure expenditures.6 
Data on expenditure is generally collected on a household level. The level of 
consumption is likely to vary depending on whether the household consists of a single 
person, is a married household or a household with children still living at home. As it is 
custom in these types of analyses, we adjust total expenditure for the number of 
household members. As there are obviously economies of scale related to sharing the 
same house and other types of consumption, it is customary to take this into account 
using so-called “equivalence scales”, i.e. correcting consumption by a factor that takes 
                                                 
4 Maestas (2004) analyzed “unretirement” transitions based on HRS data. She found that nearly one-
half of retirees follow a non-traditional retirement path that involves partial retirement and/or retirement. 
Moreover, the unretirement rate observed at least five years after their first retirement was around ¼. 
5 It is not quite clear how homemakers and others not having participated in the labor force throughout 
the working ages have responded to this. Thus, there is a risk that some homemakers report themselves as 
not having retired although they have the age for being retired, while others report themselves of being 
retired, maybe because their husband is retired. 
6 Consumption in the CAMS data consists of 8 main consumption groups: housing (mortgage plus 
rent), utilities (energy, water and telephone), car use (petrol plus repairs/services), health related 
expenditure (excluding health insurance), expenditure on equipment for home and garden (but not for 
repairs/maintenance etc.), food at home, dining out, clothing and equipment for leisure activities 
(including travel expenditure) and other expenditure (gifts, contributions etc.). 
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economies of scale into account. We use the most simple equivalence scale, the square-
root of the number of household members, to adjust for different household sizes.7 
Figure 1 shows cross-sectional evidence from the 2001 and 2003 surveys for food at 
home and basic consumption. In general, we find that basic consumption is lower for the 
older respondents in the survey than for the younger respondents. Moreover, for almost 
all age categories, respondents not being retired have a higher level of basic 
consumption than retired people. The consumption of food at home is higher for the 
non-retired than for the retired, and there is a downward trend in food consumption as 
people age. 
When looking at consumption for the retired and the non-retired groups separately, it 
appears that there is a negative correlation between consumption and age. However, it 
should be emphasized that this is cross-sectional evidence. Thus, when comparing 
consumption across age, we are in fact comparing consumption for different cohorts in 
the population. The CAMS-cohort around the age of 70, who was born in the beginning 
of the 1930’s, has faced other possibilities and living conditions than the CAMS-cohort 
now around the age of 50 who was born in the 1950’s. Moreover, different cohorts 
might have faced different options for intertemporal substitution due to long-term shifts 
in capital markets, interest rates etc. which might have induced them to choose different 
paths of consumption. Figures on total consumption and main consumption groups are 
shown in the appendix. 
 
                                                 
7 Chosing the appropriate equivalence scale is a highly debated issue, cf. Atkinson and Bourguignon 
(2000). One of the problems with the simple equivalence scale adjustment described above is that it does 
not distinguish between extra household members being children or adults. 
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Figure 1: Expenditure through age 
 
The respondents in the CAMS survey were also asked to state their time use on 31 
activities, cf. the list of activities in the appendix. These 31 activities have been 
aggregated into 6 major activity groups: leisure, housework, market work, personal care, 
transport & communications (including computer time) and other activities (including 
volunteer work, helping out friends and family etc.).  
Comparing time use for retired people and non-retired people, it appears that the time 
spent on the 6 main activities is very different between these two groups, cf. table 1. Not 
surprisingly, the level of market work is significantly higher for people still in the labor 
market (some retired people still have a low number of working hours), whereas people 
who have retired spend a significant number of extra hours in leisure or with housework. 
We also find that the time spent on personal care is somewhat higher for people who 
have retired, and the same is true for time spent in other activities (which is a small 
number of hours). On the other hand, people who have not retired spend more time 
traveling/commuting or communicating (using computer).  
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 All Non-retired Retired 
Leisure 8.2 7.0 9.2 
Personal care incl. sleep 8.1 7.4 8.6 
Housework 3.1 2.5 3.5 
Travel and communication 1.7 2.0 1.3 
Marketwork 2.2 4.4 0.5 
Other activities 0.8 0.7 0.8 
No. of households 1372 619 753 
 
Table 1: Time use in hours per day in 2001 
 
Figure 2 shows time use over age for the retired and the non-retired group. The level 
of market work is at a fairly constant level over the age groups. Housework, which is at 
a relatively high level for the retired people, is constant for the group of retired, but 
slowly declines with age for the non-retired. Tables of time use over time for the other 
time use categories can be found in the appendix. Time spent on personal care including 
sleep increases with age, whereas time spent on transport & communications and other 
activities decreases over time for both retired and non-retired. Again, it should be noted 
that we are looking at cross-section data where cohort effects are present. Thus, time 
spent on computer use is probably affected by the fact that people in their 50’s are much 
more likely to have learned to use a computer than people in the 70’s. In general, these 
trends in time use over age confirm prior analyses, cf. Hill (1985) and Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (2004).  
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Figure 2: Time-use through age 
 
All in all, we find that expenditure gradually decreases as people age, and that the 
level of consumption is lower for retired than for non-retired across all ages. 
Furthermore, we see that retired people have more time for household production and 
leisure. Thus, it seems obvious to conclude that retired people compensate for the loss of 
consumption of market products with a higher level of consumption of household 
production and a higher level of leisure.  
 
Individual heterogeneity in preferences and 
productivity 
The different allocations across individuals may reflect differences in productivity in 
the labor market and in household production, different preferences for expenditure 
versus leisure, different constraints in the labor and product markets, and different 
marginal utilities of wealth. People with a relatively high preference for market goods 
compared to leisure or goods produced in household production will tend to postpone 
retirement. Along the same lines, individuals with a relatively high productivity in 
household production compared to their productivity in the market may retire relatively 
early. Thus, people who are productive at home, good at do-it-yourself work, cooking 
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etc. may be more interested in early retirement, giving up consumption of market goods 
for household production goods. On the other hand, people who are not productive in 
household production might hold on to their jobs in the labor market for a longer period, 
thereby reducing a possible consumption drop at retirement. These individual specific 
differences affect people’s decision on when to retire, their willingness to accept a 
decline in consumption in order to achieve an increase in leisure, and their desire to 
swap hours worked in the labor market with hours worked at home.  
In general, preferences are often assumed to be constant over time for the individual. 
This is a convenient generalization. However, the individual utility function may change 
over the life time as priorities and needs may change with age.8 Moreover, productivity 
in market work versus in household production may change over the life. Most wage 
regression studies find a positive relationship between age/experience and 
wages/productivity, but it is not yet clear what happens to productivity when people 
approach and cross their retirement age. Due to depreciation of human capital, changes 
in work processes from technological change and gradual detriments in individual health 
one might expect that productivity is declining from a certain age. This hypothesis is 
substantiated by the fact that the unemployment risk is usually higher for people above 
55 than for middle aged people. Thus, it is likely that the relative productivity of market 
work versus housework may change over time. For example, people may find that their 
market productivity degrades faster than their productivity in household production, or 
vice versa. This in turn might affect their retirement decision and their preferences for 
market goods versus household production goods. 
Our theoretical model allows for individual differences in the marginal utility of 
wealth. We expect that people who are well off (high wealth) will have a relatively 
lower marginal utility of wealth than people who have less wealth. Data shows a small 
negative correlation between retirement age and total wealth. This implies that people 
who retire early have a relatively higher wealth than people who retire later in life. 
                                                 
8 For example, while more than 90 percent of the respondents interviewed in HRS 2002 answered that 
they enjoyed going to work, it was also the case that 60 percent of the respondents who had (recently) 
retired reported that they were very satisfied with retirement, while another 33 percent report that they 
were moderately satisfied, and more than 45 percent told that their retirement years have been better than 
pre-retirement. Among the most important reasons for why people retire, almost 30 percent reported that 
they found it very important to have time to do other things; more than 35 percent wanted to spend more 
time with their family. Around one third of the respondents mention poor health as a very or moderately 
important reason for retiring, while only 6 percent said that not liking their work was a very important 
reason for them to retire. Moreover, people mention that the advantages to retirement is “being one’s own 
boss”, “taking it easy” and the opportunity to travel. Moreover, not being productive does not seem to 
worry the majority of the respondents at all, while the risk of illness/disability and not having enough 
income concerns around half of the respondents. A natural interpretation of these observations is that 
people’s work life and retirement life are seen as two independent phases in life. The fact that people seem 
to enjoy working and later enjoy not working might reflect that preferences for consumption versus leisure 
change gradually as people age. Whether this change over life is truly “exogenous” or reflects that 
preferences are shaped by circumstances/constraints is hard to tell. One could interpret preferences as 
being endogenous, i.e. “you learn to love what you can get instead of getting what you love”. See Hill and 
Juster (1985) for a discussion. 
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5 Empirical model 
Above, we argued that there may be individual differences in preferences for 
consumption of market goods versus household produced goods or leisure. In order to 
derive an empirical model for our analysis of the joint decision of the allocation of time 
and consumption, we add some more structure to the general lifecycle model introduced 
earlier by assuming that utility is separable in its arguments, market consumption (cmt), 
output from household production (cnt), and (pure) leisure (lt). For simplicity, we assume 
that utility can be expressed in the form of an add-log utility function for each 
individual/household, i: 
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where jitθ , j=m,n,l denote individual/household i’s preference/taste parameters for 
market goods, household produced goods and leisure, respectively, at time t. 
Furthermore, we assume that the productivity in household production is constant, thus 
ruling out economies of scale in household production. Exploiting the first-order 
conditions derived previously, and using the time-constraint Hlhh itimt ≡++ int , we can 
derive two equations for the demand for consumption and household production: 
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Thus, individual i’s demand for market products at time t is positively correlated 
with individual i’s preference for market products and/or productivity in market 
production, and negatively correlated with i’s marginal utility of wealth at t. These 
preferences may change over time/age. For example, people who approach the “usual” 
retirement age are usually well settled in their homes, costs on mortgages are decreasing 
or have stopped altogether etc., and this may induce them to focus more on other sources 
of well-being, as discussed above. In addition, preferences may depend on the 
composition of the household. As people age, they often cease to have financial 
responsibilities for supporting children. Moreover, they might have got grandchildren 
etc. with whom they want to spend more time. Another important source of individual 
heterogeneity is individual differences in productivity in the market versus productivity 
in the household. These individual productivities may also vary over the life cycle.  
The preference factors for consumption of market goods and household production, 
ln mitθ  and ln nitθ , are specified by a set of individual specific observables as age, gender, 
marital status, household size, educational status etc., all captured by Xit. As in Zeldes 
(1989), we further assume that preferences depend on unobserved individual/household 
characteristics, time effects, and residual effects (a random term). 
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The marginal utility of wealth, itλ , can be expressed by a stochastic process, cf. 
Blundell and MaCurdy (1999): 
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With this specification, the marginal utility of wealth can be captured by an 
individual fixed effect 0λ plus a function of age plus a random error reflecting 
expectational error up to the current period. 
As noted in section 2, the standard life cycle model applies to an individual with a 
positive labour supply, i.e. an interior solution. In the following we suggest a small 
adaptation to this formulation. Since an individual who is retired has zero market wage, 
we are in a corner solution. A convenient way to incorporate this is to drop the wage 
measure in the housework equation and put in dummies for retirement status, R, in both 
equations. We then end up with the following empirical specification of the model: 
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The idiosyncratic error terms, umit and unit, reflect the sum of the effects of 1) the 
random error from the stochastic process for itλ  2) random error in the preference 
specification, and 3) random error in the optimization of consumption and household 
production, respectively. We assume that the idiosyncratic error terms are uncorrelated 
with retirement status R as well as with the other explanatory variables captured by X. 
The individual specific unobserved heterogeneity factors, miη  and niη , capture 1) 
unobserved heterogeneity in the marginal utility of wealth, 0iλ , and 2) unobserved 
heterogeneity in preferences for market production versus household production. We 
control for age through Xit. The age parameter captures effects of age working through 
two channels: 1) preferences, and 2) the marginal utility of wealth.  
A comparison between the estimates found by using cross-sectional data with the 
estimates found by exploiting the panel dimension of the data gives us an indication of 
the extent of unmeasured individual heterogeneity. In a cross-section estimation by e.g. 
OLS, the empirical model does not take explicit account of the unobserved individual 
factors, iη , which are instead treated as part of a combined error term. We assume that iη  
captures individual specific unobserved factors like preferences for consumption of 
market goods versus home produced goods, productivity in market work versus 
productivity in household production, and marginal utility of wealth. These 
characteristics may vary across otherwise comparable households. If iη  is uncorrelated 
with the explanatory variables in X and R, then OLS produces consistent estimates. 
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However, if iη  is correlated with e.g. the retirement status, Ri, the OLS-estimates of 2α  
and 2β  are biased and inconsistent. This could be the case if the unobserved individual 
characteristics reflected by iη  tend to enhance the chance of choosing retirement at an 
early age. Performing OLS-regression in the equations above would then result in a 
biased and inconsistent estimate of the effect of R. The different sources of unobserved 
heterogeneity iη  result in correlation between iη  and Ri of different signs.  
On the one hand, we might ex ante expect that iη  is negatively correlated with Ri 
through the following two channels: 
• Relatively higher preferences for consumption of market goods rather than other 
sources of utility tend to keep people in labor market (low Ri).  
• Higher productivity in market work rather than housework tends to postpone 
retirement (low Ri).  
On the other hand, we may ex ante expect that iη  is positively correlated with Ri 
because: 
• A person with relatively low 0iλ  (high iη , high wealth), will retire earlier than 
otherwise (high Ri).  
If the correlation between iη  and Ri is negative, the OLS-estimates of the effect of 
retirement status R in both equations will be numerically larger than the “true” effect of 
retirement, 2α  and 2β . On the other hand, if the correlation between iη  and Ri is positive, 
then the OLS-estimates will be numerically smaller than “true” effects of retirement, 2α  
and 2β . Whichever effects dominate is an empirical question. 
 
6 Panel data estimation 
Below, we compare cross-sectional evidence with longitudinal evidence from the 
CAMS 2001-2003 panel on consumption and time use. We perform our analysis on 
food-at-home and on our aggregate of basic consumption (food-at-home, food-out and 
clothing). In cases where we do not expect any correlation between the unobserved 
effect and the explanatory variables, the random effects approach is the natural choice of 
panel data estimator. However, as argued above, we expect the unobserved 
heterogeneity iη  to be correlated with retirement Ri. Moreover, unobserved 
heterogeneity in relative preferences and relative productivity is likely to be correlated 
with other individual and household characteristics, captured in Xi. This speaks in favour 
of using a fixed effects approach which allows correlation between the unobserved effect 
and the explanatory variables. The fixed effects approach does not allow the inclusion of 
time-constant explanatory variables in Xit. The problem is that time-demeaning in the 
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context of the fixed effects approach generates collinearity between the time-constant 
explanatory variables and the unobserved heterogeneity effect. The time-constant 
explanatory variables are not identified as they are perfectly correlated with the 
unobserved heterogeneity. In our study, the parameter of primary interest is the 
coefficient to R, which changes over time. The fixed effects approach allows us to 
interpret the coefficient to R.9  
 
 OLS 
Random effects 
panel data estimator 
Fixed effects 
panel data estimator 
Retired -0.062 (-2.42) -0.037 (-1.34) 0.054 (1.14) 
Age -0.006 (-3.01) -0.007 (-2.93) -0.034 (-4.37) 
D partner 0.158 (6.94) 0.136 (5.07) -0.215 (-2.76) 
Education, years 0.038 (9.51) 0.042 (8.5) -  
Wealth 0.124 (7.87) 0.086 (5.13) -0.028 (-1.06) 
Dummy d2003 -0.041 (-1.96) -0.042 (-2.73)   
Constant 8.187 (59.45) 8.223 (49.6) 10.663 (21.8) 
R2 0.12  0.12  0.00  
N 2604  2604  2604  
Note: t-values in parentheses. 
 
Table 2: Estimation results, log consumption of basic commodities 
 
The OLS regressions indicate that retirement status has a significant effect on log 
basic expenditure in the first column. Obviously, retirement status and age are strongly 
correlated, but both show up significant in the OLS regression. Having a partner also has 
a positive effect on basic consumption. Since consumption has been corrected for 
equivalent household size, a positive effect from having a partner might indicate either 
that this correction is not adequate or that married households can exploit economies of 
                                                 
9 In cases where the interest lies in the coeffients of the time-constant explanatory variables and where 
there is concern that the unobserved effect is correlated with some explanatory variables, it may be a 
problem to find an appropriate panel data estimator. Random effects will produce inconsistent estimates of 
all parameters. And fixed effects (or first differencing which produces equal results in a two period 
context) eliminates the time-constant variables. In cases when all time-constant variables are assumed to 
be uncorrelated with the unobserved effect while the time-varying variables are possibly correlated with 
the unobserved effect, a Hausman and Taylor type model may be an alternative, cf. Wooldridge (2001). 
The Hausman and Taylor (1981) estimator fits random-effects models in which some of the covariates are 
correlated with the unobserved individual-level random effect. The idea is that there is a subset of the 
time-invariant and time-varying explanatory variables that can be assumed a priori to be uncorrelated with 
the unobserved heterogeneity effects. This subset of explanatory variables can be used as instruments in 
defining a number of moment conditions that can be solved using a GMM approach. Applying the 
Hausman and Taylor estimator on our data resulted in a parameter estimate for retirement very close to the 
fixed effects estimate.  
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scale through e.g. fixed costs as housing, cars etc. and therefore have more money left 
for expenditure on variable consumption items. An alternative interpretation might be 
that having a partner may be correlated with a higher employment probability, higher 
income etc. because these characteristics are considered attractive elements in the 
marriage market. Finally, having a partner is negatively correlated with age in the age 
group above 50. 
Moving from cross-sectional analysis to panel analysis makes the effect of retirement 
somewhat smaller and the effect of age larger. The random effects estimation results are 
shown in column 2 and the fixed effects results in column 3. In particular, in the fixed 
effects approach, the effect of retirement is small and insignificant. The Hausman test 
verified that the fixed effects estimates are significantly different from the random 
effects estimates and the OLS estimates, respectively. This is interpreted as evidence in 
favourr of the fixed effects assumption that the unobserved individual specific effects are 
correlated with the explanatory variables.10  
The same regressions were performed for the consumption of food-at-home, cf. table 
3. The estimates and test results for the food-at-home equation are in line with the results 
for basic commodities above. The smaller effect of retirement in the panel data setting is 
in accordance with the idea that unobserved heterogeneity in preferences/productivity in 
market production versus household production will lead to a (numerically) upward bias 
in the OLS estimates. A number of explanations could be offered for this. One obvious 
explanation is that the OLS-analysis only catches the cross-sectional variance in 
expenditure. Expenditure differences between retired and non-retired are due to the fact 
that different types of individuals choose different timing of retirement due to different 
preferences for leisure versus consumption or different productivities in housework 
versus market work.  
                                                 
10 We should however be aware of the usual caveats when using the Hausman test. First, that strict 
exogeneity is maintained under the null and the alternative. Consequently, correlation between the 
explanatory variables and the idiosyncratic errors within and across time periods causes both fixed effects 
and random effects to be inconsistent. Secondly, the Hausman test is implemented assuming that the 
conditional variances are constant and the conditional covariances are zero when using the random effects 
estimator. If this is not the case, the standard Hausman test may fail. 
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 OLS 
Random effects 
panel estimator 
Fixed effects 
panel estimator 
Retired -0.065 (-2.11) -0.048 (-1.44) 0.073 (1.09) 
Age -0.003 (-1.24) -0.004 (-1.36) -0.056 (-5.22) 
D partner 0.158 (5.76) 0.151 (4.85) -0.057 (-0.53) 
Education in years 0.020 (4.03) 0.021 (3.66) -  
Wealth 0.047 (2.48) 0.039 (1.92) -0.009 (-0.25) 
Dummy for 2003 -0.091 (-3.58) -0.092 (-4.35) -  
Constant 7.736 (46.44) 7.771 (40.82) 11.431 (16.71) 
R2 0.04  0.04  0.04  
N 2604  2604  2604  
Note: t-values in parentheses. 
 
Table 3: Estimation results, log consumption of food at home 
 
An alternative explanation could be that people having retired in the time span 2001-
2003 might not have adjusted their consumption levels, yet. Thus, the fact that we do not 
observe as large an effect of changes in retirement status in the panel data estimations 
might simply reflect that the consumption drop is not reflected in the 2003 data. It is 
difficult to reject this argument since we do not have more recent data. It would 
undoubtedly have been nice to have a longer panel. However, other analyses of the 
consumption drop seem to point to the fact that the drop is experienced very close to the 
retirement date and that people adjust their consumption upwards later, cf. Hurd and 
Rohwedder (2003) and Banks, Blundell and Tanner (1998). Banks, Blundell and Tanner 
(1998) find that consumption growth drops around retirement but returns to a somewhat 
higher level a couple of years after retirement. Hurd and Rohwedder (2003) compare 
survey information on people’s expected consumption drop around retirement with their 
information on actual consumption change around retirement and conclude that people 
are more pessimistic about retirement’s effects on their consumption levels than what 
appears to be necessary. 
It could also be argued that the people who chose to retire between 2001 and 2003 
did not retire following a planned retirement decision, but rather retired following an 
unemployment period and unsuccessful job search. This would probably imply that they 
had already adjusted their consumption to a lower level of income prior to retirement. 
Other studies find evidence of such an effect, cf. Christensen (2005) or Smith (2005). 
Due to the relatively small group (around 160 people) changing retirement status 
between 2001 and 2003 in our data set, we have not tried to subdivide this group further.  
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 OLS 
Random effects 
panel estimator 
Fixed effects 
panel estimator 
Retired 0.430 (11.92) 0.413 (10.60) 0.300 (3.84) 
Age -0.002 (-0.68) -0.001 (-0.39) -0.037 (-2.89) 
Dummy woman 0.512 (16.44) 0.510 (14.19) -  
Dummy partner -0.004 (-0.11) -0.011 (-0.31) -0.244 (-1.91) 
Education in years -0.032 (-5.67) -0.032 (-4.87) -  
Wealth 0.014 (0.64) 0.007 (0.30) -0.035 (-0.81) 
Dummy 2003 -0.082 (-2.77) -0.082 (-3.33) -  
Constant 2.863 (14.35) 2.831 (12.43) 5.198 (6.47) 
R2 0.17  0.17  0.01  
N 2604  2604  2604  
Note: t-values in parentheses. 
 
Table 4: Estimation results, log household production 
 
From the estimates in table 4, columns 1-3, we find that the housework increases by 
around 40 pct. when retirement status changes from 0 to 1. Being a woman has a large 
positive and significant effect on the amount of housework, and the level of education 
affects housework negatively. Age as well as having a partner has a negative and 
significant effect on the demand for housework in the fixed effects estimates. Comparing 
the OLS estimates in column 1 with the panel data estimates in columns 2-3, we see that 
the effect of retirement status is larger for the cross-section estimates than for the panel 
estimates. Again, we interpret this as evidence in favour of the idea that unobserved 
heterogeneity in preferences for consuming the output from household production and in 
individual productivity in household production are correlated with the decision to retire. 
Therefore, the OLS estimates are upward biased and inconsistent. The Hausman test 
rejects the null that the fixed effects estimates are the same as the random effects and the 
OLS estimates. This is evidence in favour of the fixed effects assumptions that the 
unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with the explanatory variables. We find a 
correlation between the error terms in the consumption equations and the housework 
equation of around 0.06. This may suggest estimating the consumption and the 
household production equations simultaneously. We leave this challenge for future 
analysis. 
In the following discussion of panel data versus cross-sectional evidence (OLS) we 
shall assume that the functional form above is correct. It is important to note that panel 
estimates produce precise estimates of the effect of retirement only if: 
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a) “Enough” people change retirement (R) status over the period. 
b) The unobserved individual specific effects ( iη ) really are fixed over time. 
c) The change in retirement status is exogenous. 
 
Assumption (a) is a crucial assumption as it is not possible to identify any effects of 
R in the panel data context if R does not change. 8 percent of the sample - around 160 
people – changed status between 2001 and 2003. In a statistical context, this is not a 
large number of observations and may be an explanation of why the effects of changes 
in retirement status were insignificant in at some of the panel regressions. The CAMS 
survey will be updated with a 2005 wave some time in 2006. Adding a new wave will 
probably enhance the panel data quality and improve the reliability and statistical 
significance of the effects analyzed. 
 Assumption (b) also deserves some attention. It is highly probable that people’s 
preferences for consumption versus leisure change as they age. On the productivity side, 
people’s productivity is likely to decline with age, and this might affect their market 
productivity more than their productivity in household production. This is explicitly 
reflected in our modeling of individual preferences as a function of observables 
including age. 
Assumption (c) – that the change in R is exogenous – can obviously be challenged. 
Previous studies on the retirement decision, cf. Gustman and Steinmeier (1986), Rust 
and Pheelan (1997) etc., suggest that people’s timing of retirement depends on a number 
of factors, including the level of income compensation upon retirement. Consequently, it 
is highly likely that people postpone retirement depending on their anticipated 
consumption change. The decision to retire is taken under numerous uncertainties, i.e. 
changes in professional and marital status, risk of illness, changes in tastes, retirement 
systems etc. We will investigate this issue further below. 
Unobserved heterogeneity is only one type of problem. Another problem which is 
probably also relevant in the context of the CAMS dataset is measurement error. The 
CAMS data is subject to measurement error in consumption and time use, as discussed 
in the data section. Consumption and time use are left-hand side variables in our 
analysis, and under the classical errors-in-variables assumption that the measurement 
error is uncorrelated with the independent variables, measurement error has no effect on 
the statistical properties of OLS but may lead to larger standard errors, cf. Wooldridge 
(2002). More importantly, the indicator for retirement status may be subject to 
measurement error. In the data, retirement status is determined by respondents’ own 
information about whether they are retired. Previous analyses show that people’s 
perception of whether and when they have retired can vary. For example, some people 
who have been outside the labor force for most of their careers as homemakers will 
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report that they are retired, others may not, perhaps depending on the retirement status of 
their spouse. People who are unemployed might report to have retired, and others might 
report that they are unemployed while they effectively are not active in job seeking 
anymore. And others again have effectively withdrawn from the labor force, but do not 
consider themselves retired and do not claim social security pensions or other pensioners 
benefit.  
In the case of a classic measurement error of a continuous right-hand side variable 
where the error is uncorrelated with the true indicator (but correlated with the observed), 
we know that the estimated parameter will always underestimate the true parameter, and 
that the attenuation bias depends on the variance of the measurement error and the 
variance of the unobserved “true” indicator. In general, the attenuation bias is worse in 
the panel setting. In a model where the right-hand side variable in question is binary as it 
is the case with retirement, the standard assumption about the classical measurement 
error being uncorrelated with the true value of R no longer holds. For example, if the 
true value of R is 1 and the observed value is 0, the measurement error is always -1, and 
vice-versa, and the measurement error is then correlated with the true value of R. To 
conclude, there are two types of bias – selection (unobserved heterogeneity) and 
measurement error – which affect the parameter estimates in opposite directions. The 
direction of the net effect is unknown. 
 
7 Endogeneity in the retirement decision 
In the previous analysis, retirement was treated as an exogenous variable. Thus, we 
assumed that the retirement decision is unaffected by the level of or anticipated changes 
in consumption or housework, respectively. However, we can think of several examples 
where people’s retirement decision is linked to anticipated changes in consumption or 
housework. For example, consider two otherwise identical people who have different 
expectations about their consumption drop at retirement due to e.g. unobserved 
differences in pension schemes. If the person who anticipates the highest drop decides to 
postpone retirement in order to smooth consumption, then we may underestimate the 
costs of retirement in the form of a consumption drop. Another example is two people 
with the same individual and household characteristics, but with different costs (in terms 
of expenses or time) of going to work. We may see that the person with the higher costs 
of going to work will choose to retire sooner than the person with the lower costs. 
Moreover, the drop in expenditures will be higher for the person with the higher costs of 
going to work even though this extra drop does not result in a drop in well-being. 
Previous studies on the retirement decision, cf. Gustman and Steinmeier (1986) or 
Rust and Pheelan (1997), suggest that people’s timing of retirement depends on a 
number of factors, including the level of income compensation upon retirement. Thus, it 
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is very likely that people postpone retirement depending on their anticipated 
consumption decrease.11 Now, the decision to retire is taken under numerous 
uncertainties, i.e. changes in professional and married life, risk of illness, changes in 
taste, retirement systems etc. We will investigate this issue further below. 
With retirement status R being a binary and possibly endogenous explanatory 
variable, we can profit from the methodology of estimating Average Treatment Effects 
(ATE), cf. Wooldridge (2001). The central problem faced in the treatment effects 
literature is that for each individual we observe either the outcome with treatment (y1) or 
the outcome without treatment, the so-called “counter-factual” (y0), but since an 
individual cannot simultaneously be in both stages, we cannot observe both outcomes. If 
the treatment, retirement, was randomly assigned, estimation of the average treatment 
effect would simply be the difference between the average outcome of the treated and 
the average outcome of the untreated. However, for retirement (as for many other 
treatments) randomization is infeasible. Instead, individuals determine themselves 
whether they want to retire. And this decision is often related to the benefits/costs of 
treatment. Consequently, there is self-selection into retirement. 
The parameter of interest is the difference in outcomes with and without treatment, 
y1- y0. In many contexts, the main measure of interest is the average treatment effect 
(ATE), i.e. the expected effect of treatment on a randomly drawn person from the 
population: 
 1 0( )ATE E y y≡ −  (10) 
The treatment effects literature offers some suggestions to solve the problem of 
finding the counterfactual effect. The idea is that by conditioning on observables, X, we 
can eliminate the bias that arises from self-selection into retirement. Broadly speaking, 
there are two main types of treatment effects estimators. One group of estimators is 
based on the assumption of ignorability-of-the-treatment conditional on the covariates. 
In our context, this assumption implies that, conditional on observables X, retirement R 
and (y0, y1) are independent: 12 
                                                 
11 As an illustration, we performed a simple probit of non-retired citizens choice to retire. If not retired 
in 2001, CAMS asked what their expected change in consumption would be if they retired right now. In 
CAMS 2001, non-retired respondents were asked if they expected that their consumption would increase, 
decrease or stay the same if they should choose to retire, and by how much their consumption would 
change in percent. Controlling for age, gender, partner and health change, we find that people’s 
expectations about their consumption change upon retirement is significantly correlated with their 
probability to retire. One possible explanation could be that people use the timing of retirement to smooth 
consumption over time, thus postponing retirement until the decline in consumption is not too large.  
12 The interpretation of the conditional independence assumption is that two people with the same 
observables X, one being retired and the other not being retired, the outcome of the retired person, had 
he/she not retired, is the same as the outcome for the non-retired person. Likewise, again holding X fixed, 
the outcome of the non-retired person, had he/she retired, is the same as the outcome for the retired person. 
Thus, conditional on X, we can eliminate the selection bias. The conditional independence assumption 
always holds if retirement is a deterministic function of X, in which case we have so-called “selection on 
observables”. 
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 1 0( , ) |y y R X⊥  (11) 
However, people’s timing of retirement may be linked to anticipated changes in 
consumption or housework upon retirement. Thus, people select into the treatment 
(retirement) based on expectations about the benefits and costs of the treatment. The 
instrumental variable approach is useful when we suspect failure of the ignorability-of-
treatment assumption. The idea is that the instrument should predict treatment after 
partialing out controls. Furthermore, the instrument should be unrelated to unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
We can predict retirement by performing an estimation of the retirement choice 
based on predetermined individual or household observables. In order to predict each 
person’s retirement status in 2001 and 2003, we performed a probit with retirement 
status as the dependent variable and a number of characteristics known prior to these 
years as age in the form of age dummies, gender, years of education etc. captured in the 
matrix X. The probability of a person being retired takes the following form: 
 ( ) ( 1| ) ( )p X P R X X β≡ = = Φ  (12) 
The results are presented in table 5 below. The estimation is based on pooled 
observations from 2001 and 2003. The pseudo-R2 of the estimation is 0.24. On average, 
the probit model seems to fit the data quite well: the observed average propensity to 
retire and the predicted probability of retirement are both around 0.61. The dummies for 
age 62 and 65 confirm the peaks in retirement found in other studies. These are due to 
specific institutional settings in the US, especially connected to the social security 
system. The probit estimation verifies that non-linearities related to age are important in 
the identification of the timing of retirement. 
The IV approach has been used in previous analyses to reduce the impact of 
unexpected events such as job loss or disability in the retirement decision. Some of these 
studies have also used non-linearities in age as instrument for retirement, recognizing 
that the probability of retirement is higher at certain ages when workers become eligible 
for government retirement benefits. Haider and Stevens (2004) point to two potential 
problems when choosing non-linearities in age as an instrument for retirement. First, 
older households generally reduce their consumption as they age, as we show in section 
4. The rapid change in retirement status by age may be correlated with changes in the 
marginal utility of consumption at these ages. If these changes are not captured by the 
control variables but are correlated with the non-linearity in age, then the exclusion 
restriction is violated and age is an inappropriate instrument. Second, when using age as 
an instrument, it is implicitly assumed that the relationship between age and actual 
retirement is the same as the relationship between age and expected retirement. 
However, the fraction of workers who retire unexpectedly may vary systematically by 
age. Haider and Stevens (2004) show that this is not the case and conclude that age is not 
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a valid instrument for expected retirement. Instead, they use anticipated retirement time 
as an instrument, as discussed in the introduction to this paper. 
On the other hand, we argue that consumption is correlated with age measured as a 
continous variable, while age dummies do not contribute to the identification of 
consumption. Including age dummies in our consumption equations and household 
production equations above instead of age as a continous variable resulted in 
insignificant age dummies. 
 
 Coefficient t-statistic 
Dummy for woman 0.029 0.49 
Education in years -0.026 -2.49 
Dummy for 2003 0.115 1.99 
Dummy for age 51 -0.175 -0.31 
Dummy for age 52 -0.179 -0.33 
Dummy for age 53 -0.278 -0.55 
Dummy for age 54 0.029 0.06 
Dummy for age 55 -0.189 -0.39 
Dummy for age 56 0.163 0.35 
Dummy for age 57 -0.009 -0.02 
Dummy for age 58 0.181 0.38 
Dummy for age 59 0.141 0.3 
Dummy for age 60 0.590 1.26 
Dummy for age 61 0.514 1.1 
Dummy for age 62 1.081 2.32 
Dummy for age 63 1.151 2.48 
Dummy for age 64 1.256 2.68 
Dummy for age 65 1.510 3.23 
Dummy for age 66 1.479 3.15 
Dummy for age 67 1.561 3.33 
Dummy for age 68 1.694 3.6 
Dummy for age 69 1.822 3.84 
Dummy for age over 70 2.297 4.97 
Constant -0.528 -1.11 
Note: t-values in parentheses. 
 
Table 5: Probit estimation for retirement status 
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The predicted probabilities from the probit estimation are therefore used as 
instruments in the following. The estimations are performed using the fixed effects panel 
data estimator with instruments (xtivreg in Stata), cf. Wooldridge (2001). We estimate 
the usual equations by IV with retirement status instrumented. Instruments are 1, Xi and 
predicted probabilities, ˆ ip . A couple of alternative panel IV estimations were also 
implemented, see Wooldridge (2001) for a discussion of different procedures. One of 
these was to extend the above procedure to include the explanatory variables for 
retirement interacted with the deviation between the other explanatory variables and 
their respective means, i.e. *( )i iR X X− . Thus, the equations were estimated by IV with 
retirement status instrumented and instruments 1, Xi, ˆ ip , and ˆ *( )i ip X X−  (predicted 
retirement probabilities interacted with deviations from the means of Xi. The IV 
procedure was also extended with normal densities ˆˆ ( )i i iX bφ φ=  of the index function 
(latent variable function) in the estimation equation (and as an instrument). Finally, we 
ran a fixed effects regression on 1, Ri, Xi, *( )i iR X X− , ˆ ˆ* /i i iR φ Φ , 
ˆ ˆ(1 )* /(1 )i i iR φ− −Φ . This is a fixed effects version of “switching regressions” due to 
Heckman, see Vella and Verbeek (1999).  The results for consumption of food-at-home 
and household production when using the first of the IV procedures above and the 
“switching regressions” procedure are shown in tables 6-7 below. 
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 Fixed effects IV FE “Switching regressions” 
Retired (R) -0.526 (-1.00) -0.218 (-0.85) 
Age -0.025 (-0.82) -0.038 (-2.23) 
Dummy for partner -0.015 (-0.13) -0.036 (-0.28) 
Years of education -  -  
Wealth 0.006 (0.14) 0.036 (0.76) 
R*dev(age) -  0.009 (0.41) 
R*dev(partner) -  -0.031 (-0.26) 
R*dev(education) -  -0.009 (-0.40) 
R*dev(wealth) -  -0.093 (-1.44) 
ˆ ˆ* /i i iR φ Φ  -  0.365 (1.97) 
ˆ ˆ(1 )* /(1 )i i iR φ− −Φ  -  -0.021 (-0.13) 
Dummy 2003 -  -  
Constant 9.731 (5.94) 10.282 (10.39) 
N 2604  2604  
Note: t-values in parentheses. 
 
Table 6: Consumption of food-at-home, fixed effects instrumental variable approach 
 
Using predicted retirement as instrument in the consumption equations results in 
somewhat higher estimates for the effect of retirement status on consumption than the 
fixed effects estimations in tables 2 and 3. Since the results are insignificant regarding 
the effect of retirement, one should be cautious when interpreting the results. One 
careful interpretation could be that a prediction of retirement status solely based on 
predetermined household and personal characteristics obviously does not take individual 
or personal characteristics related to different time preference rates, risk aversion etc. 
into account. Thus, when we “force” people to retire based on their observed 
characteristics, the decline in consumption is somewhat higher than the observed decline 
based on realized behaviour. This suggests that people tend to smooth consumption with 
the timing of their retirement decision. Table 7 shows that the IV estimates for the 
housework equation are somewhat smaller (and insignificant) than the fixed effects 
estimates that we presented in table 4. 
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 Fixed effects IV FE “Switching regressions” 
Retired (R) 0.441 (0.74) 0.136 (0.45) 
Age -0.044 (-1.30) -0.035 (-1.74) 
Dummy for woman -  -  
Dummy for partner -0.254 (-1.89) -0.246 (-1.62) 
Years of education -  -  
Wealth -0.039 (-0.84) -0.056 (-0.99) 
R*dev(age) -  -0.050 (-2.04) 
R*dev(partner) -  -0.157 (-1.01) 
R*dev(education) -  -0.006 (-0.04) 
R*dev(woman) -  0.012 (0.45) 
R*dev(wealth) -  0.044 (0.57) 
ˆ ˆ* /i i iR φ Φ  -  -0.107 (-0.49) 
ˆ ˆ(1 )* /(1 )i i iR φ− −Φ  -  -0.187 (-0.93) 
Dummy for 2003 -  -  
Constant 5.600 (3.00) 5.337 (4.59) 
N 2604  2604  
Note: t-values in parentheses. 
 
Table 7: Housework equation, fixed effects instrumental variable approach 
 
8 Conclusion 
The main purpose of this paper is to explore the role of unobserved individual 
heterogeneity for the effects of retirement on consumption and household production. 
We argue that there are three major sources of individual heterogeneity: 1) heterogeneity 
in preferences for consumption versus leisure and household production, 2) 
heterogeneity in productivity in market work versus housework, and 3) heterogeneity in 
the marginal utility of wealth. The unobserved individual heterogeneity is likely to be 
correlated with the retirement decision. Thus, people with relatively high preferences for 
leisure or the output from household production or with a high productivity in household 
production will tend to retire earlier. And individuals with a relatively low marginal 
utility of wealth will retire relatively early. In that case, OLS-estimates of the effects of 
retirement will tend to be biased and inconsistent. By exploiting the panel dimension of 
our data, we find that the effects of retirement on consumption and household production 
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are numerically smaller in a panel data analysis than when analyzed with OLS. 
Moreover, the fixed effects estimates, which assume some sort of correlation between 
the unobserved heterogeneity and the explanatory variables, are significantly different 
from the random effects estimates, which assume no such correlation. We interpret this 
as evidence in favour of unobserved heterogeneity being an important factor in the 
retirement decision. Moreover, the direction of the bias points at unobserved 
heterogeneity in 1) preferences for household production and leisure versus market 
goods and 2) productivity in household production versus market production as affecting 
the retirement decision. 
Most studies of the retirement-consumption drop assume that the retirement decision 
is exogenous. However, it seems reasonable that people consider their expected changes 
in consumption and time for e.g. household production when they decide when to retire. 
Thus, retirement may be endogenous. We address the endogeneity issue by using a 
treatment effects approach where predicted probabilities of retirement are used as 
instruments for retirement. The IV estimates when applying this method are numerically 
higher than the results under the exogeneity assumption and insignificant. 
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Figure A1: Expenditure on housing and utilities 
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Figure A2: Expenditure on home and garden supplies and car use 
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Figure A3: Expenditure on clothing and recreation 
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Figure A4: Expenditure on food at home and food out 
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Figure A5: Expenditure on health and other expenditure 
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Figure A6: Time use in leisure and personal time (sleep+hygiene etc.) 
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Figure A7: Time use in transport+communication and other activities 
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Figure A8: Retirement age, pooled sample 
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Figure A9: Retirement age, panel 
 
 146
 
Variable Mean Std. Minimum Maximum 
Basic consumption 5124.5 3139.7 1000.0 31324.8 
Food at home 2960.8 1613.2 0.0 9975.5 
Housework 21.8 13.4 0.0 93.4 
Age 63.8 6.0 50.0 75.0 
Woman 0.6 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Partner 0.7 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Number of children 3.4 1.9 0.0 18.0 
No. of residents in household 2.1 1.0 1.0 8.0 
Education in years 13.0 2.7 0.0 17.0 
Household income, US$ 57747.0 65632.4 0.0 744346.1 
 
Table A1: Summary statistics for dataset 
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Var. name in 
panel 
Var. name in 
CAMS 2001 
Var. name in  
CAMS 2003 
Mortgage XB7 B7 B13 
Home/rent insurance XB8 B8 B7 
Property tax XB9 B9 B8 
Rent XB10 B10 B14 
Electricity XB11 B11 B15 
Water XB12 B12 B16 
Heat XB13 B13 B17 
Phone/cable XB14 B14 B18 
Auto finance charges XB15 B15 B19 
Auto insurance XB16 B16 B9 
Health insurance XB17 B17 B11 
House/yard supplies XB18 B18 B20, B22 
Home maintenance XB19 B19 B24, B25 
Food/drink groceries XB20 B20 B36 
Dining out XB21 B21 B37 
Clothing XB22 B22 B26 
Gasoline XB23 B23 B38 
Vehicle service XB24 B24 B10 
Drugs XB25 B25 B28 
Health services XB26 B26 B29 
Medical supplies XB27 B27 B30 
Vacations XB28 B28 B12 
Tickets to movies, sports events etc. XB29 B29 B31 
Hobbies/leisure equipment XB30 B30 B32, B33 
Contributions XB31 B31 B34 
Gifts XB32 B32 B35 
 
Table A2: List of consumption groups in CAMS consumption survey 
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Code Description Observed Activity type* 
A1 WATCH TV weekly L 
A2 READ PAPERS/MAGS weekly L 
A3 READ BOOKS weekly L 
A4 LISTEN MUSIC weekly L 
A5 SLEEP/NAP weekly P 
A6 WALK weekly T 
A7 SPORTS/EXERCISE weekly L 
A8 VISIT IN PERSON weekly L 
A9 PHONE/LETTERS/EMAIL weekly L 
A10 WORK FOR PAY weekly M 
A11 USE COMPUTER weekly T 
A12 PRAY/MEDITATE weekly L 
A13 HOUSE CLEANING weekly H 
A14 WASH/IRON/MEND weekly H 
A15 YARD WORK/GARDEN weekly H 
A16 SHOP/RUN ERRANDS weekly H 
A17 MEALS PREP/CLEAN-UP weekly H 
A18 PERSONAL GROOMING weekly P 
A19 PET CARE weekly L 
A20 SHOW AFFECTION weekly O 
A21 HELP OTHERS monthly O 
A22 VOLUNTEER WORK monthly O 
A23 RELIGIOUS ATTENDANCE monthly L 
A24 ATTEND MEETINGS monthly T 
A25 MONEY MANAGEMENT monthly H 
A26 SELF CARE monthly P 
A27 PLAY CARDS/GAMES/PUZZLES monthly L 
A28 CONCERTS/MOVIES/LECTURES monthly L 
A29 SING/PLAY MUSIC monthly L 
A30 ARTS AND CRAFTS monthly L 
A31 HOME IMPROVEMENTS monthly H 
*) H: Housework, L: Leisure, M: Marketwork, P: Personal care including sleep,  
T: Transport and communication (computer time), O: Other activities. 
 
Table A3: List of activities in CAMS time use survey 
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